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REDISCOVERING CONSERVATISM: BURKEAN
POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
ERNEST YOUNG*
Recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court-particularly the
Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey-have
caused many to question widely-held assumptions about the
meaning of judicial conservatism. In this Article, Ernest Young
argues that the views of modern judicial "conservatives" such as
Judge Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia are antithetical to
classical conservative political theory, as exemplified by the writ-
ings and speeches of the eighteenth-century British philosopher!
politician Edmund Burke. In particular, Mr. Young argues that
strict adherence to the original understanding of the Constitution,
judicial deference to democratic majorities, and formulation of
legal directives as bright-line rules are all inconsistent with class-
ical conservatism. Instead, Mr. Young advocates an approach to
constitutional interpretation inspired by Burke's emphasis on tra-
dition and evolutionary reform. Moreover, Mr. Young speculates
that it is precisely this "common-law constitutionalism" that may
be driving the emerging center of today's Supreme Court.
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Conservative constitutional theory might be interesting, but it
isn't.
-Mark Tushnet'
Until very recently, few would have questioned that conservative juris-
prudence is ascendant in this country, at least outside of legal academia.
Professor Robin West, for example, observed in 1990 that "[c]onservative
constitutionalism now dominates the Supreme Court, may soon dominate
the federal judiciary, and has already profoundly shaped the constitutional
law of the foreseeable future."2 The Court's 1991 and 1992 Terms, how-
ever, have led some to doubt whether the five Reagan-Bush appointments
to the Court have created a monolithic conservative block. Professor Kath-
leen Sullivan, for example, observed that "the Supreme Court did not unveil
a full-tilt conservative revolution [in the 1991] Term," and that although
"the Court continued to veer sharply to the right" in some respects, "[iln
other areas.., the Court showed surprising moderation."3 Writing from a
perspective substantially to the right of Professor Sullivan, Professor Lino
Graglia demanded to know "[h]ow ... a Court that in its [1991] term
reaffirmed ... a constitutional right to an abortion, disallowed nonsectarian
1. Mark Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory, 59 TutL. L. Rav. 910, 927 (1985).
2. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MicH. L. Rav. 641, 642
(1990).
3. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 24 (1992).
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prayer at a high school graduation ceremony, and continued to discover
new limitations on capital punishment and new protections for the crimi-
nally accused [can] possibly be considered . . .conservative?"' And
although the 1992 Term lacked a defining moment comparable to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and, on the whole, produced rather ambiguous results,
the one thing that does seem clear is that the predicted conservative revolu-
tion never arrived.
The reason that those who anticipated a conservative apocalypse are
now scrambling for explanations is that those observers never really
stopped to consider what made the new constitutionalism "conservative."
Instead, virtually all participants in the debate have defined "conservatism"
operationally, as whatever jurisprudence is advocated by judges, academics,
and politicians generally considered to be on the rightward end of the polit-
ical spectrum.5 This is even true of those who now criticize our new, more
complicated Court from the right. A recent article by Professor Graglia, for
example, never defines "conservatives" in any more meaningful way than
"those likely to be opposed to the ACLU on every issue."' Such sweeping
categorizations ignore differences that divide "conservative" justices from
each other as sharply as those that separate them from their more liberal
counterparts; as Professor Michael Paulsen points out, "there are deep rifts
beneath the surface of an apparently 'conservative' Court, rifts that erupt
occasionally into earthquakes along legal conservatism's ideological fault
lines."7 Although these rifts have been characterized by different commen-
tators in a number of ways," virtually all observers share the belief that the
various positions on the Court, with the obvious exceptions of those of Jus-
4. Lino A. Graglia, A Conservative Court? No, 1993 Pua. INT. L. REV. 147, 147.
5. Professor West's article is an excellent example. In her twenty-six page description of
the "conservative constitutional paradigm," see West, supra note 2, at 651-77, Professor West
does not cite to any representatives of conservatism outside the group of modem legal academics
and judges whom she is analyzing. Hence, although Professor West presents an interesting analy-
sis of the group she defines as "conservative," she ignores the logically prior question of whether
that group is really conservative at all. Cf. James G. Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of
Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five Conservative, Academic Judges, 40 U.
MIAMI L. Pav. 913, 913 (1986) (comparing the views of Judges Bork, Easterbrook, Posner,
Scalia, and Winter with traditional Burkean conservatism).
6. Graglia, supra note 4, at 149. Although Professor Graglia generally seems to be using
"conservatism" as the opposite of judicial activism, he also makes clear that activism may be used
for "conservative" purposes as well. See id. at 149-5i, 158-59. However, he never provides any
general definition of what would constitute such a purpose.
7. Michael S. Paulsen, The Many Faces of "Judicial Restraint," 1993 Put. Irr. L. REv. 3,
3.
8. See id. at 4 (arguing that the conflict is among five different sources of authority-text,
original intentions, Congress and the Executive, state governments, and judicial precedent-to
which advocates of "judicial restraint" might defer); Christopher H. Schroeder, A Conservative
Court? Yes, 1993 PuB. INT. L. REv. 127, 130-46 (characterizing the divisions as between "judicial
role" conservatism, "ideological" conservatism, and "dispositional" conservatism); Sullivan,
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tices Stevens, Blackmun, and (perhaps) Ginsburg, can be accommodated
under the "conservative" umbrella.9
This consensus, however, fails to take conservatism seriously as a co-
herent ideology rather than a simple devotion to the status quo. Conserva-
tism, I will argue, arises out of skepticism about the capacity of human
reason to order the world around us. This skepticism leads the conservative
to rely on tradition and habit, rather than abstract theory, as a source of
knowledge, and to prefer slow, incremental change to radical transforma-
tions. Although this conservatism is properly defined as a "situational" ide-
ology in that it emphasizes the value of traditional institutions against
revolutionary change,10 not all defenders of the existing order are conserva-
tive. A judge, for example, may be reluctant to depart from the status quo
because of concerns about separation of powers, because the existing order
conforms to his substantive vision of the just society, or because the ex-
isting distribution of social goods promotes the interests of his own class;
none of these motivations, however, are inherently conservative. Indeed,
once the approaches of the "conservative" justices are examined in terms of
their basic philosophical assumptions, it becomes apparent that the "fault
lines" on the Court reach all the way down to the philosophical core."
Justices Scalia and Souter, for example, differ not only with respect to par-
ticular results, but also in their basic assumptions about human nature, so-
cial evolution, and the judicial role. If this is true-and if conservatism
itself is seen as a coherent set of philosophical first principles rather than as
slavish devotion to the status quo-then it makes little sense to speak of
divisions on the Court as conflicts within conservatism.
This Article seeks to redefine conservatism in constitutional law by
returning to the thought of Edmund Burke, the eighteenth-century British
politician and philosopher whose Reflections on the Revolution in France12
supra note 3, at 26 (arguing that the "conservative" justices are split over the methodological
choice of "rules" or "standards").
9. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 8, at 127 ('The Rehnquist Court truly is a conservative
Court. It is so much of one, in fact, that the disagreements on the Court and about the Court are
now entirely debates within conservatism, not between liberalism and conservatism." (emphasis
added)). It is too early to tell where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg will fit into this picture,
although it seems likely that she will come to rest somewhere between the Court's moderate
conservatives and her more liberal colleagues.
10. See Samuel P. Huntington, Conservatism as an Ideology, 51 AM. PoL. Sc. REv. 454,
455-56 (1957) (contrasting "situational" or "institutional" ideologies, which are defined by their
attitude toward the existing order and which "Jack[ ] what might be termed a substantive ideal,"
with "autonomous" or "ideational" ideologies, which involve "the ascription of value to theoreti-
cally-defined formulations and the appraisal of existing reality in terms of those formulations").
11. See infra notes 31-119, 490-538 and accompanying text.
12. EDMuND BuRK., Reflections on the Revolution in France (1791), in 8 THE WRmNOs
AND SPEECHES oF EDMUND BuRYc 53 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1989) [hereinafter
BuuK, Reflections].
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is still regarded as "the most revered of conservative texts. ' 13 In so doing, I
hope to demonstrate not only that conservatism is a coherent philosophy,
but also that those generally identified as paradigms of conservative juris-
prudence-such as Justice Antonin Scalia or Judge Robert Bork-are not
really conservative at all. To some extent, of course, this is simply quib-
bling about definitions. My primary point is that Bork and Scalia are not
Burkeans, and that Burke's philosophy offers a powerful critique of current
"conservative" jurisprudence; this, I think, is an important contribution even
if I cannot persuade anyone to stop calling Bork and Scalia "conservative."
The "conservative" label matters, however, for at least two reasons. First,
"conservatism" is a term with both a plain meaning-based on its root
"conserve"-and a history; to the extent that modem "conservative" juris-
prudence is inconsistent with the political theory that has historically been
used to conserve and protect existing social institutions, it is simply inaccu-
rate to call the jurisprudence "conservative."' 4 Second, and more impor-
tant, confusion about ideological labels has seriously distorted the debate
about constitutional interpretation generally. This distortion extends be-
yond the now-discredited tendency to view the Rehnquist Court as a mono-
lithic conservative bloc; scholars attacking originalism, for example, have
tended uncritically to identify that position with Burkean arguments for
traditionalism that actually undermine the originalist position.' 5 Hence, the
identification of conservatism with originalism, judicial restraint, and rules
has stifled virtually all attempts to gain a more sophisticated understanding
of what classical conservatism can contribute to the more general debate
about constitutional interpretation. Recovery of the Burkean meaning of
conservatism, then, offers a perspective that has heretofore been largely ab-
sent from constitutional theory.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the model of
jurisprudence most commonly associated with modem judicial conserva-
tism. This model-of which Judge Bork and Justice Scalia are the most
prominent exponents-has as its three basic canons adherence to the origi-
nal understanding of the Constitution, deference to democratic decision-
making, and preference for rules over standards in the formulation of legal
13. Kent Greenawalt, Justice Harlan's Conservatism and Alternative Possibilities, 36 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 53, 54 (1991); see also 1 BRUCE AcKaiuAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 17
(1991) (noting that the historicist strand of constitutional thought "has yet to find its modem
spokesman who is Burke's equal").
14. As Professor Huntington points out, all of the major manifestations of conservative ideol-
ogy in Western political history have displayed the essential characteristics of Burkean thought.
See Huntington, supra note 10, at 463-67.
15. See David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. Ray. 1035, 1055 (1991); cf. Mark
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE U. 1037, 1040 (1980) (characterizing originalism as a form of "procedural
Burkeanism").
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directives. 6 Part II develops the older Burkean model of conservatism,
which rests upon a pessimistic view of human nature and downplays the
efficacy of a priori rationalizations about law and justice in favor of tradi-
tion and incremental social reform. 7 In Part III, I argue that these assump-
tions critically undermine all three of the basic tenets that undergird the
jurisprudence of Judge Bork, Justice Scalia, and others; rather than resting
on conservative principles, those tenets in fact depend on ideas about
human rationality, democracy, and the social contract that are more consis-
tent with classical liberalism.' 8
Finally, in Part IV, I attempt to sketch the outlines of a truly Burkean
approach to constitutional interpretation, relying on gradual, evolutionary
development of traditional constitutional principles in a manner similar to
the common law. 19 It is critical, however, to remember that Burke abhorred
general theories;2' what emerges here, therefore, is less a theory than an
outlook-a preference for some sorts of arguments over others, as well as a
particular disposition toward the various sources of constitutional law. This
somewhat vague prescription will likely leave devotees of current trends in
constitutional theory profoundly unsatisfied. Such dissatisfaction, I think,
is simply an indication that the Burkean critique goes deeper than individual
theories of constitutional interpretation to question the very goals of consti-
tutional theory as it is currently practiced. Indeed, the most important
theme of this Article may be that constitutional theory is considerably less
16. See infra notes 22-119 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 120-207 and accompanying text. In developing a Burkean perspective on
the Constitution, I mean to avoid the separate question of the extent to which Burke's ideas actu-
ally influenced the Framers themselves. See, e.g., RussE.L Knu, THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTrru-
TION at ix-x (1990) (arguing that Burke was "much more in the mind of the Framers than was John
Locke"). My interest, rather, is in what Burke can tell us about interpreting the Framers' legacy.
In concentrating on interpretive methodology, I also wish to avoid for the most part the issue of
the consistency of Burke's substantive ideas with particular constitutional doctrines. See, e.g.,
Wilson, supra note 5, at 916 n.3 (emphasizing Burke's substantive insistence on mixed govem-
ment in criticizing the constitutional decisions of modem "conservative" judges).
18. See infra notes 208-335 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, the literature ad-
vocating originalism, judicial restraint, and/or rule-based decisionmaking virtually never
self-consciously identifies itself as conservative in the sense of drawing inspiration from conserva-
tive philosophers of other fields or eras. Judge Bork, for example, abhors the trend of importing
political theory of any stamp into constitutional adjudication. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMIr-
iNG OF AMERICA: THE PoLrIcAL SEDucnoN OF toE LAw 133-38 (1990). The absence of refer-
ences to Burke or other conservative philosophers may reveal an awareness that classical
conservatism rests on different, and indeed contradictory, assumptions. Nonetheless, one of the
primary modem proponents of classical conservatism has uncritically signed on to a jurisprudence
of original intent. See KnRu, supra note 17, at 101-103.
19. See infra notes 336-489 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., EDMuND BURKE An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in 1 THe
WORKS OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BuRKE 492 (Harry G. Bohn ed., 1841) [hereinafter BURKE,
Appeal] ("[B]efore I judge upon any abstract proposition, [it] must be embodied in circum-
stances ....").
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important than most of us tend to think: theory can only take us so far,
Burke teaches, and in the end we are often left with little more than the
application of prudent good sense to the particular problem at hand. None-
theless, conservatism has a great deal to say about how to think about con-
stitutional law, despite its aversion to theoretical systems. Hence, although
conservative constitutional theory may remain profoundly uninteresting,21 I
hope to demonstrate that conservative constitutionalism is not.
I. MODERN CONSERVATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
Before turning to Burke, it will be useful to try to articulate what cur-
rently passes for conservative constitutional jurisprudence. Inevitably, this
task involves an element of subjectivity in picking and choosing a few ex-
amples of conservative legal thought from among the multitude of voices at
the rightward end of the political spectrum. In part, this is due to the prob-
lematic position of the conservative in a predominantly liberal society like
America.22 Although I will consider this problem further below,2 3 this sec-
tion focuses upon judicial, as opposed to political, social, or moral conser-
vatism.24 In developing a model of modem judicial conservatism, I will
focus primarily on the writings and opinions of Justice Scalia and Judge
Bork; other theorists will be considered insofar as they shed light on the
major features of Scalia's and/or Bork's jurisprudence. Although I will
question both these men's conservative credentials in Section III, the choice
to start with them should not be controversial in terms of perceptions
among the legal community and the public at large. Justice Scalia is almost
universally regarded by both popular25 and academic 26 commentators as the
most philosophically rigorous member of the Supreme Court's conservative
wing; according to Professor Michael Paulsen, "Scalia's is the most devel-
oped, intellectually compelling, consistent, and forcefully applied judicial
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22. See generally Louis HARrz, THE LiBERAL TRADrnON IN AMERICA 3-32, 145-77 (1955)
(arguing that because it lacks a feudal past, America has been a fundamentally liberal society in its
origins and political development, and that developing a coherent conservative philosophy in such
an environment is impossible).
23. See infra notes 210-30 and accompanying text.
24. See Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 54-55 (distinguishing among social, political, and judi-
cial conservatism).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Leader of the Opposition, THm NEw REPuBLIC, Jan. 18,
1993, at 20 ("Scalia is the purest archetype of the conservative legal movement that began in the
1960s in reaction to the Warren Court."); An Antidote to Antonin, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at
23 (observing that if Justice Holmes's description of the Supreme Court as "nine scorpions in a
bottle" is correct, then Justice Scalia is "the chief scorpion" on the "Reagan-Bush" Court).
26. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism ofAntonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297,
1299 (1990) ("[F]or all his strongly-held views, Justice Scalia nonetheless still seems to be a
person driven by his methodological commitments rather than a desire to reach particular
results.").
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philosophy of any current justice."27 As for Judge Bork, his nomination to
the Supreme Court in 1987 has been described as an attempt by a "radical
conservative regime" to effect "the first constitutional counterrevolution" in
American history,28 and his fullest work of constitutional theory, The
Tempting of America, has been described as "a conservative legal clas-
sic."'29 Although there are other theorists commonly regarded as "conserva-
tive" who differ in meaningful ways from these two, Bork and Scalia seem
like a fair beginning for my analysis.3"
Setting political beliefs aside, the decisions and writings of Justice
Scalia, Judge Bork, and others display three primary methodological themes
that I take to represent the basic tenets of modem conservative constitution-
alism: originalism-the belief that judges should adhere to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution in deciding constitutional cases; judicial re-
27. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 10.
28. Morton J. Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitutional
History, 50 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 655, 662-63 (1989).
29. Stephen B. Presser, Robert Bork's Civil War, CHI. TRIn., Nov. 19, 1989, at Cl (book
review). Judge Bork himself has rather scrupulously sought to maintain a firm boundary between
political ideology of any kind and the "neutral" principle of judicial restraint. Indeed, he goes out
of his way to note that "conservatives as well as liberals have surrendered" to the temptation of
"political judging." BoRK , supra note 18, at 7.
30. One prominent group of theorists that I will not consider here is the Law and Economics
movement, despite the fact that this group is often identified with conservatism. One reason is
that it is unclear whether advocates of economic analysis see it as an autonomous approach to
constitutional interpretation, or simply as part of a broader theory of legal pragmatism. See Rich-
ard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653, 1664-68 (1990)
(acknowledging that "[t]he economic approach cannot be the whole content of legal pragmatism"
and emphasizing other aspects in his discussion of constitutional interpretation). More impor-
tantly, Law and Economics seems clearly not conservative in the Burkean sense. Although Burke
was personally sympathetic to reliance on free markets, see EDMUND BURKE, Thoughts and De-
tails on Scarcity (1795), in 9 THE WRniNGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 119, 133-35 (Paul
Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1991), it is difficult to see this as a logical consequence of his
conservative beliefs about human nature, tradition, etc. Nor did Burke see economic analysis as
an appropriate tool of general application to social and political problems; indeed, he protested the
universalization of such analysis in the Reflections when he lamented that "the age of chivalry is
gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is
extinguished forever." BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 127. Burke would almost certainly
see such Law and Economics stalwarts as the Coase Theorem as highly rationalistic abstractions
that bear little or no relation to social reality. See George F. Will, Foreword to CLINTON Ros-
srrER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1982) ("[Burke] thought that economic reasoning en-
couraged a desiccated rationalism inappropriate to the life of society."). Similarly, Burke would
surely balk at the willingness of legal economists to reshape dramatically large areas of existing
doctrine in order to bring them into line with the requirements of general economic theory. In the
end, as Professor Anthony Kronman has observed, Law and Economics represents a radical pro-
ject "to re-found the discipline of law on something deeper, more secure, and ultimately less
subjective than the law itself." Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism,
73 CORNELL L. Rv. 335, 339 (1988). Burke, on the other hand, would prefer to seek resolution
of our legal dilemmas in a deeper understanding of the traditions and processes of law itself. See
infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
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straint-the belief that judges should generally defer to decisions by the
elected branches of government; and a preference for formulating legal di-
rectives in terms of rules that narrowly constrain the discretion of the deci-
sionmaker, rather than in terms of standards, which allow more flexibility in
responding to the circumstances of individual cases. I will discuss each of
these interrelated positions in turn.
A. Originalism
Originalism is most commonly associated with Judge Bork, who de-
fines his position as requiring simply that "a judge is to apply the Constitu-
tion according to the principles intended by those who ratified the
document."3 Professor Michael McConnell offers a somewhat broader
definition of originalism-which he discusses under the label of "interpreti-
vism" 3 2 -as the view that "judges must look to the text, structure, history,
and purposes of the Constitution to determine the principles to apply to the
circumstances of today."33 Originalists vary in the relative emphasis that
they place on text, extrinsic evidence of intentions, and other forms of his-
torical evidence. Some originalists, whom I will call "textualists," see the
language of the Constitution as the foremost or exclusive authority, gener-
ally because it is the surest guide to the Framers' intentions.34 Extra-textual
historical evidence is thus useful only in determining what terms used in the
text were commonly understood to mean at the time the relevant constitu-
31. BORK, supra note 18, at 143.
32. Scholars have not agreed on a label for the approach articulated by Judge Bork and
others. Some have used "interpretivism" as basically synonymous with "originalism." See, e.g.,
JoHN H. ELY, DmsocRAcy AND DIsTRusT-. A THEORY OF JuIcIAL REVmW 1 (1980) (defining
"interpretivism" as the view that "judges ... should confine themselves to enforcing norms that
are stated or clearly implicit in the written constitution"). I prefer, however, Dean Brest's use of
"originalism" to signify "the interpretation of text and original history as distinguished, for exam-
ple, from the interpretation of precedents and social values." Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204,204 n.1 (1980). Moreover, it seems clearly
correct that "[w]e are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over whether judges should
stick to interpreting, but over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they
should adopt." Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984); see
also id. at 1 n.1 (accepting the blame for "hav[ing] started the use of the 'interpre-
tivist-noninterpretivist' terminology" in an earlier article).
33. Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64
CH.-KEN L. Ray. 89, 92 (1988).
34. See Brest, supra note 32, at 205. Judge Bork, for example, argues that "what the ratifiers
understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time would have
understood the words to mean. . . . The search is not for a subjective intention. . . . When
lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words ordinarily mean." BORK, supra
note 18, at 144. Note that a textualist need not be an originalist at all, if his reliance on the
constitutional language is based on a belief that only a written text can impose constitutional
obligations or adequately constrain judges, rather than on the usefulness of the text as a guide to
original intent.
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tional provision was adopted. "Intentionalists," by contrast, believe that the
constitutional text often serves as a useful guide to the intent of the Fram-
ers, but is not necessarily preferred to other sources of authorial inten-
tions.35 The intentionalist position is based on the idea that "the force of
law derives from the authority of the lawmaker." 36 It is thus important to
adhere to what the lawmaker actually meant in enacting (or ratifying) 37 a
legal provision, even if that meaning diverges from the way the terms used
were generally understood at the time.3" The distinction between intention-
alism and textualism may make little difference in practice, however. Be-
cause the language used by the Framers will almost always be the best
evidence of their intentions, it will often be unnecessary for originalist
courts to look beyond the text to other extrinsic evidence of what the Fram-
ers meant.
39
Justice Antonin Scalia describes another variant as "faint-hearted"
originalism.40 Adherents of this theory are willing to postulate that provi-
sions of the Constitution were originally intended to have evolving content;
in this way, for example, originalists can argue that the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment precludes flogging, even
though the practice was common when the Amendment was adopted.4t
Although Scalia confesses that "in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted
originalist,"42 he rejects the idea of evolutionary content in principle:
A democratic society does not.., need constitutional guarantees
to insure that its laws will reflect "current values." Elections take
35. See Brest, supra note 32, at 209.
36. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 233 (1988).
37. Originalists generally agree that the relevant intent is that of the ratifiers, as the Conven-
tion itself had no power to give the document legal effect. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Original
Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REv. 507, 512 (1988).
Some argue, however, that judges must look to the intent of the Framers themselves as a "fair
reflection" of the ratifiers' intent, due to the difficulty of determining what the ratifiers in each
state convention actually thought. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 353, 375 n.130 (1981). Because the ratifiers' intent ultimately controls, however, inten-
tions of the Framers that were not publicly disclosed to the ratifiers cannot be authoritative. Such
sources as the notes taken by participants at the Philadelphia convention, which were not made
public until well after ratification, are thus important only insofar as they augment our knowledge
of how the ratifiers might have understood the Convention's public utterances. See Rotunda,
supra, at 510-11.
38. Likening constitutional interpretation to statutory construction, Professor Kay explains
that "we believe the statutory obligation does not emanate from the mere words of the provision
but from the act of legislation.... It is to that exercise of human will in making the relevant law
that we refer in statutory construction." Kay, supra note 36, at 232.
39. See id. at 234-35.
40. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989); see
also Brest, supra note 32, at 205 (describing "moderate originalism").
41. See Scalia, supra note 40, at 861-62.
42. Id. at 864.
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care of that quite well. The purpose of constitutional guaran-
tees-and in particular those constitutional guarantees of individ-
ual rights that are at the center of this controversy-is precisely to
prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values
that the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the society to devote
to the subject the long and hard consideration required for a con-
stitutional amendment before those particular values can be cast
aside.43
Even setting aside Justice Scalia's objections, "faint-hearted" originalism
may not be all that helpful when it comes to deciding cases. As Dean Brest
points out, a number of established doctrines that the true originalist must
deplore are consistent with a more moderate form of originalism; for exam-
ple, a moderate originalist may approve the Court's gender-discrimination
decisions based on an evolutionary view of the Equal Protection Clauses.
The problem, however, is that the evolution of these doctrines cannot be
said to have been guided by originalist sources in any meaningful way.'
"Faint-hearted" originalism is thus incomplete as a constitutional theory
without some additional account of how judges construing open-ended pro-
visions of the document can be constrained by sources beyond the text and
the intent of the Framers.
These variants of originalism all rest upon a similar set of arguments.
Advocates of originalism have advanced arguments based upon the require-
ments of democratic self-government, the need for judges to decide cases
according to neutral principles, the nature of the Constitution as law or as a
social contract, and upon the finality of judicial decisions in constitutional
cases. Judge Bork, for example, begins his argument for originalism with
the "Madisonian" model of constitutional government, which "assumes that
in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better reason
[than] that they are majorities."4 Judicial review is thus vulnerable to
what Professor Alexander Bickel described as the "counter-majoritarian dif-
ficulty."46 According to Bickel, judicial review is "a deviant institution in
43. Id. at 862; see also Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44
STAN. L. REv. 1019, 1030 (1992) ("The purpose of constitutional restrictions on self government
is to impede policy adjustments in light of changing circumstances."). Justice Scalia also notes
that "even if one assumes ... that the Constitution was originally meant to expound evolving
rather than permanent values .... I see no basis for believing that supervision of the evolution
would have been committed to the courts." Scalia, supra note 40, at 862.
44. See Brest, supra note 32, at 234.
45. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47IND. LJ. 1,
2 (1971).
46. ALEXANDER M. BicKEa.., THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH: THE SuPREME COURT AT Tm
BAR OF POLmCS 16 (1962).
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the American democracy"4 7 because "when the Supreme Court declares un-
constitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now;
it exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against
it."48 Bork recognizes, however, that the Madisonian model also includes a
counter-majoritarian element that places certain political principles beyond
the reach of majority control.49 The tension between these two premises is
resolved "by the Supreme Court's power to define both majority and minor-
ity freedom through the interpretation of the Constitution. Society consents
to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring prin-
ciples believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by,
the Constitution."5 The most basic form of the argument from democracy
can thus stop here; former Attorney General Edwin Meese III argues, for
example, that when a judge enforces the Constitution "according to its plain
words as originally understood... [the judge] is enforcing the will of the
enduring and fundamental democratic majority that ratified the constitu-
tional provision at issue."51 In such cases, Meese concludes, "the institu-
tion of judicial review promotes the purposes of constitutionalism and
validates the consent of the governed."52
Judge Bork's argument, however, is somewhat more sophisticated.
For Bork, the Court can only fulfill its role of mediating between the
majoritarian and counter-majoritarian premises of the Madisonian model if
it arrives at its decisions in a particular way:
[Tihe Court's power is legitimate only if it has.., a valid theory,
derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of major-
ity and minority freedom. If it does not have such a theory but
merely imposes its own value choices ... the Court violates the
postulates of the Madisonian model that alone justifies its power.
It then necessarily abets the tyranny either of the majority or the
minority.53
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 16-17.
49. See Bork, supra note 45, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Edwin Meese HI, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'y 5, 10 (1988).
52. Id. Not all originalist scholars accept the argument from democracy. Professor Kay ar-
gues, for example, that originalism may often be incompatible with democratic government. '"he
enactors' intent may have been popularly sanctioned when first enacted, but over time their judg-
ments are increasingly unlikely to reflect contemporary majority opinion any better than the
choices of uneleeted, but living judges." Kay, supra note 36, at 289. As a result, Kay concludes,
a commitment to originalism may require courts to strike down legislative enactments as often as
it requires judges to sustain them. Id.
53. Bork, supra note 45, at 3.
630 [Vol. 72
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
The crucial point is that "a legitimate Court must be controlled by princi-
ples exterior to the will of the Justices."54 Bork thus echoes Professor Her-
bert Wechsler's call for decision according to "neutral principles," which
Wechsler defined as "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved."55s Bork goes further than
Wechsler, however, by insisting on neutrality in the definition and deriva-
tion of principles, as well as in their application.5 6 "If the Court is free to
choose any principle that it will subsequently apply neutrally," Bork points
out, "it is free to legislate just as a political body would."'5 7 For Bork, ad-
herence to the original understanding of the Constitution is the only way of
arriving at principles that are sufficiently neutral in terms of derivation and
definition. With respect to derivation, originalism allows the judge to trace
his principles to the Constitution itself, rather than to his own subjective
value judgments.58 Similarly, originalism guides the judge's choice of the
level of generality at which to define a principle by requiring definition at
the level of generality "that interpretation of the words, structure, and his-
tory of the Constitution fairly supports."59 This method satisfies the require-
ment of neutrality because it "is a solution generally applicable to all
constitutional provisions as to which historical evidence exists."6 Bork
thus concludes that "[t]he judge must stick close to the text and the history,
and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.'
A more straightforward argument for originalism derives from the very
nature of Constitution as law. Professor Henry Monaghan, for example, has
argued that
[t]he root premise [of judicial review] is that the supreme court,
like other branches of government, is constrained by the written
constitution. Our legal griindnorm has been that the body politic
can at a specific point in time definitively order relationships, and
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 2 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959)).
56. Id.; see also BoRIc, supra note 18, at 146 ('The philosophy of original understanding is
capable of supplying neutrality in all three respects-in deriving, defining, and applying
principle.").
57. BORK, supra note 18, at 146.
58. See id. at 146-47.
59. Id. at 150.
60. Id.
61. Bork, supra note 45, at 8. Justice Scalia presents the corollary of this argument when he
observes that "the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution... is that the judges
will mistake their own predilections for the law." Scalia, supra note 40, at 863. "Nonoriginalism,"
he warns, "plays precisely to this weakness. It is very difficult for a person to discern a difference
between those political values that he personally thinks most important, and those political values
that are 'fundamental to our society.' Id.
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that such an ordering is binding on all organs of government until
changed by amendment.62
Similarly, Justice Scalia contends that judicial review depends upon a "per-
ception that the Constitution... is in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the
business of the courts-an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable
through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law."63 A variant
of this position argues that judges must look to the intentions of the Framers
in addition to the constitutional text, because the authority of legal rules
must ultimately be grounded in a pre-existing right of the lawmakers.r 4
Other originalists emphasize the unique nature of the Constitution as a so-
cial contract, rather than its more general qualities as a legal document.
Versions of this argument emphasize obligations running between the fed-
eral government and the states, between the three branches of the federal
government, and between the government generally and the people.65 The
Constitution, the argument holds, specifies the rights and duties running
along all three of these axes; when judges reach beyond the document in
deciding cases, they overstep the contractual allocation of authority. Hence,
federal courts, acting as part of the national government, violate the Tenth
Amendment when they limit the powers of state governments in ways not
contemplated by the original Constitution.66 Similarly, because Congress's
enumerated powers are limited only by other specific provisions such as the
Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court violates the separation of powers inherent
in Articles I and I when it invalidates congressional action based on val-
62. Monaghan, supra note 37, at 375-76 (footnotes omitted). Professor Bruce Ackerman
makes a similar argument that the basic rules of society can only be changed by rare acts of
"higher lawmaking" involving a mobilized citizenry; in other times, it is the province of the judi-
ciary to preserve the efforts of "constitutional politics" against revision. See AcrKERMAN, supra
note 13, at 6-7. Professor Ackerman, of course, has a drastically different view of when legitimate
acts of constitutional change can be said to have occurred. See id. at 58, 105-108 (arguing that the
New Deal Court's abandonment of Lochner-era jurisprudence was equivalent to the Founding and
Reconstruction in terms of higher lawmaking).
63. Scalia, supra note 40, at 854. Justice Scalia's argument is grounded in part on the rela-
tive institutional competencies of courts and legislatures. "If the Constitution were not that sort of
a 'law,' but a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to
believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature?" Id. Indeed,
he concludes, "the legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of social values."
Id.
64. See Kay, supra note 36, at 231; see also BORK, supra note 18, at 145 ("If the Constitution
is law, then presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were
understood to have intended."); Graglia, supra note 43, at 1024 ("An entirely sufficient reason for
originalism, is that interpreting a document means to attempt to discern the intent of the author;
there is no other 'interpretive methodology' properly so called.").
65. See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Consti-
tutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 583-84 (1985). Professor Perry is merely
describing the argument, which he rejects.
66. See Earl M. Maltz, Murder in the Cathedral-The Supreme Court as Moral Prophet, 8
U. DAYTON L. REv. 623, 627 (1983).
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ues that are not derived directly from the Constitution.67 Finally, the argu-
ments from democracy described above can all be framed as necessary
requirements of the contractual obligations running between the people and
those who govern them: Because the only limits upon their majoritarian
prerogatives to which the people have consented are those in the constitu-
tional text, judges exceed their legitimate authority in imposing other limits
based on values extrinsic to the Constitution.68
The last set of arguments for originalism stems from the finality of
Supreme Court decisions in constitutional cases. According to this argu-
ment, nonoriginalist interpretation is appropriate for nonjudicial political
actors in attempting to ascertain their constitutional obligations because
their interpretations can later be revised if the values imputed to the Consti-
tution turn out not to be appropriate or acceptable. The judiciary, however,
is unique in having the power to impose its own binding interpretation upon
all other actors, who can overrule that interpretation only in extremely rare
instances. As a result, Professor McConnell argues, judges should "stick to
the common core of agreed-upon essentials, leaving more contentious pro-
positions to bodies whose judgments are less final and conclusive." 69
Hence, members of Congress may interpret the Constitution by looking "to
natural law, science fiction, the New York Times editorial page, 'or any
other source that may shed light on the problem' "; judges, however, must
rely only on original intent.70
This is necessarily an incomplete catalogue of the arguments that have
been made in favor of originalism; indeed, as Professor Ronald Rotunda has
observed, "[t]he issues relating to original intent and the uses of history
have created almost a cottage industry in the scholarly literature."'" This
survey is sufficient, however, for my present purpose, which is to evaluate
not whether originalism is successful, but whether it is conservative in its
basic assumptions. Before considering that question, however, it is neces-
sary to examine two related aspects of contemporary conservative jurispru-
dence: judicial restraint and the preference for rule-based adjudication.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 33, at 92 (arguing that the basis for originalism "is that
all legitimate authority, including that of judges, stems initially from the consent of the
governed").
69. Michael McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convic-
tions into Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1501, 1514 (1989).
70. Id. at 1513-14 (quoting MicHAEL. J. PmuY, MoRALrrY, PoLTmCs AND LAW 150 (1988));
see also Kay, supra note 36, at 234 ("[E]xplicit and direct recourse to the original intentions may
be more necessary in constitutional than in statutory interpretation because erroneous interpreta-
tions of statutes are more easily corrected by the legislature."). As articulated by Professor Mc-
Connell, this argument bears an obvious affinity to Judge Bork's neutral principles argument in
that both emphasize adherence to a common core of agreed-upon principles.
71. Rotunda, supra note 37, at 509.
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B. Judicial Restraint
The concept of judicial restraint is only partially differentiable from
originalism in constitutional interpretation. For virtually all originalists, a
primary virtue of originalism is that it promotes judicial restraint by limiting
the grounds upon which judges may strike down the actions of the other
branches of government;72 indeed, many originalists argue that what is ulti-
mately at stake in the battle over originalist interpretation is the balance of
power between the courts and the political branches of government. 73 It is
possible, however, to formulate a nonoriginalist theory of constitutional in-
terpretation that nonetheless emphasizes judicial restraint.74 In addition to
respecting the text and original intentions of the Constitution, a judge might
also exercise judicial restraint by deferring either to the decisions of Con-
gress, the Executive, and state governments, or to doctrines and principles
articulated in judicial precedent.75 Given these multiple objects of defer-
ence, conflicts are bound to arise when they point in different directions;
indeed, there is good evidence that this tension is what drives the divisions
among the "conservative" members of the Rehnquist Court. 7 6 The argu-
ments for judicial restraint, albeit similar to those for originalism, warrant
separate consideration here.
The primary argument for restraint, as for originalism, rests on the
democratic principle. "Most fundamentally," Professor McConnell argues,
"rule by judges is objectionable in this society because it is inconsistent
with the principles of self-government. The tradition of this political com-
munity cannot accept the proposition that the elite make better decisions
than the people, or that popular institutions are inferior to electorally unac-
countable ones."'77 This argument is sometimes coupled with an assertion
that judges (as well as lawyers and law professors) are profoundly unrepre-
sentative of the general public. Judges, the argument holds, are generally
72. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 18, at 159-160. Some commentators see originalism as a
particular form of judicial restraint. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 4 (observing that the original
intentions of the Framers are one of several sources of legal authority to which a practitioner of
judicial restraint might defer).
73. Graglia, supra note 43, at 1048 ("[The originalism debate] is not over different tech-
niques of reading, but rather over different systems of government. The debate is not over how
the Court should interpret the Constitution, but over whether it should intervene in the political
process only on the basis of the Constitution").
74. See BicKEL, supra note 46, at 24 (arguing that the Court's function "might (indeed, must)
involve the making of policy," but that that function must be narrowly tailored to the unique
institutional competencies of the judiciary and limited to respect the roles of the other branches);
see also BoRK, supra note 18, at 187-93 (criticizing Bickel for departing from originalism by
assigning some policy-making role to courts).
75. See Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 54; Paulsen, supra note 7, at 4.
76. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 6-7.
77. McConnell, supra note 69, at 1538.
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upper-middle-class, highly educated, and, as a result, subject to certain pre-
dispositions on moral issues. Legislators, on the other hand, are forced by
the rigors of electoral politics to pay more attention to the views of the
populace at large. As a result, Professor McConnell asserts, "it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that a preference for judicial rule contains a large
element of class bias.""8 Finally, proponents of judicial restraint often em-
phasize the difficulties that the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment face in correcting judicial decisions that flout the will of the people.
Because of these difficulties, and because judges are generally reluctant to
overrule their own precedents, courts should refrain from interfering in the
political process.79
A more subtle variant of the democratic argument is Alexander
Bickel's fear that "judicial review may... have a tendency over time seri-
ously to weaken the democratic process." 0 Professor Bickel relies heavily
on the admonition of James Bradley Thayer, made during an earlier period
of judicial activism, that judicial review inherently expresses a form of dis-
trust of the legislature. "The legislatures," Thayer argued, "are growing
accustomed to this distrust, and more and more readily incline[d] to justify
it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional restraints.... turning that
subject over to the courts ... ."I' Judicial review, in other words, encour-
ages legislators to become sloppy and lazy, knowing that their constitu-
tional errors will be corrected by the judiciary. This argument may be
expanded to encompass not only the legislature but the people at large:
[Tihe exercise of [judicial review], ... is always attended with a
serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes
comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political ex-
perience... that come[s] from fighting the question out in the
ordinary way, and correcting their own errors .... The tendency
of a common and easy resort to this great function... is to dwarf
the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of
moral responsibility. It is no light thing to do that.82
78. Id. at 1537. Professor McConnell's observations apply not only to judges but also to
"most of the lawyers who appear before them and the academics who comment on their work."
Id. Judge Bork puts the point more strongly still, insisting that "[tlhe theorists of left-liberal
constitutional revisionism ... are best understood as the academic spokesmen for, and the ration-
alizers of, the dominant attitudes of ... a powerful American subculture whose opinions differ
markedly from those of most Americans." BORK, supra note 18, at 241.
79. See McConnell, supra note 69, at 1538.
80. BxcKEm, supra note 46, at 21.
81. JAMEs B. THAYER, Jom MARSHALL 103-04 (1901) [hereinafter THAYER, JOHN MAR-
SHALL]; see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 156 (1893) [hereinafter Thayer, American Doctrine] ('The
checking and cutting down of legislative power, by numerous detailed prohibitions in the constitu-
tion, cannot be accomplished without making the government petty and incompetent.").
82. THAYER, Jom MARSHALL, supra note 81, at 106-07.
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It is important, in Thayer's view, not only that decisions be made correctly
and be perceived as legitimate by the people, but also that the people actu-
ally participate in the process. Democracy depends upon a people with the
will and experience necessary to engage in republican self-government; by
taking the really important decisions away from the political process, the
Court risks undermining the capacity of the people to play their own essen-
tial role in our democracy.8 3
A final set of arguments for judicial restraint arises from a conception
of the institutional competence of the judiciary and its role in a government
of coordinate and divided powers. In addition to the nonrepresentativeness
of judges, courts have a number of other institutional disadvantages in de-
ciding basic social and moral issues: their information is generally limited
to the facts that litigants choose to present to them; they are institutionally
insulated from the political and business worlds that give rise to the cases
they hear; and their dockets are so crowded that judges can devote little
time even to critical cases.8" Moreover, as Professor McConnell notes, "it
is the rare Supreme Court Justice who can keep up with more than a negli-
gible sampling of the poetry, science, economics, literature, philosophy,
theology, and history that should inform an expositor of moral reality."851
Finally, judicial review is only an incidental check on the powers of the
political branches, because the courts can only decide constitutional issues
when cases happen to come before them. Proponents of judicial restraint
thus argue that the judiciary cannot be regarded as the primary bulwark
against violation of the Constitution by the legislature; otherwise, courts
would have been assigned a more direct and immediate role in the legisla-
tive process.86 Courts should thus respect the constitutional judgments of
83. See also McConnell, supra note 33, at 108-09 (arguing that shifting more and more deci-
sionmaking responsibility to judges "would debase and impoverish republican government"). For
Professor McConnell, "self-government directed toward the common weal is good in itself. ... If
the quest for justice is taken out of the political arena and moved into the branch of government
uniquely insulated from popular participation, one of the great functions of republicanism will be
lost." Id. McConnell goes on to point out that this impoverishment of the democratic process
occurs even in the areas of morality and human rights in which nonoriginalists are most eager for
judicial intervention: "[N]ot only do Supreme Court opinions contain little serious moral reflec-
tion, but they serve as an excuse for dispensing with moral reflection at other levels of govern-
ment. ... Constitutional adjudication is not a supplement to moral-political deliberation; it is often
a substitute." McConnell, supra note 69, at 1537. Indeed, Professor Maltz contends that such a
decline in democratic discourse occurred following the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). According to Maltz, "American society was in the midst of a fundamental reevalua-
tion of its position toward the legality of abortion" in the period immediately preceding Roe; the
Court's decision, however, "effectively ended this process of discourse and compromise" by lock-
ing in a particular solution and polarizing further debate. Maltz, supra note 66, at 630-31.
84. McConnell, supra note 33, at 106.
85. Id.
86. See Thayer, American Doctrine, supra note 81, at 136.
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the other branches because, in the end, it is those branches that are primarily
responsible for ensuring conformity with the Constitution's provisions.87
As Professor Thayer put it, "where a power so momentous as this primary
authority to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the body to
whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect."88
Most other arguments for judicial restraint are likely to be variations
on these themes of democracy and institutional role. These same arguments
figure prominently in defense of the third central tenet of current conserva-
tive jurisprudence: the preference for rules over standards in adjudication.
I discuss this preference in the next section.
C. Rules over Standards
In the 1989 Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, Justice Scalia
declared that "I stand with Aristotle... in the view that 'personal rule' ...
should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to
the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an
exact pronouncement." 89 By firmly declaring his preference for "general
rule[s] of law" over "personal discretion to do justice,"9 Justice Scalia was
taking sides in the jurisprudential debate between proponents of "rules" and
"standards" as the preferred form of legal directives.91 Professor Sullivan
summarizes the usual definition of "rules" as follows:
A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited trigger-
ing facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leav-
ing irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be
worked out elsewhere .... A rule necessarily captures the back-
ground principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of
over- or under-inclusiveness. But the rule's force as a rule is that
decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the
87. Id. at 136-38.
88. Id. at 136.
89. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1182
(1989) (quoting THE POLITCS OF AmsroT E bk. III, ch. xi, § 19, at 127 (Ernest Barker trans.,
1946)).
90. Id. at 1176.
91. On the rules/standards debate, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Dutn L.J. 557, 621 (1992) (arguing that the desirability of rules or stan-
dards is influenced by the frequency with which a law will govern conduct and the costs of
promulgation); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
Rv. 1685, 1685 (1976) (arguing that there are two opposing rhetorical models used for substan-
tive law disputes: individualism, preferring rules, and altruism, preferring standards); Frederick
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & Pu. POL'Y 645, 646-47 (1991) (arguing for
a legal system based on presumptive positivism, where both rule-based and particularistic deci-
sion-making are compatible with the idea of law).
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background principle or policy to the facts would produce a dif-
ferent result. 2
Professor Sullivan provides the following description of "standards":
A legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse deci-
sionmaking back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the
decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the
decisionmaker more discretion than do rules.... Thus, the appli-
cation of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in
the next case less than does a rule-the more facts one may take
into account, the more likely that some of them will be different
the next time.93
This typology corresponds roughly to the distinction between categorization
and balancing in constitutional adjudication. Categorization, Sullivan ar-
gues, is rule-like in that it decides individual cases by determining whether
a given fact situation falls within bright-line boundaries.94 Balancing, on
the other hand, is standard-like in that it requires the decisionmaker to di-
rectly apply the background values at issue in light of all relevant
circumstances. 5
The choice of rules over standards has commonly been justified by
appeal to "Rule of Law" values of certainty and equal treatment. "[The
Rule of Law," according to Friedrich von Hayek, "means that government
in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will
use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual
affairs on the basis of this knowledge."96 Such certainty is essential to indi-
vidual liberty: John Rawls, for example, argues that to the extent that
"[t]he boundaries of our liberty are uncertain .... liberty is restricted by a
reasonable fear of its exercise." 97 Rules also help avoid the arbitrariness
92. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58.
93. Id. at 58-59.
94. See id. at 59. Professor Sullivan argues that the two-tier structure of strict scrutiny for
government acts that implicate fundamental rights or suspect classifications, and rational basis
review for other sorts of state action, is the primary form of categorization in modem constitu-
tional law. This is true despite the balancing rhetoric that accompanies both levels of review,
because "[t]he classification at the threshold cuts off further serious debate." Id. at 60.
95. See id. Justice Scalia, of course, is notorious in his distaste for balancing. In criticizing
the majority's adoption of a "totality of the circumstances" approach to separation of powers in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), for example, Scalia fumed that "[a] government of laws
means a government of rules. Today's decision... is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned
by law." Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERDOM 72 (1944); see also Scalia, supra note
89, at 1179 ("Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes.").
97. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusricE 239 (1971).
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that may accompany discretionary decisions under standards. When the
decisionmaker is empowered to take into account any factor that he deems
relevant, we run the risk that the decision may be influenced by improper
considerations such as antipathy toward particular individuals or groups,
subjective moral or political views, or even sheer caprice. Rules thus pro-
mote the value of treating like cases alike by excluding factors that, for one
reason or another, we think ought to be irrelevant to the determination at
issue.98
Judges may also choose rules over standards for reasons of judicial
restraint. Promulgation of rules means that legal directives are given sub-
stantive content by legislators ex ante rather than left to judicial elaboration
ex post.99 There is thus less opportunity for judges to shape the content of
the rule through application of open-ended, particularistic analysis. More-
over, it is easier for observers to evaluate whether a judge has been faithful
to a bright-line rule than to determine whether a court has applied a highly
discretionary, multi-factor balancing test in the way that the framers of the
standard would have approved. Advocates of rules argue that this enhanced
transparency of judicial decisions in turn deters judges from overstepping
the bounds of their power."° Similarly, Justice Scalia explains:
[Wlhen ... I adopt a general rule. . . , I not only constrain lower
courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have
such different facts that my political or policy preferences regard-
ing the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be unable to indulge
those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing prin-
ciple. In the real world of appellate judging, it displays more ju-
dicial restraint to adopt such a course than to announce that, "on
balance," we think the law was violated here-leaving ourselves
free to say in the next case that, "on balance," it was not.101
While adherence to rule-based decisionmaking constrains the ability of
judges to follow their own subjective preferences, Scalia also notes that it
98. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 62. Justice Scalia's version of the equality argument fo-
cuses on "the appearance of equal treatment." Scalia, supra note 89, at 1178 (emphasis added).
Conceding that general rules may fail to take into account subtle variations between cases, Scalia
argues that rules nonetheless protect the legitimacy of the Court better than standards. This is
because in cases where passions run high on both sides, losers who see precedent as being on their
side are unlikely to accept minor distinctions in the application of multifactor tests as a justifica-
tion for the Court's decision to change course. "Much better," Scalia argues, "to have a clear,
previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision." Id.
99. See Kaplow, supra note 91, at 559-60.
100. See Kennedy, supra note 91, at 1690. According to Professor Kennedy, formulating
rules at a high level of generality also promotes judicial restraint. "Generality in statement," he
argues, "guarantees that individual decisions will have far reaching effects. There will be fewer
cases of first impression, and because there are fewer rules altogether, there will be fewer occa-
sions on which a judge is free to choose between conflicting lines of authority." Id.
101. Scalia, supra note 89, at 1179-80.
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may embolden judges when they are constrained to reach unpopular results:
"The chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant
duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm,
clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.""1 2 Rules thus require judicial
deference to the majority will as expressed in the law, not to the popular
passions of the moment.
A preference for rules is also related to originalism. The affinity of
rule-based decisionmaking and a close adherence to the written text is obvi-
ous; textualism is rule-like in that it excludes from the decisionmaking pro-
cess all considerations other than the parsing of the authoritative language.
Broader forms of originalism have a similar rule-like structure in their ap-
proach to the historical tradition. The first dimension of this structure re-
quires the judge to focus upon history to the exclusion of all other
factors.10 3 Originalism adds a second dimension of rule-ness by limiting
the historical inquiry to particular "constitutional moments in the discontin-
uous historical past," rather than the evolution of legal principles over a
continuous period from the Founding to the present."°4 Although the latter
102. l at 1180. As an example, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (noting the "personal toll" of joining the majority opinion holding that flag
desecration is protected speech, but observing that "[t]he hard fact is that sometimes we must
make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the
law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.").
103. In Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (plurality opinion), for example,
the Court upheld a California court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant who was personally served with process while in the state on business unrelated to the lawsuit.
Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia recited extensive historical evidence demonstrating that the
idea that "the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in
the State" is "[almong the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in the Amer-
ican tradition." Id. at 610 (plurality opinion). Having established this, Scalia refused to conduct an
"independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule."
"[F]or our purposes," he declared, "its validation is its pedigree." Id. at 621 (plurality opinion).
According to Professor David Strauss, Justice Scalia's opinion in Burnham represents "a deliber-
ate-almost boastful-refusal to offer any functional or policy arguments why courts should be
allowed to establish personal jurisdiction [over transients]." David A. Strauss, Tradition, Prece-
dent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDoZo L. REv. 1699, 1702 (1991). The reason for this refusal was
undoubtedly the standard-like nature of the functional or fairness inquiries; as Justice Brennan's
opinion concurring in the judgment makes clear, the alternative to historical pedigree is a balanc-
ing test that considers such factors as the reasonable expectations of the defendant, the extent to
which the defendant has purposefully availed himself of benefits provided by the forum state, the
burdens on the transient defendant, etc. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 635-40 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Although Justice Scalia recognized that such a discretionary test might be
unavoidable in cases considering novel procedures, his opinion shows a clear preference for the
rule-like historical test where it is available. See id. at 619 (plurality opinion).
104. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 114. In this sense, Burnham is a traditionalist, not an original-
ist, decision because it looks to the continuity of historical practice over time rather than focusing
exclusively upon the Founding. Justice Scalia's opinions interpreting the general guarantee of due
process have tended to follow this pattern. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 25-26 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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approach leaves a great deal of discretion to emphasize particular phases of
history at the expense of other periods, the former is rule-like in identifying
the practices of particular periods as authoritative while disregarding the
rest of history as largely irrelevant. Professor Sullivan thus describes
"[t]he rule-like structure of originalism" as a "positivist attempt to find
rules in the facts of the authoritative past."1 5 Originalism also appeals to
supporters of rules because of the kind of legal directives that originalist
inquiries tend to support and produce.1" 6 For example, the Court's test for
whether a given proceeding falls within the Seventh Amendment's require-
ment of a jury trial focuses on whether such a proceeding would have
sounded in law or equity in 1791.107 Similarly, Justice Scalia believes that
originalism can be used to constrain the discretion of judges even with re-
spect to those open-ended provisions of the Constitution that seem most
standard-like by their own terms. For Scalia, "the essence of the judicial
craft" is to give "even the most vague and general text ... some precise,
principled content .... The trick is to carry general principle as far as it can
go in substantial furtherance of the constitutional prescription."'' 0 By
grounding rules in the original understanding of the Constitution, judges
can claim that their attempts to craft rules out of these amorphous areas of
the law are not judicial legislation, but rather legitimate products of con-
strained interpretation. 0 9
When the imperatives of originalism and rule-based decisionmaking
conflict, however, Justice Scalia appears to harbor a preference for rules. In
Employment Division v. Smith,"0 for example, Scalia held that the Free
Exercise Clause does not preclude the state from "requiring any individual
to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the perform-
ance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires).""' Although
this interpretation has the virtue of providing a bright-line rule for deciding
future cases, it does not rest upon any evidence of the original understand-
ing of the First Amendment.' 2 Justice Scalia's preference for rules also
105. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 114.
106. See Kay, supra note 36, at 288 ('The outstanding characteristic of original intentions
adjudication, for good or ill, is that it is, compared with the alternative methods, most likely to
produce relatively clear and stable rules for lawful government activity").
107. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989).
108. Scalia, supra note 89, at 1183 (citing the development of per se rules under the broad
directives of the Sherman Act as an example).
109. See id. at 1184-85.
110. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
111. Id. at 878.
112. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 9-10; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109, 1119 (1990) (producing substantial
historical evidence that the original understanding of the First Amendment would require the sort
of weighted balancing test advocated by Justice O'Connor's opinion in Smith); Michael W. Mc-
Connell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
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seems to win out when it conflicts with his political beliefs. In Arizona v.
Hicks," 3 for example, Justice Scalia no doubt infuriated advocates of strong
law enforcement by holding that the act of moving a stereo turntable dis-
covered in plain view to look at the serial numbers underneath constituted a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 1 4 In so holding, Scalia drew a
bright line distinction between "'looking' at a suspicious object in plain
view and 'moving' it even a few inches."11 5 "A search is a search," he
declared, "even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable." 116
The example of Hicks highlights the extent to which the features of
modem conservative constitutionalism constitute an interpretive methodol-
ogy rather than a corollary of conservative political positions. Judge Bork,
for example, criticizes conservatives as well as liberals for departing from
originalism." 7 Similarly, liberals have argued for judicial restraint in re-
sponse to the Lochner Court,' 18 and Professor Sullivan has concluded that
"rules and standards simply do not map in any strong or necessary way onto
competing political ideologies."' 19 This focus on methodology also charac-
terizes the classical conservatism of Edmund Burke. As the next section
illustrates, however, Burke's conservatism is methodology of a very differ-
ent kind.
II. THm CONSERVATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE
As there is an element of subjectivity in identifying modem conserva-
tive constitutionalism with Judge Bork and Justice Scalia, so too is there a
similar problem in choosing Edmund Burke as the definitive example of
"philosophical" or "classical" conservatism. This choice, however, has
generally not been controversial among those who study conservatism as a
matter of political theory. Political scientist Samuel Huntington, for exam-
ple, observes that "[a]ll the analysts of conservatism ... unite in identify-
REv. 1409, 1511-12 (1990) (same). For Justice O'Connor's test, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 899
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
113. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
114. Id. at 324-25.
115. Id. at 325 (quoting id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
116. Id. See generally Kannar, supra note 26, at 1324-28 (discussing Hicks as an example of
Scalia's "formalistic approach").
117. See BORK, supra note 18, at 223-40 (discussing "Itihe Theorists of Conservative Consti-
tutional Revisionism").
118. See Horwitz, supra note 28, at 657-59.
119. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 96.
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ing Edmund Burke as the conservative archetype and in assuming that the
basic elements of his thought are the basic elements of conservatism."'' 0
Focusing on Burke nonetheless presents several problems at the outset.
Critics from Burke's time down to the present have questioned his consis-
tency, 121 the coherence of his philosophy, 2 and the continuing relevance
of his ideas in a society whose traditions and institutions are far different
from the aristocratic eighteenth century order that Burke defended.' 23 The
relevance question I would like to put off until Part II; my concern here
is simply to lay out Burke's philosophy as developed in its original context.
Both the consistency'2 5 and coherence' 26 criticisms of that philosophy seem
120. Huntington, supra note 10, at 456. Similarly, Robert Nisbet asserts that "Burke is the
prophet-the Marx or the Mill-of conservatism." ROBERT NISBET, CONSERVATISM: DREAM AND
RE.rrY at x (1986).
121. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins, The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke, 5 THE THOMIsT
61, 61-63 (1943) [hereinafter Hutchins, Oligarchy] (arguing that Burke's views on virtual repre-
sentation were inconsistent); Robert M. Hutchins, The Theory of the State: Edmund Burke, 5 REv.
POL. 139, 145 (1943) [hereinafter Hutchins, Theory of the State] (noting apparently contradictory
statements on the nature of the state).
122. See, e.g., Hutchins, Theory of the State, supra note 121, at 155 ("In discussing the theory
of the state Burke developed... not so much a philosophy of conservatism ... as a series of
specious arguments, rhetorical flourishes, and quotable lines which Tories of all later generations
have hurled at the heads of those who sought social improvement.").
123. See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERSON, BURKE 74 (1980) ("By his insistence on the importance of
circumstances Burke ruled himself out of court for the late twentieth century.").
124. See infra notes 210-30.
125. Burke's support for the American colonists but condemnation of the French revolution-
aries is often Exhibit A in accusations of inconsistency. See, e.g., BURKE, Appeal, supra note 20,
at 493-94 (noting such accusations by members of his own political party, who had supported both
revolutions). That instance, however, is explained by the fact that Burke viewed the Americans as
demanding the restoration of their traditional rights under the British Constitution, see id. at 503,
while he saw the French as casting away their traditions in favor of abstract, theoretical liberties.
See, e.g., ButRm, Reflections, supra note 12, at 216. In general, Burke defended himself against
charges of inconsistency by observing that "[iut is in the nature of things, that they who are in the
centre of a circle should appear directly opposed to those who view them from any part of the
circumference." BURnKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 506. Because Burke's thought arises in re-
sponse to particular challenges from a variety of directions, then, he may appear contradictory
while really defending the same position; as his biographer Lord Morley put it, "[hie changed his
front, but he never changed his ground." JOHN VISCOUNT MORLEY, Burke, in 14 THE WORKS OF
LORD MoRLEY 162 (1921). But see FRANK O'GoRmAN, EDMUND BURKE: His POLITICAL PrLos-
oPHY 14 (1973) (asserting that "Burke did change his ground with regard to several important
philosophical matters").
126. Some problems of coherence are inevitable in light of the fact that Burke never attempted
a comprehensive theoretical exposition of his ideas. In response to the suggestion that the Reflec-
tions might constitute such a work, Burke insisted that he "was throwing out reflexions on a
political event, and not reading a lecture upon theorism and principles of Government. How I
should treat such a subject is not for me to say, for I never had that intention." EDMUND BURKE,
Letter from Edmund Burke to William Cusac Smith (July 22, 1791), in 6 THE CORESPONDENCE OF
EDMUND BURKE 304 (Thomas Copeland ed., 1970). Nonetheless, C. B. Macpherson concludes
that, although "there is no orderly development of a theory of political obligation or political right
drawn from first principles of human nature, as with Hobbes or Locke," there are nonetheless "the
rudiments of such a theory." MACPHERSON, supra note 123, at 38. Moreover, as I hope to show
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substantially overstated on the merits; more importantly for my present pur-
poses, both criticisms are generally concerned with Burke's substantive
political positions. My focus here, however, is on the philosophical meth-
odology with which Burke approached political questions. The major as-
pects of that methodology, which derive their consistency and coherence
from common roots in Burke's pessimistic view of human reason, are dis-
cussed in the sections below.
A. Human Reason and the Rejection of Abstract Theory
Although Burke generally does not reason from first principles in the
formal sense of John Locke or Thomas Hobbes, his thought nonetheless
ultimately rests upon a particular view of human nature. '"The foundation
of government is... laid," for Burke, "not in imaginary rights of men...
but in political convenience, and in human nature; either as that nature is
universal, or as it is modified by local habits and social aptitudes." 12 7
Burke's view of human nature and rationality, which developed largely in
response to the optimistic rationalism of the Enlightenment, is relatively
pessimistic: "We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own
private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the
general bank and capital of nations and of ages."12 Burke's philosophy is
thus largely an attempt to make the world safe for human beings of limited
rationality, by suggesting ways of operating and preserving a political sys-
tem that do not require unrealistic rational faculties in either the governors
or the governed. Hence, just as James Madison and the other American
founders have been described as attempting "to economize on virtue," 12 9
Burke attempts to economize on both virtue and rationality. Noel
O'Sullivan calls this approach "a philosophy of imperfection, committed to
below, definitions of coherent philosophies such as Hutchins's, see supra note 121, beg the ques-
tion in that they assume the basic liberal premise that the political and social universe is suscepti-
ble of explanation by means of rational theorizing. See infra notes 131-37.
127. BURE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 534; see also EDMUND BURKE, Observations on a Late
State of the Nation (1769), in 2 Tim WRrrmNGs AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 196 (Paul
Langford ed., Clarendon Press 1981). ("[P]oliticks ought to be adjusted, not to human reasonings,
but to human nature; of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part.").
128. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 138. Burke rejected, however, the idea that human-
ity is universally depraved, observing that "he that accuses all mankind of corruption ought to
remember that he is sure to convict only one." EDMUND BURKE, A Letter from Edmund Burke to
John Farr and John Harris, Esqurs., Sheriffs of the City of Bristol (1777), in 1 THE WORKS OF
THE RiGHT HoN. EDMUND BUnRKE, supra note 20, at 206, 221 [hereinafter BURKE, Letter to the
Sheriffs of Bristol].
129. See Ac RamAN, supra note 13, at 198-99.
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the idea of limits, and directed towards the defence of a limited style of
politics."' 30
An initial corollary of Burke's distrust of human reason is his rejection
of abstract theories. Extremely suspicious of universal propositions, he saw
the Enlightenment's fascination with metaphysical speculation as insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the complexity of social and political reality:
Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral, or any
political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong
to these matters. The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines
of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They
admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These excep-
tions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but
by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first in rank of
the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regula-
tor, the standard of them all.' 3 '
Burke saw himself as a practical politician rather than a philosopher; hence,
his distaste for theory is based in part on a pragmatic public servant's preoc-
cupation with real people and problems.'32 Nevertheless, it is impossible to
avoid the conclusion that Burke was much more than a politician. Despite
Burke's protestations against philosophizing, Professor Hutchins correctly
pointed out that "[Burke] could seldom leave a question without a fling at
the theory of it."' 33 Thus, Burke acknowledged that "I do not put abstract
ideas wholly out of any question, because . . . without . . . sound
well-understood principles, all reasonings in politics, as in every thing else,
would be only a confused jumble of particular facts and details . ... "I"
Nonetheless, he insisted that "[a] statesman, never losing sight of princi-
ples, is to be guided by circumstances."' 35 For Burke, this pragmatism did
not represent a sacrifice of principle in order to meet the exigencies of polit-
ical life; rather, Burke believed that no other philosophical approach was
possible given the limitations of human reason. As J. G. A. Pocock ex-
plained, "[Burke's] account of political society ... endows the community
130. NOPL O'SULLIVAN, CONSERVATISM 4 (1976).
131. BuRxE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 498.
132. See BRURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, supra note 128, at 215 ("I do not pretend to
be an antiquary, a lawyer, or qualified for the chair of professor in metaphysics. I never ventured
to put your solid interests upon speculative grounds."); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567, 1570 (1985) ('The wisdom of the politician
is pragmatic and contextual, attentive to the particularities of time and place, attached to estab-
lished institutions and procedures and accepting of the need for compromise.") (describing
Bickel's philosophy, which was in turn based on Burke's).
133. Hutchins, Theory of the State, supra note 121, at 139.
134. EDMUtD BuKc, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians (1792), in 2 THE WoRKS oF
TmE RI GH HoN. EDMuND BURKE 474, 474 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1841) [hereinafter BuRuc, Uni-
tarians' Petition].
135. Id.
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with an inner life of growth and adaptation, and it denies to individual rea-
son the power to see this process as a whole or to establish by its own
efforts the principles on which the process is based."' 36 As a result, Pocock
concluded, "Burke's thought can.., properly be set in opposition to any
rationalist system of politics, which presents political society as based on
the assent of individual minds to universal principles rationally
discerned."'13 7
Rather than universal principles, Burke believed that political philoso-
phy must begin with the reality of a particular society. 138 He insisted that
"[t]he theory contained in [the Reflections] is not to furnish principles for
making a new constitution, but for illustrating the principles of a constitu-
tion already made. It is a theory drawn from the fact of our govern-
ment."'139 As a result, political theory must take into account the unique
character of each society, acknowledging that "social and civil freedom,
like all other things in common life, are variously mixed and modified,
enjoyed in very different degrees, and shaped into an infinite diversity of
forms, according to the temper and circumstances of every community." 4 '
It is impossible to judge the validity of general principles apart from this
context; as Burke put it, "[t]he practical consequences of any political tenet
go a great way in deciding upon its value.... What in the result is likely to
produce evil, is politically false: that which is productive of good, politi-
cally true."'' This empiricism is joined in Burke's thought with a convic-
tion that no principle can be taken to extremes. "The whole scheme of our
mixed constitution," he observed, "is to prevent any one of its principles
from being carried as far, as, taken by itself, and theoretically, it would
go."' 42 Burke was thus unsympathetic to criticisms that the British consti-
tution failed to perfectly measure up to any given philosophical or moral
principle:
Allow [the avoidance of extremes] to be the true policy of the
British system, then most of the faults with which that system
stands charged will appear to be, not imperfections into which it
has inadvertently fallen, but excellencies which it has studiously
sought. To avoid the perfections of extreme, all its several parts
are so constituted, as not alone to answer their own several ends,
136. . G.A. PococK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution-a Problem in the History of ldeas,
in PoLrrics, LANGUAGE AND TmIM: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 203
(1971).
137. Id.
138. See AxANaa M. BicKm.L, Political Thought and the Democratic Process, in Tim Mo.
RALrrY OF CONSENT 3, 3-4 (1975).
139. BrunKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 534.
140. BuRxE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, supra note 128, at 217.
141. BuRI , Appeal, supra note 20, at 523.
142. Id. at 534.
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but also each to limit and control the others: insomuch, that take
which of the principles you please-you will find its operation
checked and stopped at a certain point. 43
Indeed, Burke felt that attempts to achieve perfection in terms of a given
principle might well be counterproductive; he thus insisted that "[i]t is no
inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be
tolerated; lest, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate
times and manners.... new corruptions might be produced for the conceal-
ment and security of the old."'"
Most of all, Burke abhorred the idea that fundamental and far-reaching
reform should be undertaken in order to rebuild society along ideal lines
dictated by abstract theory. This conviction rested on a sense that the confi-
dent reformers of the Enlightenment did not appreciate the underlying fra-
gility of society:
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his
clock, is however sufficiently confident to think he can safely
take to pieces, and put together at his pleasure, a moral machine
of another guise, importance and complexity, composed of far
other wheels, and springs, and balances, and counteracting and
co-operating powers. Men little think how immorally they act in
rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their delu-
sive good intention is no sort of excuse for their presumption.
They who truly mean well must be fearful of acting ill.' 45
Burke hated abstract theory because it precluded the sort of prudence neces-
sary to maintain the fragile institutions of civil society. As Professor Bickel
explained, "[t]rue believers[,] . . . theorists, and ideologues made the
French Revolution, and for Burke a politics of theory and ideology, of ab-
stract, absolute ideas was an abomination, whether the idea was the right of
the British Parliament to tax the American colonies or the rights of man."'"
Although Burke diligently sought reform of particular abuses in the British
system of government, he refused to subject that system to the withering
scrutiny of comparison with an ideal political theory. "We ought to under-
stand [our Constitution] according to our measure," Burke said, "and to
venerate where we are not able presently to comprehend."147
143. Id.
144. EDMUND Btuma, Thoughts on the Present Discontents (1770), in 2 THs WRrrincs AND
SpEIacHs OF EDMUND BuKE, supra note 127, at 241, 310-11 [hereinafter BURKE, Present
Discontents].
145. BuRxE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 535.
146. ALEXANDER M. BicKEL, Edmund Burke and Political Reason, in THE MoRALrry oF CON-
snrEr, supra note 138, at 11, 19.
147. BuiRK% Appeal, supra note 20, at 536.
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B. Tradition and Prescriptive Wisdom
In place of a priori reason, Burke believed people should rely on the
prescriptive wisdom inherent in longstanding prejudices and existing insti-
tutions. "Burke," Professor Anthony Kronman writes, "is the outstanding
defender of... the ancient but now largely discredited idea that the past has
an authority of its own which, however circumscribed, is inherent and direct
rather than derivative."14  The current disrepute of tradition is evident
from the stigma attached to the word "prejudice." For Burke, prejudice was
not a pejorative term but rather a name for the unexamined wisdom accu-
mulated over generations; he thus praised the British as "men of untaught
feelings, that, instead of casting away all [their] old prejudices,... cherish
them to a very considerable degree, and.., cherish them because they are
prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they
have prevailed, the more [the British] cherish them." 149 If we are to econo-
mize on reason, then, our limited capacities are better employed in search-
ing for the truth contained within prejudice; such truth is not only more
reliable but easier to apply, because it rests upon habit rather than the appli-
cation of the individual's rational faculties. Above all, because prejudice
serves as a surer source of knowledge than the reason of singular human
beings, we should never attempt "to cast away the coat of prejudice and to
leave nothing but the naked reason."'150 Even the most intelligent individual
is limited not only by his own understanding but also by the relative defi-
ciency of his own experience. Prejudice and habit, then, provide a way of
tapping a collective wisdom that transcends the capabilities of any individ-
ual. As Charles Parkin puts it, "[the higher reason] is more surely dis-
cerned in the collective and common experience of men, the co-operation of
minds and the community of instinct and sentiment which links men to one
another."' 51
148. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990).
149. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 138.
150. Id.
151. CHARLEs PARmn, THE MORAL BAsIS OF BURK1'S PoLrricAL THOUGHT 117 (1956). It is
essential to distinguish Burke's understanding of "prejudice" from its modem usage as a synonym
for bigotry. See, e.g., THE AMEvmcAN HERITAGE DIcrnoNARY 977 (2d college ed. 1982) (listing
"[i]rrational suspicion or hatred of a particular group, race, or religion" as a definition for "preju-
dice"). Although prejudice carries a strong presumptive authority for Burke, that authority was
not irrebuttable, particularly when historical experience over time showed a prejudice to be malig-
nant. Burke thus opposed bigotry throughout his life, whether on behalf of Irish Catholics, the
peoples of British India, or African-American slaves. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying
text. Burke's critiques of these and other instances of oppression, however, was always founded
upon prudence and the inconsistency of unjust practices with other, more deeply rooted traditions,
rather than upon abstract reason. See infra notes 185-96, 414-18.
The wisdom of Burke's emphasis on prejudice is evident when we consider alternative ways
in which a community might respond to bigotry. While it might be theoretically possible, for
instance, to subject each racial slur to rational scrutiny in order to determine whether it contained
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Prescriptive wisdom is also evident in the ancient institutions of civil
society. In his search for guidance in government, Burke looked not to
abstract speculation but to the British constitution, which had evolved
slowly and incrementally over hundreds of years.152 Although such a struc-
ture may contain ingredients whose rational purpose is not immediately evi-
dent to individual minds, Burke asserted that we should venerate even these
incomprehensible portions.1 53 This is because the existing institutional ar-
rangements reflect the accumulated wisdom of centuries of political deci-
sions; each incremental step is the product either of rational deliberation or
natural development and has been tested by the experience of many years.
The cumulative product reflects a reason far superior to that of any individ-
ual or generation:
Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but
... to government.... It is a presumption in favour of any settled
scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation
has long existed and flourished under it. It is a better presumption
even of the choice of a nation, far better than any sudden and
temporary arrangement by actual election. Because a nation is
not an idea only of local extent, and individual momentary aggre-
gation, but it is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as
well as in numbers and in space. And this is a choice not of one
day, or one set of people .... it is a deliberate election of ages and
of generations; it is a constitution made by what is ten thousand
times better than choice; it is made by the peculiar circumstances,
occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil and social habi-
tudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long
space of time. It is a vestment, which accommodates itself to the
body. Nor is prescription of government formed upon blind un-
meaning prejudices-for man is a most unwise, and a most wise,
being. The individual is foolish. The multitude, for the moment,
is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is
wise, and when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always
acts right.' 54
any truth, Burke would argue that we should seek to make abhorrence of racism so deeply en-
grained in the character of citizens that rejection of such slurs would be instinctive and automatic.
In much the same way, it seems likely that Thomas Jefferson's phrase "all men are created
equal'---a much contested proposition at the time it was written-is held by most Americans
today as an article of faith and tradition rather than considered political theory. In Burke's terms,
a commitment to some form of political equality-however contested the content of that term
might be-has become an American prejudice.
152. BURKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 535.
153. Id. at 536.
154. EDMuND BuRxE, Speech on the Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons
(1782), in 2 THm WoRKS OF Tm RIGHT HON. EDMUND ButKE, supra note 134, at 486, 487.
Burke's idea that prescription is a better indicator of consent is based on his idea that the social
contract includes not only the living but also the dead and the unborn. For Burke, the choice of a
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This passage, according to Professor Pocock, represents a restatement of the
classic English doctrine of the ancient constitution that undergirded the de-
velopment of the English common law.155 Pocock characterizes that doc-
trine as "the habit of interpreting English politics and society not with the
aid of any political theory designed for the explanation of society in gen-
eral, but in the light of those assumptions about English society which were
already contained in its most distinctive and characteristic body of rules." 6
'That body of rules," Pocock adds, "was the common law ..... "I Such an
approach recognizes the possibility of reform, but insists that the primary
inspiration for such reform comes from the history and past practices of
society.158
C. The Organic Social Contract
Burke's idea of the past's claim upon present and future generations is
reflected in a theory of the social contract that differs substantially from the
classical liberal conception. John Locke's social contract is an expression
of the principle that government must derive from popular consent, as well
as a means for deducing the rights of persons in civil society. 15 9 Similarly,
John Rawls's original position follows in this tradition by acting as a philo-
sophical test of a just society."6 Burke's contract, by contrast, has little to
say about how or why people might choose to enter into society; indeed, for
Burke, the origins of society are lost in the mists of time immemorial."6 '
single generation does not weigh heavily versus the preference of the multitudes who have gone
before. See infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
155. See PococK, supra note 136, at 227. But see Paul Lucas, On Edmund Burke's Doctrine
of Prescription; or, An Appeal from the New to the Old Lawyers, 11 HIST. J. 35, 56-63 (1968)
(arguing that "Burke both emerged from and rejected the intellectual womb of English legal
traditionalism").
156. Pococy, supra note 136, at 210.
157. Id.
158. In what is probably the most sophisticated treatment of Burke in the modem legal litera-
ture, Professor Anthony Kronman suggests that Burke's traditionalism springs from a deeper
source. "The past," Professor Kronman writes, "is not something that we ... choose for one
reason or another to respect; rather, it is such respect that establishes our humanity in the first
place." Kronman, supra note 148, at 1066. Kronman's basic argument is that the ability to par-
ticipate in multigenerational cultural projects-such as the continuing evolution of the law
through precedent-is the essence of our humanity. Hence, tradition is worthy of respect purely
for its own sake. Unfortunately, an in-depth treatment of Kronman's argument is outside the
scope of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that even if Kronman is not entirely persuasive
in characterizing Burke's traditionalism as resting on other than prudential grounds, it seems clear
that, for Burke, prudential grounds are by no means inferior justifications.
159. See JoHN Locca, SEscorN TREAns OF GovERNgmr 9N 95-99, at 58-60 (Richard H.
Cox ed., Harlan Davidson 1982) (1690).
160. See RAWLs, supra note 97, ch. I, § 4, at 17-22 (1971).
161. See PococK, supra note 136, at 229 (describing Burke's belief that "little or nothing can
be known of the history of an immemorial constitution save that there is a great weight of pre-
sumption in its favour").
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For Burke, then, the social contract functions primarily as an articulation of
the nature of civil society:
Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of
mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure-but the
state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partner-
ship agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco,
or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little tempo-
rary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is
to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partner-
ship in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a
temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science;
a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained
in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who
are dead, and those who are to be born.' 62
The first distinctive feature of this contract is that it includes not only the
living, but also the dead and the unborn. Burke would thus never accept
Thomas Jefferson's declaration that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the
living: . . . the dead have neither powers or rights over it."' 63 Instead,
Burke views society as an organic community. "Our political system," he
writes, is like
a permanent body composed of transitory parts, . . . moulding
together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race,
[wherein] the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged, or
young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on
through the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and
progression.)
In this way, the British constitution "preserv[es] the method of nature in
the conduct of the state," thereby "giv[ing] to our frame of polity the image
of a relation in blood, binding up the constitution of our country with our
dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our
family affections, keeping inseparable.., our state, our hearths, our sepul-
chres, and our altars.' ' 65
The role of consent in this community is minimized in several ways.
First, Burke adopts a strong version of implied consent, whereby those born
into the community automatically incur obligations upon receiving the ben-
162. BuRKs, Reflections, supra note 12, at 146-47.
163. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), quoted in GEORGE
SELDES, THE GREAT THouGrrs 209 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
164. Busmc, Reflections, supra note 12, at 84.
165. Id.
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efits of civil society.' 66 Second, Burke believes that, as a practical matter,
the contract is justified by prescription and not by rationalistic speculation
about its origins. "The foundations, on which obedience to governments is
founded, are not to be constantly discussed," he writes. "That we are here,
supposes the discussion already made, and the dispute settled." 167 Finally,
and most interestingly, the social contract is binding in the deeper sense that
it arises out of human nature and natural law; in this sense, the contract is
not voluntary at all. 168 This position is evident in the Reflections, where
Burke argues that
[e]ach contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great
primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the
higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, accord-
ing to a fixed compact sanctioned by inviolable oath which holds
all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed
place.16
9
As a result, individuals are bound to other members of the political commu-
nity by duties and obligations that are not chosen. "Dark and inscrutable
are the ways by which we come into the world," Burke writes. "The in-
stincts which give rise to this mysterious process of nature are not of our
making. But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps unknowable,
arise moral duties, which, as we are able perfectly to comprehend, we are
bound indispensably to perform."'170
The prescriptive authority of Burke's social contract creates an enor-
mous presumption in favor of existing institutions. "The constitution of a
country being once settled upon some compact, tacit or expressed," Burke
declares, "there is no power existing of force to alter it, without the breach
166. Although Burke admits that "civil society might be at first a voluntary act," and even that
"in many cases it undoubtedly was," he nonetheless insists that "its continuance is under a perma-
nent standing covenant, co-existing with the society." Social obligations do not, for Burke, de-
pend on the acts or choices of individuals; rather, he explains that "[mien without their choice
derive benefits from [social] association; without their choice they are subjected to duties in
consequence of these benefits; and without their choice they enter into a virtual obligation as
binding as any that is actual." ButKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 522.
167. BuRi , Unitarians' Petition, supra note 134 at 476. As Leo Strauss observes, "Burke
does not reject the view that all authority has its ultimate origin in the people or that the sovereign
is ultimately the people or that all authority is ultimately derived from a compact of previously
'uncovenanted' men. But he denies that these ultimate truths ... are politically relevant ......
LEo STRAuss, NATURAL RaoHT AND HISTORY 298 (1953).
168. See O'GoRMAN, supra note 125, at 114.
169. BuRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 147.
170. BuRKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 523. For a modem statement of a related view, see
Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in LMER.ALISM AND ITS CRMCS 172 (Michael J. Sandel
ed., 1984) (recognizing "loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact
that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-
as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history," and which
"go beyond the obligations [we] voluntarily incur").
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of the covenant, or the consent of all the parties. Such is the nature of a
contract."' 7 The will of the majority, moreover, is irrelevant where the
basic obligations of society are concerned; the majority "cannot alter the
moral any more than... the physical essence of things."' 72 This admoni-
tion does not preclude reform, however, so long as the essential structure of
the compact is kept according to tradition and passed on to future genera-
tions. The conditions and methodology of such reform are considered in
the next section.
D. The Possibility of Evolutionary Change
Many commentators have tended to assume that Burke's views on tra-
dition and the social contract lock him into a rigid defense of the existing
order.' 73 Such criticisms ignore Burke's profound commitment to social
and political reform. Burke writes, for example, that "[a] disposition to
preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard
of a statesman."' 7 4 This commitment to reform extended even to the basic
constitution of society: "Publick troubles have often called upon the Coun-
try to look into its Constitution. It has ever been bettered by such a revi-
sion." 75 Nor did Burke see his traditionalism as inconsistent with reform.
For Burke, "the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conserva-
tion, and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a princi-
ple of improvement. It leaves acquisition free, but it secures what it
acquires."'1 76 This method has the advantage of ensuring that reforms are
not merely transitory; instead, they are "locked fast as in a sort of family
settlement, grasped as in a kind of mortmain for ever."'177 The best evi-
dence of Burke's commitment to reform, however, lies in the record of his
political life. Prior to the French Revolution, which came near the end of
Burke's political career, no one would have questioned Burke's reformist
credentials. In his earlier years, Burke had spoken out against the oppres-
sion of Catholics in Ireland,'17 served as the philosophical spokesman for
171. BURKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 521-22.
172. Id. at 522.
173. See, e.g., Hutchins, Theory of the State, supra note 121, at 147-48 (arguing that under
Burke's organic contract "[t]he people are ... contractually bound to the precise constitution
which they possess and to the precise distribution of political power which it ordains. A doctrine
Locke had employed to legalize a revolution becomes, in Burke's hands, a means of defending the
status quo.").
174. BuKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 206.
175. EDMUND BURKE, Address to the British Colonists in North America (1777), in 2 THE
WORKS OF THE RIGHr HoN. EDMUND BURKE, supra note 134, at 401, 404.
176. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 83-84.
177. Id. at 84.
178. See EDMUND BURKE, Tract on the Popery Laws (1765), in 9 Tim WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE, supra note 30, at 434, 435 [hereinafter BURKE, Popery Laws].
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the Rockingham Whig party in their opposition to George III's court system
of ministry, 17 9 and opposed Lord North's ministry by urging conciliation
with the American colonists.18 Burke also strongly condemned slavery;
prior to the American Revolution, he opposed seating American representa-
tives in Parliament on the ground that any delegation would have included
slave owners,"' l and drafted a Negro Code that would have provided for the
gradual emancipation of black slaves in America.18 Finally, much of
Burke's later political career was preoccupied with seeking to shelter the
people and customs of India from the abuses of the British East India Com-
pany; this effort culminated with his leading role in the seven year impeach-
ment trial of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General of Bengal. 8 3 Indeed,
Burke's remark near the end of his life that "the affairs of India ... are
those on which I value myself the most'" 84 indicates that he viewed himself
primarily as a reformer.
Burke's conservatism is evident, however, in the particular method of
reform that he advocated. He was constantly aware of the complexity of
civil society and the danger that our limited ability to fully grasp the work-
ings of government posed for reformers; he thus criticized the French revo-
lutionaries for forgetting that "[i]n states there are often some obscure and
179. See BURKE, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 260-61.
180. See EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Conciliation with America (1775), in 1 THE WORKS OF
THE RIGnT Ho N. EDMUND BURKE, supra note 20, at 181, 181 [hereinafter BURKE, On
Conciliation].
181. See CONOR C. O'BRImN, THE GREAT MELODY: A TnEMmAnc BIOGRAPHY AND COM-
MNrm ANTHoLoGY OF EDMUND BURKE 91-92 (1992); see also id. at 92 (noting Burke's skepti-
cism of American rhetoric about freedom in the Virginia Resolves of 1765, on the ground that the
authors were slave owners).
182. See EDMUND BURKE, Letter from Edmund Burke to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas: With
the Sketch of a Negro Code (1792), in 2 THE WORKS OF a RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE, supra
note 134, at 419, 420-28. It is thus unfair to identify Burke with the defense of slavery or segrega-
tion. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 103, at 1712 ("The traditionalist, Burkean case in support of
segregation was a strong one .... ). Professor Strauss fails to recognize that the Burkean case for
segregation was no stronger than the case for slavery-which obviously was not strong enough,
given Burke's countervailing commitment to justice and reform. Indeed, Professor James Wilson
concludes that "the essence of Burke's conservatism" was "a vigilant hostility to injustice." Wil-
son, supra note 5, at 942. The view of Burke as ineluctably committed to defending all aspects of
any existing order, no matter how unjust, is an untenable straw man once Burke's political record
is taken into account.
183. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Opening of Impeachment (1788), in 6 THE WRrr.
INGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 264 (P.J. Marshall ed., Clarendon Press 1991); EDMUND
BURKE, Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts (1785), in 1 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HON.
EDMUND BUIRKE, supra note 20, at 315.
184. EDMUND BURKE, Letter from the Right Hon. Edmund Burke to a Noble Lord (1796), in
SELECTED WRrrIN(s AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 512, 521 (Ross J. S. Hoffman & Paul
Levack eds., 1949). Although Burke failed to secure Hastings's conviction, Lord Morley asserts
that "he overthrew a system, and stamped its principles with lasting censure and shame." MOR-
LEY, supra note 125, at 129. But see O'GoRmAN, supra note 125, at 105-106 (arguing that Indian
reform was inevitable even absent Burke's role).
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almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on
which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially
depend."1 5 Because of this inherent danger, Burke insisted that "it is with
infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice
which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes
of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of
approved utility before his eyes." '186 A prudent reformer must thus begin
not with abstract speculation but with "the existing materials of his coun-
try."' 7 It was in this way that Burke explained the Glorious Revolution of
1688, which he saw as having restored constitutional government to Britain:
The very idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough to
fill us with disgust and horror. We wished at the period of the
Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an in-
heritance from our forefathers. Upon that body and stock of in-
heritance we have taken care not to inoculate any cyon alien to
the nature of the original plant. All the reformations we have
hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of reference to
antiquity; and I hope ... that all those which possibly may be
made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical prece-
dent, authority, and example.'
This method is unlikely to satisfy those who are impatient with continuing
injustice. Burke, however, saw the slow pace of change as a positive factor,
rather thani a necessary inconvenience. "It is one of the excellencies of a
method in which time is amongst the assistants," he wrote, "that its opera-
tion is slow, and in some cases almost imperceptible."'8 9 Burke supported
this view with an analogy to physical construction: "If circumspection and
caution are a part of wisdom, when we work only upon inanimate matter,"
he pointed out, "surely they become a part of duty too, when the subject of
our demolition and construction is not brick and timber but sentient beings,
by the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits multitudes
may be rendered miserable."' 90
Slow reform, for Burke, minimized the risks of change by proceeding
in small increments that could each be tested for consistency with the over-
all structure of government and society:
By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is
watched; the good or ill success of the first, gives light to us in the
second; and so, from light to light, we are conducted with safety
185. BuRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 112.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 206.
188. Id. at 81.
189. Id. at 217.
190. Id.
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through the whole series. We see that the parts of the system do
not clash. The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are
provided for as they arise. One advantage is as little as possible
sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, we balance.
We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anom-
alies and contending principles that are found in the minds and
affairs of men. 191
This description, as well as Burke's references to "analogical precedent,
authority, and example,"' 192 is reminiscent of the methods of the common
law. Indeed, Professor Charles Fried describes the rejection of abstract phi-
losophy in favor of precedent and analogy as paradigmatic of "the artificial
Reason of the law."' 93 From a historical standpoint, Professor Pocock
traces the kinship of Burke's thought with that of Sir Matthew Hale, one of
the foremost English common lawyers. For both Hale and Burke, Pocock
argues, "a belief in immemorial customary law.., was one of the cardinal
beliefs of the society in which both men lived."'194 Burke's theory of re-
form is thus grounded in the common-law tradition of evolutionary change
whereby "custom was constantly being subjected to the test of experience,
so that if immemorial it was, equally, always up to date."'19 Even when
evolutionary adaptation was required, however, Burke insisted on careful
adherence to the general themes and values inherent in tradition. "I put my
foot in the tracks of our forefathers," he declared, "where I can neither
wander nor stumble."'196
E. The Natural Aristocracy
For Burke, one means of ensuring that change would be prudently
managed was to place power in the hands of a governing elite. "In all
societies," Burke argued, "consisting of various descriptions of citizens,
some description must be uppermost."' 97 This uppermost description is the
"natural aristocracy." According to Burke, "A true natural aristocracy is...
an essential integrant part of any large body rightly constituted"; this group
operates in society as "the leading, guiding, and governing part. It is the
soul to the body, without which the man does not exist."'19 The natural
191. Id.
192. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
193. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tgx. L. Rv.
35, 57 (1981).
194. PococK, supra note 136, at 231. Burke's roots in the common-law tradition are also
evident in his metaphors, which often "[identify] the principles of political liberty with the princi-
pies of our law of landed property." Id. at 212.
195. Id. at 213.
196. BuRKE, On Concilation, supra note 180, at 197.
197. BuiRE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 100.
198. BuRKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 525.
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aristocracy thus provides the structure that holds society together; without
it, a people collapses into a mob. Burke was ambiguous, however, with
respect to the membership of this natural aristocracy. On the one hand,
Burke had a considerable attachment to the traditional system of hereditary
privilege: "Some decent, regulated pre-eminence," he wrote, "some prefer-
ence (not exclusive appropriation) given to birth, is neither unnatural, nor
unjust, nor impolitic."' 99 Membership in the elite is based on a set of "le-
gitimate presumptions, which, taken as generalities, must be admitted for
actual truths. ' '2"" These presumptions are based upon Burke's belief that a
certain sort of upbringing is most conducive to forming the character of
those who are to direct society:
To be bred in a place of estimation; ... to be habituated to the
censorial inspection of the public eye;.., to have leisure to read,
to reflect, to converse; to be enabled to draw the court and atten-
tion of the wise and learned wherever they are to be found;.., to
be taught to despise danger in the pursuit of honour and duty; to
be formed to the greatest degree of vigilance, foresight, and cir-
cumspection, in a state of things in which no fault is committed
with impunity, and the slightest mistakes draw on the most ruin-
ous consequences ... these are the circumstances of men, that
form what I should call a natural aristocracy, without which there
is no nation.20'
Under Burke's idea of "presumptive virtue" then, "[t]hose who have land,
leisure, and information, and especially land, are presumed to be virtuous
199. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 103. The principal value of a hereditary aristocracy
is its ability to serve as a means of transmission for the culture and traditions of society. The
perpetuation of the great families, Burke felt, produces a valuable historical continuity; families,
like the contract of civil society itself, are communities of the dead, the living, and the unborn.
Burke thus observes that "[tihe immediate power of a Duke of Richmond, or a Marquis of Rock-
ingham, is not so much of moment but if their conduct and example hand down their principles to
their successors; then their houses become the publick repositories and office of Record for the
constitution." EDMUND ButuK, Letter from Edmund Burke to the Duke of Richmond (November
15, 1772), in 2 THE Com-SPoNDEmcE OF EDMUND BURKE 372, 377 (Lucy S. Sutherland ed.,
1960). Burke's attitude toward the hereditary elite was not without ambivalence, however. Lord
Morley recounts that "Burke used to reproach them with being somewhat languid, scrupulous, and
unsystematic"; according to Morley, Burke became frustrated when he could not agree with im-
portant members of the ministry "as to what constitutes a decent and reasonable quantity of
fox-hunting... in a [national] crisis." MoR.EY, supra note 125, at 61-62. This frustration was
only symptomatic of Burke's deeper awareness that the aristocratic system kept self-made men of
ability (like himself) from ever attaining the highest positions of power; according to Isaac
Kramnick, "Burke epitomized the love/hate ambivalence that the assertive bourgeoisie felt toward
their aristocratic betters." IsAAc KRAMNICK, THE RAGE OF EDMUND BuP.KE: PORTRAIT OF AN
AMIVALENT CONSERvATIVE 8 (1977).
200. ButKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 525.
201. Id. at 214-15.
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and wise."2 2 Despite his admiration of the hereditary aristocracy, how-
ever, Burke believed that this group must be supplemented by persons of
ability from the other classes. Burke asserts that he does not wish "to con-
fine power, authority, and distinction to blood and names and titles." In-
stead, he explains, "[t]here is no qualification for government, but virtue
and wisdom, actual or presumptive. Wherever they are actually found, they
have, in whatever state, condition, profession or trade, the passport of
Heaven to human place and honour."203
Whatever its composition, the idea of a natural aristocracy is central to
Burke's theory of civil society. At the heart of this theory is a distrust of
the ability of law and institutional constraints alone to hold off the corrup-
tion of the State. Instead, good government ultimately must depend on the
character of the rulers rather than the institutional structures that surround
them:
The laws reach but a very little way. Constitute Government how
you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the
exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and
uprightness of Ministers of State. Even all the use and potency of
the laws depends upon them. Without them, your Common-
wealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living,
acting, effective constitution.2°
Burke's basic disagreement with Madison, then, lies in Burke's conviction
that we cannot economize on virtue by means of institutional checks and
balances or by setting conflicting interests against one another.205 Instead,
Burke argues that we must concentrate power in the hands of a relatively
few individuals who are either bred or carefully selected to be more virtu-
ous than the population at large. 06 Character is more important than law;
202. Hutchins, Oligarchy, supra note 121, at 114. As illustrated below, however, Hutchins
goes too far in asserting that "the presumption is irrebuttable." Id.
203. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 101. Burke's catalogue of qualifications for the
natural aristocracy thus includes "to be employed as an administrator of law and justice, and to be
thereby amongst the first benefactors to mankind," "to be a professor of high science, or of liberal
and ingenuous art," "to be amongst rich traders, who from their success are presumed to have
sharp and vigorous understandings," and "to possess the virtues of diligence, order, constancy, and
regularity, and to have cultivated an habitual regard to commutative justice." BURKE, Appeal,
supra note 20, at 525.
204. BURKE, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 277.
205. Cf., e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Max Peloff ed., 1987) (argu-
ing that, because we cannot count on virtuous rulers, government must be so constructed as to
check itself). As a proponent of the British Constitution's "mixed regime," of course, Burke
approved of institutional measures based on divided functions and conflicting interests. See
BUmK, Reflections, supra note 12, at 244. The point here is simply that those measures are
insufficient to preserve society if its statesmen fail to live up to a certain standard of virtue.
206. In addition to the provision of a governing elite, the presence of the natural aristocracy
has a stabilizing influence in two more subtle ways. The first is through the concentrations of
property that adhere to social status; such concentrations, particularly in the form of hereditary
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"of all things [with which] we ought to be the most concerned," Burke
writes, is "who and what sort of men they are, that hold the trust of every
thing that is dear to us.""2 7
Im. MODERN CONSERVATIVE CONSTrruTIONALISM THROUGH
BuRKEAN EYES
Having developed a model of classical conservatism based on Edmund
Burke's political philosophy, this section uses that model to critique the
modem conservative constitutionalism of Justice Scalia, Judge Bork, and
others. Because this Article is not an attempt to evaluate comprehensively
the jurisprudence of any particular individual, this section does not discuss
many aspects of modem conservative thought that are legitimately con-
servative in a Burkean sense; Justice Scalia, for instance, often exhibits a
deep respect for tradition that is distinct from his commitment to original-
ism. OS This Article's purpose, rather, is to ask whether the methodological
doctrines most commonly associated with conservatism today-original-
ism, judicial restraint, and rule-based decisionmaking-can accurately be
described as "conservative" in the traditional, Burkean sense. Although
such an inquiry sheds little normative light on how we ought to interpret the
wealth transmitted from generation to generation, provide a stabilizing force within the social and
economic order. See BEumE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 102 ("The power of perpetuating our
property in our families is one of the most valuable and interesting circumstances belonging to it,
and that which tends the most to the perpetuation of society itself."). The natural aristocracy was
also important for its role in preserving the manners of the ancient world, which Burke referred to
as chivalry and nobility. For Burke, the way people are accustomed to treat one another is at least
as important as legal obligations. Human reason is not sufficient to formulate a system of govern-
ment that can make allowances for all the complexities of human interactions through positive
law; instead, we rely on manners to smooth over the inevitable conflicts and make an imperfect
system workable. Burke was thus confident that "[w]hilst manners remain entire, they will cor-
rect the vices of law, and soften it at length to their own temper." BuRxE, Letter to the Sheriffs of
Bristol, supra note 128, at 210. Although both these aspects of the natural aristocracy were cru-
cial for Burke, they are less important in the context of judicial review; hence, I have devoted only
minimal space to them here.
207. BuRKE, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 278.
208. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (arguing that historical acceptance of punitive damages is sufficient to
uphold them under the Due Process Clause); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621-22
(1990) (holding that transient jurisdiction is constitutionally valid because of its historical accept-
ance, without considering the usual fairness balancing test used in personal jurisdiction cases);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that traditional
denial of parental rights to adulterous natural fathers precluded a substantive due process chal-
lenge to a statute granting a conclusive presumption of fatherhood to the mother's husband). See
generally Strauss, supra note 103, at 1701-05 (concluding that Justice Scalia "is deeply respectful
of tradition and gives it near primacy in interpreting the Constitution"). Note, however, that to the
extent the historical pedigree of an existing practice is used, as in Burnham, as a bright-line rule of
validity that excludes all other considerations, that approach is in tension with the Burkean prefer-
ence for particularized, standard-like decisionmaking. For criticism of Justice Scalia's specific
approach to tradition in Michael H., see infra notes 403-09 and accompanying text.
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Constitution, it can at least help clarify the terms of theoretical debate.
Once we understand that "conservatism" may mean something other than
originalism, restraint, and rules, for example, we are in a better position to
understand the current divisions on the Supreme Court.20 9 To the extent
that Burke's classical position is persuasive, however, my critique takes on
a more normative focus. If Burke is basically right about the limitations of
human reason, the importance of tradition, etc., then modem conservative
constitutional jurisprudence is sorely misguided. Before embarking upon
that argument, however, it is necessary to deal with some problems of trans-
lation in applying Burke's views to modem-day America.
A. The Dilemma of American Conservatism
The translation problem arises from Burke's own insistence on the im-
portance of context. "[T]he general character and situation of a people
must determine what sort of government is fitted for them," he insisted.
"That point nothing else can or ought to determine."21 0 Some of Burke's
strongest statements in this vein, moreover, occurred when he was address-
ing the subject of the American colonies.2"1 This attachment to the particu-
lars of time and place creates a problem for Burke's modem students
because modem America bears little resemblance, at least at first glance, to
the aristocratic, traditionalist society which Burke was concerned with de-
fending. "We live," according to Professor McConnell, "in the most thor-
oughly liberal political community in the history of the world, a community
in which virtually all serious political figures from Barry Goldwater to
George McGovern are 'liberals."'"2 2 The reason for this lies in what histo-
rian Louis Hartz has called "the storybook truth about American history:
that America was settled by men who fled from the feudal and clerical
oppressions of the Old World."2 3 America thus lacks the aristocratic rem-
nants of the feudal tradition that Burke felt were so important.21 4 And
209. Professor Kathleen Sullivan's insightful Foreword to the Supreme Court's 1992 Term is
an excellent example of a similar project. In her essay, Sullivan describes the divisions among the
Court's "conservative" bloc in cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992), R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992),
in terms of the choice between rules and standards; she traces this distinction, in turn, to alterna-
tive versions of philosophical conservatism. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 104, 112-21.
210. BURKE, On Concilation, supra note 180, at 103.
211. See id.
212. McConnell, supra note 69, at 1514.
213. HARTz, supra note 22, at 3.
214. See, e.g., 1 ALwaXS DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMoCRACY IN AMERICA 14 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Vintage Books 1945) (1835) ("The emigrants who colonized the shores of America... somehow
separated the democratic principle from all the principles that [they] had to contend with in the
old communities of Europe, and transplanted it alone to the New World. It has there been able to
spread in perfect freedom and peaceably to determine the character of the laws by influencing the
manners of the country.").
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never having experienced a French-style revolution against an entrenched
feudal order, America also lacks the tradition of reaction of which Burke's
Reflections were a part.215 In short, Burke developed his philosophy for a
society that was already highly traditionalist;216 his ideas are thus of ques-
tionable applicability to a nation that is itself a child of liberalism. In
America, Hartz contends, "Burke ... equalled Locke." '217
American conservatism has never coherently resolved this dilemma.
The result has been that American conservatism is highly splintered; as
Robert Reich observed near the end of Ronald Reagan's presidency, "so
many different ideologies now parade under the conservative banner that
without a strong leader capable of uniting them the conservative movement
is likely to fragment."21 This fragmentation, in turn, causes problems for
conservative constitutionalism. The sheer diversity of philosophical view-
points within contemporary American conservatism makes it difficult to
formulate a single, coherent constitutional theory upon which all factions-
economic free marketeers, New Right religious fundamentalists, neocon-
servative intellectuals, and others-can agree.219 I am not, of course, at-
tempting to develop a theory that will pass review by the Republican Party
Platform Committee; however, the underlying causes of the dilemma go to
the very possibility of a coherent conservative theory. American conserva-
tism has splintered because some, perhaps most, American conservatives
feel obligated to defend the democratic traditions of classical liberalism.220
215. See HARTZ, supra note 22, at 5; see also id. at 35-50 (discussing the distinctive nature of
the American revolution); 2 AL ms DE TocQuEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERiCA 108 (Phillips
Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1840) ("The great advantage of the Americans is that they
have arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution, and that
they are born equal instead of becoming so.").
216. See Pococy, supra note 136, at 143.
217. HARTz, supra note 22, at 153. In more recent years, the "liberal consensus" school of
thought exemplified by Tocqueville and Hartz has come under attack from scholars who empha-
size the civic republican elements of the American political tradition. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN,
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERCAN REVOLUTION (1967); J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIVEL-
LAN MoMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT ANt THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1786-1787 (1969). But see
Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HisT. REV. 629 (1982) (arguing that
both the American Founders and the British reformers of the late 18th Century relied on Locke far
more than on older republican traditions). I have no wish to step into this scholarly crossfire.
Rather, the crucial point is that neither the liberal consensus historians nor the republican revision-
ists assert the existence of any aristocratic elements that would make Burke feel more at home.
218. Robert B. Reich, Will the Right Splinter After Reagan?, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1988, at
16. Moreover, none of the most prominent groups--economic conservatives, neoconservatives,
or the New Right-display much affinity for Burkean principles. See PAUL GOTTFRIED &
THoMAs FLEmanG, THE CONSERVATIVE MovmhmNT at xi (1988) ("[Clonservative attitudes may
no longer be relevant to what are now the dominant tendencies in American conservatism.").
219. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 911.
220. See, e.g., HARTz, supra note 22, at 110 (noting that the Whigs, who replaced the Federal-
ists as the party of the Right after 1840, "embraced America's liberal unity with a vengeance, and
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If the liberal rationalist tradition is truly inescapable in America, then a
Burkean critique of modem constitutional jurisprudence will be meaning-
less. In that case, we are stuck with the debate between originalists and
nonoriginalists-a debate which, I will argue below, is mostly a debate
within liberalism.
Burke's own historical situation provides a clue towards resolving this
dilemma. After all, Burke's partisan political loyalties were not to the To-
ries but the Whigs-the party of liberal reform which traced its origins back
to the Glorious Revolution and John Locke. Professor Huntington points
out that, although it is true that Burke equalled Locke in America, "it was
equally true in England. Burke defended the English constitution of his day
first against the efforts of George III to reassert the influence of the Crown
over Parliament and then against the efforts of the democrats to broaden the
control of the people over Parliament.""' Burke was a conservative, ac-
cording to Huntington, because "one hundred years after Locke he was still
attempting to preserve the institutions of 1689.''222 Burke did not, however,
merely restate Locke's arguments; rather, he clothed the political arrange-
ments that the Whigs had established in the mantle of tradition and then
developed a theory of politics that made adherence to tradition the primary
imperative of good government. In so doing, Burke abandoned many of
Locke's rationalist assumptions and subtly reworked many of Locke's cen-
tral concepts.223 The social contract, for example, which for Locke had
been a tool for deriving the rights of individuals in society, became for
Burke a metaphor for the involuntary obligations of individuals to the com-
munity.224 Burke understood that preserving liberalism required a philoso-
phy other than liberalism itself.
developed a philosophy of democratic capitalism"); RossrrER, supra note 30, at 219-20 ("The
Right had to renounce Conservatism and accept the ground rules of democracy or be thrown out
of the game for disloyalty and perversity. The game, as we know, was much too pleasant and
profitable, and the Right has been playing it ever since 1840 with smashing success."). Again, I
do not want to dispute the possibility that republicanism may have played an equally important
role in the origins of the nation. Civic republican scholars, however, seem to agree that "the ghost
of Republicanism has long since deserted the center of American life, where Liberalism is now
Hegemonic." AcxERmAN, supra note 13, at 29. It is thus understandable that many American
conservatives have chosen liberalism as the appropriate philosophical tradition to defend.
221. Huntington, supra note 10, at 461.
222. Id.; see also FREDEMCK A. DREYER, BuRE's PoLrncs: A Smnv IN Whio ORTiODOXY
5 (1979) ("Burke's theory was orthodox Whiggism in the sense that it was compatible with Lock-
ean principles.").
223. See Rod Preece, Edmund Burke and His European Reception, 21 THE EoiurrEETrrH Cmi-
TuRY: THEoRY AND INTERPRErATION 255, 259 (1980) ("Burke ... accepts much of [the maxims
and principles of liberalism], but restricts their excesses by order, marries their liberties with
virtue, enjoins their pursuit only by prudence, and denies those principles when discovered by the
vagaries of 'barbarous metaphysics.'").
224. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text.
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Seventeenth century liberalism failed to provide the tools for its own
defense because it was what Professor Huntington calls an "ideational" ide-
ology-an ideology based on "the ascription of value to theoreti-
cally-defined formulations and the appraisal of existing reality in terms of
those formulations. '2  Even when a society's institutions generally con-
form to the ideal, Huntington argues that an ideational ideology cannot be
used to defend the status quo:
The perfect nature of the ideology's ideal and the imperfect na-
ture and inevitable mutation of the institutions create a gap be-
tween the two. The ideal becomes a standard by which to
criticize the institutions, much to the embarrassment of those who
believe in the ideal and yet still wish to defend the institutions.
Eventually the defenders are faced with an unavoidable choice:
either they must abandon their ideology in order to defend their
institutions and substitute a conservative philosophy for their old
ideational theory, or they must adhere to their ideational theory at
the risk of further contributing to the downfall of those institu-
tions which largely embody their ideals.226
The particular nature of liberalism, moreover, simply worsens the dilemma.
Liberalism's faith in both reason and progress requires continual revision of
existing theories, followed by renewed criticism of political institutions for
nonconformity with the new dispensation.227 Professor Mary Becker, for
example, notes that "[tihe current versions of traditional liberalism, repub-
licanism, critical legal studies, and feminism are, today, almost unrecogniz-
able as developments of the liberal thought of even twenty years ago. 228
Modem legal liberalism thus repeats the eighteenth century pattern in which
the radicalism of the French revolutionaries succeeded the moderate liber-
alism of John Locke.229
Conservatism's job, then, is to save liberalism from itself. Indeed, this
has been the role of American conservatism for much of our history. Ac-
cording to Clinton Rossiter, "[Americans] have thought of liberty as a heri-
225. Huntington, supra note 10, at 458; see also KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
219 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., 1936) (1929) (characterizing the "liberal-humanitarian
idea" as "establish[ing] a 'correct' rational conception to be set off against evil reality").
226. Huntington, supra note 10, at 458-59 (citations omitted).
227. See MANNiELm, supra note 225, at 222-23; see also Michael Walzer, The Communitar-
ian Critique of Liberalism, 18 PoL. THEORY 6, 14 (1990) (observing that "liberalism is a strange
doctrine, which seems continually to undercut itself, to disdain its own traditions, and to produce
in each generation renewed hopes for a more absolute freedom from history and society alike").
228. Mary E. Becker, Four Faces of Liberal Legal Thought, 34 U. Cm. L. SCH. REc. 11, 17
(1988).
229. Cf. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE Cfmtc L LEGAL STUDiEs MovmiT 4142 (1986) (advo-
cating a "superliberalism" to be embodied in "an institutional structure, itself self-revising, that
would provide constant occasions to disrupt any fixed structure of power and coordination in
social life").
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tage to be preserved rather than as a goal to be fought for. The result is a
political tradition that is ... conservative about liberalism .... ,1230 In order
to preserve liberal traditions, however, one must discard the rationalist and
progressive assumptions that pervade modem liberalism; the next grand
theory of constitutional law will not inevitably be better, and indeed may be
a great deal worse than what we have. Modem conservative jurisprudence,
however, only half-fulfills the preservationist role. Proponents of original-
ism, restraint, and rules have indeed abandoned the liberal faith in inevita-
ble intellectual progress, but have retained the Enlightenment's confidence
in human reason. This excess of rationalism lies at the heart of modem
conservative constitutionalism and renders it antithetical to Burkean
principles.
B. Originalism
If Edmund Burke were a judge in modem America, there is good rea-
son to believe that he would not be an originalist. As the following passage
illustrates, Burke placed little reliance on the original structure and theoreti-
cal underpinnings of institutions; rather, institutions become effective in
meeting the needs of society through a continuing process of adaptation that
may or may not be consistent with the original intentions of the founders:
Old establishments are tried by their effects. If the people are
happy, united, wealthy, and powerful, we presume the rest. We
conclude that to be good from whence good is derived. In old
establishments various correctives have been found for their aber-
rations from theory. Indeed, they are the results of various neces-
sities and expediencies. They are not often constructed after any
theory; theories are rather drawn from them. In them we often
see the end best obtained, where the means seem not perfectly
reconcilable to what we may fancy was the original scheme. The
means taught by experience may be better suited to political ends
than those contrived in the original project. They again re-act
upon the primitive constitution, and sometimes improve the de-
sign itself, from which they seem to have departed. I think all this
might be curiously exemplified in the British Constitution.23'
230. Rossrri, supra note 30, at 67-68. The primarily positional role of conservative philoso-
phy should not be allowed to mask its intellectual sophistication. As Professor Huntington has
observed,
Conservatism is the intellectual rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of
human existence. It has a high and necessary function. It is the rational defense of
being against mind, of order against chaos . . . . The theory of conservatism is of a
different order and purpose than other common political theories, but it is still theory.
Huntington, supra note 10, at 460-61.
231. BuRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 220 (emphasis added).
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Burke would thus undoubtedly object to a theory of interpretation that locks
in local meaning of our constitutional structures; instead, we should leave
future generations some room for adaptation. This idea is based on both
fairness and prudence: "Where the great interests of mankind are con-
cerned through a long succession of generations," Burke writes, "that suc-
cession ought to be admitted into some share in the councils which are so
deeply to affect them. If justice requires this, the work itself requires the
aid of more minds than one age can furnish." 32 Rather than attempt to
anticipate future problems and needs, the founders of institutions would do
better to lay out broad standards, then let future generations apply them in
particular situations as they come up. Burke thus observes that "the best
legislators have been often satisfied with the establishment of some sure,
solid, and ruling principle in government.., and having fixed the principle,
they have left it afterwards to its own operation. ' 33
Interestingly enough, some scholars on the Left have not overlooked
the anti-originalist bent of Burke's philosophy. Professor Ackerman notes,
for example, that "the Burkean . . . insist[s] that the Constitution is best
understood as a historically rooted tradition of theory and practice-an
evolving language of politics, as it were, through which Americans have
learned to talk to one another in the course of their centuries-long struggle
over their national identity. 234 Originalists, however, have long rejected
the idea that the meaning of the Constitution can evolve in a manner similar
to the common law. Over a hundred years ago, for example, Thomas Coo-
ley drew a sharp distinction between the common law and our written
constitution:
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitu-
tions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as
to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is
with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion,
and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government be-
yond their control, that these instruments are framed; and there
232. Id. at 217-18.
233. Id. at 218. This approach corresponds roughly to what Professor Monaghan calls "the
two-clause theory" of constitutional interpretation, under which some clauses of the Constitu-
tion-such as the clause specifying the minimum age of the President-have a fixed historical
meaning while others, such as the Equal Protection Clause, "were intended to be moulded to the
views of contemporary society." Monaghan, supra note 37, at 362 (emphasis and internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also ELY, supra note 32, at 12 (describing non-"clause-bound" interpreti-
vism). For Monaghan, however, this approach depends on an argument that the Framers intended
to allow open-ended interpretation of some clauses. See Monaghan, supra note 37, at 362. Pro-
fessor Ely, on the other hand, assumes that such interpretation must still draw upon some general
principle to be found within the four comers of the document. See ELY, supra note 32, at 12.
Burke recognized neither of these constraints in the context of the British Constitution, primarily
because of its immemorial origins.
234. AcKEmAN, supra note 13, at 22.
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can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as
inheres in the principles of the common law .... Public sentiment
and action effect such changes, and the courts recognize them, but
a court or legislature which should allow a change in public senti-
ment to influence it in giving to a written constitution a construc-
tion not warranted by the intention of its founders, would be
justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and pub-
lic duty; and if its course could become a precedent, these instru-
ments would be of little avail . . . . What a court is to do,
therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people
themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may re-
quire. The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is
adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a
court has occasion to pass upon it.235
Two distinct arguments are discernible in Cooley's statement. First, Cooley
argues that there are certain benefits to having a written constitution, and
that these would be lost if we were to allow the constitution to evolve in a
manner similar to that of the common law. Most importantly, a written
constitution allows us to protect certain principles that we value over the
long term from short-term temptations that might cause us to abandon
them.2 '36 Second, Cooley refers to the nature of the constitution as law:
Because its meaning "is fixed when it is adopted," judges violate their duty
and their oath when they attempt to stretch the constitution beyond its origi-
nal meaning.
The first argument is fairly uncontroversial so far as it goes, but it
leaves open the question of whether the Constitution ought to bind future
generations within broad limits or narrow ones. Originalists, of course, take
the latter view; in doing so, however, they turn their backs on a conserva-
tive tradition that has generally been cautious about the very idea of written
constitutions. For example, Joseph de Maistre, one of the leading Conti-
nental critics of the French Revolution, began his essay on political consti-
tutions with the following statement:
One of the gravest errors of a century which embraced them all
was to believe that a political constitution could be written and
created a priori, whereas reason and experience agree that a con-
stitution is a divine work and that it is precisely the most funda-
235. 1 THoMAS COOLEY, CONSTrUnONAL LnuIrrATmoNs 124 (8th ed. 1927) (quoted in Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 452-53 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting)). Mod-
em originalists continue to echo this theme. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 43.
236. See LAURENCE H. Tjma, AmEwcCAN CONSTtrTONAL LAW § 1-7, at 10-12 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing this concept in the context of "the parable of the pigeon," based on experiments dem-
onstrating that pigeons can learn to peck a key that denies them a short term food reinforcement
after they discover that doing so will earn them a larger, but delayed reward) (citing G. W. Ains-
lie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 L ExPER. ANAL. BEHAV. 485 (1974)).
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mental and essentially constitutional elements in a nation's laws
that cannot be written.237
Burke's views differed in many respects from those of the French reactiona-
ries;" 8 there is no reason to doubt, however, that he would have agreed
with de Maistre in characterizing the idea of a written constitution as an
innovation of the Enlightenment. Indeed, in asserting the need to buttress
legal institutions with a natural aristocracy, Burke scornfully contrasts
"scheme[s] upon paper" with "a living, acting, effective constitution." '239
In particular, Burke felt that the common-law method of developing princi-
ples through analogy and precedent more prudently protected the founda-
tions of the constitutional order while allowing needed room for growth.2'
A theory of written constitutions that precludes future adaptation, then,
is inconsistent with Burkean principles. Such a theory assumes a degree of
rationality on the part of the Constitution's framers that Burke would have
found unacceptable: it understands the Framers as "great gamblers on the
power of untested abstractions."24' Originalists must be similarly optimis-
tic about the Framers' ability to overcome problems of textual indetermi-
nacy and capture complex principles of government within clear written
provisions.242 For Burke, however, no statesman, no matter how wise,
could capture the infinite detail of society's needs or anticipate all future
237. JOSEPH DE MASTRE, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions (1810),
in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147 (Jack Lively trans., 1971).
238. See 2 MicHAmE CutTis, THE GREAT PoLmcAL THEORIES 50 (1962) ("If Burke is the
oracle of conservatism, de Maistre... is the fount of modem reaction, the prophet of the counter-
revolution."); Hans Kohn, The American Idea, 17 REv. PoL. 410, 412 (1955) (book review)
("Burke was certainly no de Maistre but a liberal conservative in the tradition of the Glorious
Revolution.").
239. BURKE, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 277.
240. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text. This imperative may be even more im-
portant in a democratic society like America. According to Tocqueville, democracies are espe-
cially vulnerable to short term errors; "a democracy," he writes, "can obtain truth only as the
result of experience.' 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 214, at 239. It would thus be unwise to lock in
the political choices of any given generation. Rather, the best answer to democratic fallibility for
Tocqueville is to "[]eave it to time, and experience of the evil will teach the people their true
interests." Id. Note that the need for time would be the same whether judges or the people them-
selves are in charge of the adaptation, so long as the initial decisionmaker is a democratic one.
241. Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 5, 9 (1991). Ackerman, of course, is no originalist in the Borkian sense. Under
Ackerman's "dualist" theory, however, the meaning of the Constitution changes only during rare
and momentous episodes of "higher lawmaking"; in other times, the Supreme Court serves to
preserve the products of higher lawmaking by striking down statutes that contradict the meaning
of the Constitution as established in the most recent episode of constitutional politics. See ACKER-
MAN, supra note 13, at 6-7, 9-10. Ackerman's view-which he labels "independent constitution-
alism" in his article on Justice Harlan-is thus equivalent to originalism in terms of its rejection of
common law evolution. See Ackerman, supra, at 8-10.
242. See HARRY H. WELINGTON, INTERPRETNG THE CONSTITUTION: Ta SUPREME COURT
AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 55 (1990).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
problems in a rigid system of formal rules. Instead, time is essential to
allow adaptation and compromise in light of unforeseen and changing cir-
cumstances. Burke would be appalled by the rationalist attitude evident in
Alexander Hamilton's opening to the Federalist Papers, in which Hamilton
declares that "it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country
... to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice,
or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitu-
tions on accident and force."243 Hamilton's confidence in a priori reasoning
is also apparent from his later assertion that "[t]he science of politics...
has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles are now
well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known
to the ancients"; rather than address the particular circumstances of
America, then, Hamilton proceeds to an in-depth consideration of the philo-
sophical work of Montesquieu.244 Burke, on the other hand, emphatically
rejects the notion of abstract political science:
The science of constructing a commonwealth ... or reforming it,
is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori.
Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical
science, because the real effects of moral causes are not always
immediate .... The science of government [is therefore] ... a
matter which requires experience, and even more experience than
any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and ob-
serving he may be ... 245
Burke's position is irreconcilable with a view of the Framers as having
sought, by deduction from abstract principles of political science, to create a
regime of written law that would be sufficient to the needs of all society and
all generations. On the contrary, Burke's view coincides roughly with that
of the common-law constitutionalists of the late nineteenth century, who,
according to Professor Ackerman, believed that "the Founders and Recon-
structers were far too optimistic about the role of self-conscious constitu-
tional construction in history," and that "deeper changes occurred through
evolutionary processes by which an organic community adapted to imper-
fectly understood imperatives of growth and development." 46 Conserva-
tive beliefs about the limits of human rationality require a constitution that
243. Tim FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
244. Id. No. 9, at 72, 74.
245. BuRRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 111-12.
246. Ackerman, supra note 241, at 6. Ackerman identifies Judge Cooley as one of these
nineteenth-century common lawyers, see id., which would seem to contradict the general thrust of
the long passage quoted in Justice Sutherland's Blaisdell dissent. See supra note 235. My task
here is not to reconcile these contradictory strands of Cooley's thought, but rather to present them
as discrete sets of arguments which are available to present proponents and opponents of
originalism.
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can adapt in response to the unforeseen difficulties, changed circumstances,
and outright mistakes that any human endeavor will inevitably entail.
An originalist might respond to this claim with Judge Cooley's second
argument: that the historical fact of our written constitution, and its inher-
ent nature as binding law, require an originalist approach. After all,
Burke's own British constitution was unwritten; consequently, his com-
mon-law constitutionalism assumes a constitution whose origins are lost in
the mists of time. The meaning of such a constitution develops gradually
through the adaption of old precedents to new situations, until eventually
the constitution takes on meanings beyond anything envisioned by its Foun-
ders. Under such a regime it hardly makes sense to look back to the Found-
ing to determine the correct interpretation of the constitution; indeed, the
original meaning may be fundamentally unknowable, having faded into his-
torical obscurity. Burke's own constitutional regime thus incorporated sub-
stantial skepticism about the possibility of historical knowledge.247 Where
such knowledge is more accessible, however, the interpretive imperatives
may be different. As Professor Pocock observes, "if law were founded on
the decisions of known men in recorded circumstances it could be evaluated
and criticized both on rational and on historical grounds."24 Hence, be-
cause our American Constitution does rest "on the decisions of known men
in recorded circumstances," we are arguably obligated to adhere to its origi-
nal meaning.
This argument may be met on several levels. Initially, it is possible to
retrieve the analogy to the immemorial British constitution by arguing that,
in many or most cases, we cannot know the actual intent of the Framers.
Although this argument may be made in a strong form that denies the abil-
ity of the Framers to communicate a single, determinate meaning through a
text like the Constitution,249 the more common criticism is that divination
of the Framers' intent is impracticable as a matter of historical research.
Rather than wade into the merits of this extensive debate,25 I simply wish
to consider a few general aspects of originalist history that might make it
247. See POCOCK, supra note 136, at 220-21; see also Ackerman, supra note 241, at 8-9 (con-
trasting "independent constitutionalists," whose time frame "has a definite beginning and empha-
sizes crucial turning points," with American common-law constitutionalists, whose time frame
"has an indefinite beginning and emphasizes evolutionary development").
248. POCOCK, supra note 136, at 220.
249. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. Rnv. 373 passim (1982). But
see Kay, supra note 36, at 236-43 (surveying and persuasively refuting these arguments).
250. See generally Kay, supra note 36, at 243-59 (discussing problems of group intent and
historical understanding, and concluding that originalism is "not impossible"); Perry, supra note
65, at 597-602 (concluding that originalism is a viable interpretive option, but not the best one);
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 793-804 (1983) (arguing that practical problems of historical
research render originalist history too indeterminate to constrain judges).
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uncongenial to a Burkean conservative. Ironically, originalists might be
viewed as having the same unrealistic expectations of historical science that
Hamilton had with respect to political science; in the end, constitutional
historians may be unable to provide the clear and definite answers that
originalism requires." 1 Burke might thus view originalist history as simply
another form of optimistic rationalism. Although Burke does not discuss
the efficacy of historical research directly, several of his more general views
are relevant here. Burke's pessimistic view of human nature, for example,
would lead him to emphasize the dangers that self-interest poses for histori-
cal research in a legal context; as Professor H. Jefferson Powell observes,
"[t]he pressures created by the need to defend a client or justify a view-
point are so enormous, and the value of respect for historical method so
abstract, that it is probably inevitable that the historical arguments of consti-
tutionalists are historically irresponsible far more often than not." 2  Simi-
larly, Burke's pragmatism would be sensitive to "the limits imposed by
time and training" upon judges with full caseloads and little historical ex-
pertise." 3 Finally, Burke's emphasis on the lessons of experience should
require conservatives to take note of the Supreme Court's "notorious" mis-
use of history in many instances.' 4 Taken together, all of these problems
suggest that a prudent Burkean should be reluctant to accord the product of
historical research dispositive status rather than use it in an advisory role
that is sensitive to its inherent limitations.355
251. See Tushnet, supra note 250, at 793 ( Interpretivist history requires both definite answers
(because it is part of a legal system in which judgment is awarded to one side or the other) and
clear answers (because it seeks to constrain judges and thereby to avoid judicial tyranny). The
universal experience of historians, however, belies the interpretivists' expectations.").
252. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 661 (1987). Problems of
self-interested manipulation exist on the Framers' end as well; as Dean Wellington points out, "the
drafting process involves ... the purposeful manipulation of what becomes documentary history."
Wm.LNGcroN, supra note 242, at 55.
253. Powell, supra note 252, at 661.
254. Id.
255. See generally id. at 661-91 (laying out 14 rules intended "to make the lawyers' use of
history as intellectually responsible . . . as possible"). An additional problem arising from the
difficulty of ascertaining Framers' intent is its potential for destabilizing large areas of the law.
As Dean Brest points out, "a settled constitutional understanding is in perpetual jeopardy of being
overturned by new light on the adopters' intent-shed by the discovery of historical documents,
re-examinations of known documents, and reinterpretations of political and social history." Brest,
supra note 32, at 231. Of course, the meaning of the Constitution may change under a com-
mon-law approach as well; under that approach, however, changes are incremental and occur on
the basis of historical experience showing one or another interpretation is better suited to the needs
of the community. The close historical debates in terms of originalist interpretation, that is, the
ones likely to be swayed one way or the other by new historical data, are often waged over
fundamental issues such as the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights, com-
pare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to "guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citi-
zens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights") with Charles Fairman, Does the
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A second answer challenges the assumption that the Framers them-
selves were originalists. In the most exhaustive survey of the historical
data, Professor Powell rejects the common assumption that the Framers in-
tended that later interpreters would construe the Constitution in accordance
with the available evidence of original intentions:
Of the numerous hermeneutical options that were available in the
framers' day.., none corresponds to the modem notion of inten-
tionalism. Early interpreters usually applied standard techniques
of statutory construction to the Constitution. When a consensus
eventually emerged on a proper theory of constitutional interpre-
tation, it indeed centered on "original intent." But at the time,
that term referred to the "intentions" of the sovereign parties to
the constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution's lan-
guage and discerned through structural methods of interpretation;
it did not refer to the personal intentions of the framers or of any-
one else. The relationship of modem intentionalism to this early
interpretive theory is purely rhetorical.256
Professor Powell acknowledges that his argument, even if true, is not dis-
positive as to whether courts should adhere to originalism; even if the
Framers did not intend such adherence, there may be other reasons-such
as the need to constrain judges-that militate in its favor." 7 If the Framers
did not intend their enactment of the Constitution to include a requirement
to follow original intent, however, then it is hard to argue for originalism on
the basis of the Constitution's nature as binding law.258 At that point, the
originalist cannot avoid confronting the Burkean prudential arguments in
favor of evolutionary meaning.259
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5, 171-72 (1949) (discussing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and con-
cluding that Justice Black's analysis in Adamson was incorrect), or the meaning of racial equality,
see, e.g., RAout BERGER, Govam ENamr BY JUDICIARY 24-36 (1977). Moreover, any superiority
of the new historical interpretation in terms of meeting the needs of modem society would be
either coincidental or the result of the subconscious tug of modem values. Such a change would,
in any event, lack the purposive adaptation to modem life characteristic of the common law.
256. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAmv. L. REv.
885, 948 (1985).
257. See id.
258. See WELLINGTON, supra note 242, at 50-51.
259. The originalist response to Professor Powell is to infer the Framers' intent that their own
understandings of the Constitution should bind future generations from the care they took in de-
bating and drafting the language of the document. According to Professor Kay, "We would not
expect such deliberation from people who wanted their intentions to be ignored or to play a minor
role in the future application of the rules they made." Kay, supra note 36, at 284. Even if the
Framers had intended for the Constitution to evolve in a manner similar to the common law,
however, they would have had at least two good reasons to deliberate with such care: First, any
evolution would likely be very slow; hence, the Framers and their children would have to live with
the Constitution in essentially its original state for some time. Moreover, even the most fervent
nonoriginalists agree that the original intentions and understanding of the Constitution are relevant
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An originalist conceding the force of those arguments might not con-
clude that power to adapt the Constitution should be vested in the judiciary.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, admits that "[ilt seems to me that it
is almost impossible... to conclude that [the Framers] intended the Con-
stitution itself to suggest answers to the manifold problems that they knew
would confront succeeding generations."260 Nonetheless, the Chief Justice
asserts that the intended means of adaptation was not judicial review but
"the general language by which national authority was granted to Congress
and the Presidency."26' The limitations on those branches to be enforced
by the courts, by contrast, "were not themselves designed to solve the
problems of the future, but were instead designed to make certain that the
constituent branches, when they attempted to solve those problems, should
not transgress these fundamental limitations."262 Judicially enforced limita-
tions such as due process or equal protection, however, are worded in the
same general manner as the grants of legislative and executive power in
Articles I and II, so it is hard to discern Chief Justice Rehnquist's asserted
distinction from the text. Moreover, the courts are forced in innumerable
cases to apply those limitations to situations that the Framers could not have
foreseen; unless these limits are allowed to evolve in parallel with state
power, important areas of modem governmental activity will lack effective
constitutional safeguards.263 Finally, if we agree with Burke that adaptation
should follow the incremental method of the common law, then courts may
have an institutional advantage in overseeing such adaptation.Y'
The last argument in favor of originalism is Judge Bork's assertion that
the only principles that are sufficiently neutral to apply in constitutional
adjudication are originalist ones. Implicit in this assertion is the idea that
the principles originally embodied in the Constitution are the only ones to
which all the members of our community can be said to have consented. In
a sense, this assertion begs the question because the fact that we have con-
sented to a constitution does not necessarily mean that we have consented
to its present interpretation. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 32, at 205 ("The modes of nonoriginalist
adjudication defended in this article accord the text and original history presumptive weight, but
do not treat them as authoritative or binding."). On this view, the Framers had a strong incentive
to provide careful guidance to future generations, even if they did not expect their intentions to be
binding.
260. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tax. L. REv. 693, 699
(1976).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987) (reading
unconstitutional conditions doctrine into the Takings Clause in order to prevent government from
using its zoning power to force inappropriate concessions from property owner); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (applying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to
electronic wiretapping).
264. See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
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to one with a static meaning.26 More importantly, Bork's position is pre-
mised on a distinctively liberal theory of the social contract: The Constitu-
tion represents the great covenant by which Americans entered into society
together and defined their rights and duties vis-a-vis the state.266 And be-
cause our consent occurred through ratification at particular points in time,
it is to those points that we look to determine the contract's meaning.267
The Burkean model, however, is fundamentally different. In the com-
mon-law conception, consent occurs in a continuing fashion rather than at a
discrete moment in time; as Professor Pocock explains, "I]t was the prin-
ciple that the law was immemorial that made common lawyers realize that
its origin was not in men's assent to universally acceptable propositions, but
in one emergency following upon another as wave follows wave ....
Moreover, Burke's conception of the social contract deemphasizes consent
altogether, using the contract instead as a metaphor for the obligations that
bind individual to individual and generation to generation.269 For Burke,
individuals are bound to members of the national community, as well as to
generations that are dead or yet to be born, by moral obligations arising out
of a common history; the community is a "permanent body composed of
transitory parts."'27 And just as "the whole, at one time, is never old or
middle-aged or young, but.., moves on through the varied tenor of perpet-
ual decay, fall, renovation, and progression,"" so there can never be a
single isolated point in time to which we can appeal to find the complete
meaning of our mutual commitments. Instead, that meaning, like society
itself, must evolve over time in a continuing process of experimentation and
adaptation.
In the end, the most damning aspect of originalism for Burke would
almost certainly be the radical restructuring of our constitutional order that
a serious attempt to implement that interpretive philosophy would entail.
265. Cf. TRms, supra note 236, § 3-6, at 65-66 ("[The very idea of grounding the legitimacy
of constitutional claims in the 'consent' of the governed .... is circular because it leaves unan-
swered the question of whose consent counts and what the consent encompasses.").
266. See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1990) (noting
that Bork's theory presupposes a Hobbesian social contract).
267. Believers in this liberal contract have a hard time explaining why the present generation
is bound by the original act of consent. Dean Brest, for example, criticizes the liberal notion on
the ground that "[e]ven if the adopters freely consented to the Constitution ... this is not an
adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the founding document, for their consent cannot bind
succeeding generations. We did not adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and
gone." Brest, supra note 32, at 225. Burke's organic contract provides an answer to this diffi-
culty, see supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text, although it is probably not an answer Dean
Brest would like.
268. PococK, supra note 136, at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
270. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 84.
271. Id.
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As Professor Kay admits, "[t]he legal, social and economic impacts of judi-
cial review cannot be wished away, nor may we want them to be. An ab-
rupt and complete adoption of original intentions adjudication might inflict
injuries that far transcend ... specifically legal considerations ... 272
Some originalists attempt to evade this difficulty by developing a theory of
stare decisis to confine the reach of a shift to originalist reasoning.2 73 Ad-
vocates of such a theory, however, are careful to insist that such a conces-
sion does not justify continuing the practice of nonoriginalist
interpretation. 274 Burke would find this "go and sin no more" approach
curious: after all, if we are too happy with the results of all this no-
noriginalist reasoning to abandon them, why render the theory that pro-
duced those results anathema? Instead of abandoning our existing
constitutional practice, then, a true conservative would search within that
tradition for its own "latent wisdom," and seek to improve that tradition by
building upon the principles that have proven successful in the past.27
C. Judicial Restraint
As with originalism, Burkean conservatism is neither committed to nor
supportive of the modem conservative constitutionalists' view of judicial
restraint. Although Burke's view of human reason commits him to the po-
sition that all actors in a political system should act cautiously, with a keen
272. Kay, supra note 36, at 229; see also Brest, supra note 32, at 223 ("Strict originalism
cannot accommodate most modem decisions under the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amend-
ment, or the virtually plenary scope of congressional power under the commerce clause. Although
moderate originalism is far more expansive, some major constitutional doctrines lie beyond its
pale as well."); Monaghan, supra note 37, at 382 ("The expectations so long generated by this
[nonoriginalist] body of constitutional law render unacceptable a full return to original intent
theory in any pure, unalloyed form").
273. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 37, at 382.
274. See id. The problem with Monaghan's concession is that stare decisis may be fundamen-
tally incompatible with originalism. Originalism assumes that the Constitution itself can indepen-
dently provide right answers to constitutional questions; if this is true, then the doctrine of stare
decisis requires a court to choose to follow a prior decision even where that decision conflicts with
what the Constitution itself objectively requires. It is unclear, however, why this practice would
be any more legitimate than giving effect to a statute that conflicts with the Constitution. See
generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & Pun.
POL'Y (forthcoming 1994) (making this argument); Charles J. Cooper, A Note on Justice Marshall
and Stare Decisis, 1992 PuB. INT. L. REv. 95, 100 ("The principle [sic] virtues of stare decisis-
stability and predictability in the law-are in conflict with the truism that 'the ultimate touchstone
of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what [the Supreme Court] ha[s] said about
it."' (quoting Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
The only way to avoid the force of this constitutional objection to stare decisis would appear to be
to adopt some nonoriginalist interpretive theory that views precedent as a means by which courts
ascertain the original meaning of the provision involved. The originalist is thus caught in a di-
lemma: either he must advocate overthrowing an unacceptable amount of present doctrine, or
abandon some of his originalist interpretive premises.
275. See Bumra, Reflections, supra note 12, at 138.
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sense of their own limitations and those of their office, there is no reason to
believe that he would impose this obligation more strongly on judges than
on legislators or members of the executive branch. Indeed, insofar as the
argument for judicial restraint rests primarily on majoritarian assump-
tions,2 76 Burke would have little of it.277 Burke saw unrestrained democ-
racy as a threat to liberty: "[Ain absolute democracy, [like] absolute
monarchy, is .... rather the corruption and degeneracy than the sound
constitution of a republic."278 The tyranny of the majority, for Burke, was
the worst kind of oppression. Under the tyranny of a monarch, he observed,
at least the people can turn to one another for support. "[T]hose who are
subjected to wrong under multitudes," however, "are deprived of all exter-
nal consolation. They seem deserted by mankind, overpowered by a con-
spiracy of their whole species."2 79 Accordingly, Burke would reject the
overwhelming presumption in favor of majority rule put forward by advo-
cates of judicial restraint.280 According to Professor Bickel, Burke believed
"that there was nothing natural or necessary about allowing a majority to
prevail. Rule by a majority obtained where it did.., by convention and
habit, and did not obtain universally on all occasions and for all purposes
even where established." '' Rather than constructing a government around
the principle that all departures from democracy require special justifica-
276. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
277. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 914 n.1 ("Majoritarianism is ... inconsistent with tradi-
tional conservatism, which, deeply suspicious of the majority, saw it as relatively less-propertied
than those whom conservatives sought to protect.").
278. BuKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 174. Burke went on to cite Aristotle for the propo-
sition that "a democracy has many striking points of resemblance with a tyranny." Id. (citing
AusTa'r , PoLrrcs bk. iv., ch. 4).
279. Id. at 174-75.
280. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 43, at 1025 (asserting that "democracy is the norm," and
that therefore "all deviations from that norm require justification"). Although Burke believed that
the ultimate source of governmental authority was in the people, see BURKE, Popery Laws, supra
note 178, at 454, he saw the state as a trust, in which representatives use their best judgment to act
in the best interests of the people rather than simply reflect the popular will. "We are not to go to
[our constituents] to learn the principles of law and government," Burke insisted. "In doing so
we should not dutifully serve, but we should basely and scandalously betray the people, who are
not capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance called to it by the constitution." EDMUND
BURKE, Speech on a Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
Riir HON. EDMUND BUxE, supra note 134, at 481, 482; see also BURE, Reflections, supra
note 12, at 109-10 (denying that a right to participate directly in management of the state is among
"the real rights of men"). If the members of the "political" branches are seen primarily as trustees
for the people, rather than as instruments by which the people exercise their own will, then the
majoritarian argument for judicial restraint loses much of its force. After all, judges can act as
trustees as well, and in some areas their distinctive institutional capacities may make them better
trustees than legislators or members of the executive branch. See infra notes 297-303 and accom-
panying text.
281. ALExANDER M. BiccmL, Edmund Burke and Political Reason, in Tan MORALry OF CON-
sENr, supra note 138, at 16-17.
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tion, then, Burke would seek for the allocation of power that, over time,
best conduces to the welfare of society.282
This allocation for Burke was embodied in the principle of mixed gov-
ernment. Just as Burke opposed pure democracy, he also resisted attempts
by George III to concentrate power in the monarchy. Instead, Burke in-
sisted that power should be distributed among a variety of institutions com-
prising the government: "It is the nature of despotism to abhor power held
by any means but its own momentary pleasure; and to annihilate all inter-
mediate situations between boundless strength on its own part, and total
debility on the part of the people. '28 3 Burke's view of mixed government is
further elaborated in his criticism of the French revolutionaries for aban-
doning the old institution of the Estates General, which were composed of a
chamber each for the clergy, the nobles, and the common people:
In your old states you possessed that variety of parts correspond-
ing with the various descriptions of which your community was
happily composed; you had all that combination and all that op-
position of interests, you had that action and counteraction which,
in the natural and in the political world, from the reciprocal strug-
gle of discordant powers, draws out the harmony of the universe.
These opposed and conflicting interests ... interpose a salutary
check to all precipitate resolutions; They render deliberation a
matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a
subject of compromise, which naturally begets moderation; they
produce temperaments preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude,
unqualified reformations and rendering all the headlong exertions
of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever
impracticable.28 4
At first glance, this description looks a great deal like the Madisonian
model of conflicting factions within the democratic part of a government?85
For Burke, however, the important thing was not simply that various groups
had the power to check each other, but that these groups had varying insti-
tutional capacities that allowed them to contribute services which other
groups could not provide. The aristocracy, for example, was deemed to
have certain qualifications-education, character, a sense of enduring val-
ues inherited from families with longstanding traditions of leadership-that
282. See ButrKa, Reflections, supra note 12, at 110 (arguing that the allocation of powers in
the state is "a thing to be settled by convention," which extends to "[elvery sort of legislative,
judicial, or executory power").
283. BuRKEa Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 259-60.
284. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 86.
285. See THm FEDERAmT No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("This
policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives .... [is] particu-
larly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other .... ).
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democratically elected representatives of the masses might not possess. 28 6
On the other hand, Burke viewed the aristocracy as too prone to passiv-
ity;28 7 good government thus also required the more active input of the ex-
ecutive (the King) and the people. Only when all these elements were in
balance would the state operate properly: "Our constitution stands on a
nice equipoise, with steep precipices, and deep waters upon all sides of it.
In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one side, there may be a
risque of oversetting it on the other." '288
Burke viewed an independent judiciary as an important part of this
balance. "Whatever is supreme in a state," he argued, "ought to have, as
much as possible, its judicial authority so constituted as not only not to
depend upon it, but in some sort to balance it." '289 Burke thus criticized the
French revolutionaries' abolition of the parlements, which were the princi-
pal independent judicial courts prior to the Revolution. According to
Burke, "[t]hese parliaments had furnished, not the best certainly, but some
considerable corrective to the excesses and vices of the monarchy. Such an
independent judicature was ten times more necessary when a democracy
became the absolute power of the country."29 Viewing the power of the
parlements to invalidate laws as an essential element of their independence,
Burke urged the French to restore such a role to the courts; moreover, he
observed that this form of judicial review "would be a means of squaring
the occasional decrees of a democracy to some principles of general juris-
prudence."2 91 Burke's argument for retaining a form of judicial review in
France was thus threefold: such review was an "ancient" or traditional
practice, it counteracted the power of the majoritarian legislature, and it
utilized the distinctive institutional capacity of courts to integrate statutes
into a coherent, developing body of law.
As applied to modem American jurisprudence, the first of these argu-
ments is identical to the traditionalist argument against originalism:
whatever the theoretical arguments against it, "a relatively large judicial
role.., has become an historical given" in our political system that should
not be lightly disturbed.292 As Professor Bickel points out, the cases estab-
lishing the right of judicial review are now over a century and a half old.
As a result, "[s]ettled expectations have formed around them. The life of a
nation that now encompasses 185 million people spread over a continent
and more depends upon them in a hundred different aspects of its organiza-
286. See supra text accompanying note 201.
287. See BurnE, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 268.
288. Id. at 311.
289. BuRuE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 253.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 254.
292. Ti-aa, supra note 236, § 1-9, at 15-16.
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tion and coherence. It is late for radical change."2 93 Curiously, Bickel
quickly retreats from this conclusion by asserting that because "[j]udicial
review is a present instrument of government," it follows that "ultimately
we must justify it as a choice in our own time."294 For Burke, however, a
large part of the justification lies precisely in the fact that we have had
judicial review for a long time and are basically happy with the results. He
would thus seek within the tradition of judicial review for the principles that
have been responsible for its success, and seek to reform the institution, if
necessary, to bring it more completely in line with those principles.
One way to do this is to focus on Burke's allusion to the institutional
capacities of courts as an indication of where judicial review might fit into
his concept of mixed government.2 95 Professor Bickel provides the classic
statement of the institutional advantages of courts in The Least Dangerous
Branch:
[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of prin-
ciple that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges
have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation
to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of govern-
ment. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a soci-
ety, and it is not something that institutions can do well
occasionally, while operating for the most part with a different set
of gears. It calls for a habit of mind, and for undeviating institu-
tional customs. Another advantage that courts have is that ques-
tions of principle never carry the same aspect for them as they did
for the legislature or the executive. Statutes, after all, deal typi-
cally with abstract or dimly foreseen problems. The courts are
concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual case. This tends
to modify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's view. It also provides
an extremely salutary proving ground for all abstractions; it is
conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, to thinking things, not words,
293. BicKEL, supra note 46, at 14. The history of that tradition manifestly denies Professor
Graglia's assertion that "[tihe Supreme Court serves the concept of a 'living Constitution' less by
acting than by getting out of the way, as in its post-1937 refusal to enforce federalism limitations
on national power." Graglia, supra note 43, at 1031. Even Graglia's own example illustrates his
dilemma, because the federal government's ability to adapt to changing circumstances under the
broad enumerated powers in Article I would not be viable absent the Court's arguably activist
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in which the Court affirma-
tively invalidated the acts of a state government that hampered action by the federal political
branches.
294. BICrEL, supra note 46, at 16.
295. Cf. John H. Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 864 (1991) (observing that
"what [proponents of judicial activism] are actually proposing is a version of the old idea of
'mixed government,' a combination of democracy and oligarchy, as developed in the writings of
such theorists as Locke and Montesquieu").
[Vol. 72
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and thus to the evolution of principle by a process that tests as it
creates.
296
"Leisure," "training," and "insulation" sound a great deal like the character-
istics of Burke's aristocracy.2 97 As Professor Wilson suggests, "federal
296. BxcKEL, supra note 46, at 25-26. But see Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's
Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HIARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853,
870-72 (1991) (arguing that legislatures have superior deliberative mechanisms and are more in
touch with the traditions of society); McConnell, supra note 69, at 1536 ("[J]udicial decisionmak-
ing contains very little serious deliberation on moral issues."). Although Professors McConnell
and Cook are certainly correct in suggesting that we should not unquestioningly accept arguments
about the superior institutional competence of courts with respect to matters of principle, it seems
unlikely that their criticisms could outweigh the extent to which well-organized interest groups
and short-term concerns about reelection distort considerations of principle in the legislative pro-
cess, as well as the extent to which legislators simply do not focus on constitutional issues. See
WELLINGTON, supra note 242, at 84-85. Moreover, Cook's point is mitigated by the fact that
courts generally have access to the deliberative process of the legislature in the form of legislative
history. McConnell's assertion, on the other hand, seems more appropriate as an argument for
decreasing the workload of the Court in order to provide more time for moral deliberation; at any
rate, it may not be realistic to infer the absence of such deliberation from published opinions (as
McConnell does) when the pervasive rhetoric of judicial restraint gives judges an incentive to
mask such deliberation behind doctrinal arguments.
An even more potentially damaging argument (for my purposes) has been raised by Professor
David Strauss, who suggests that, despite the kinship between Burke's traditionalism and the
common law, "[i]t would be plausible for a Burkean to distrust judges." Strauss, supra note 103,
at 1707. This is because judges "are deliberately removed from society, and there is a greater
likelihood they will be out of touch with its practical concerns. They also come from an intellec-
tual segment of society that is likely to value abstractions." Id. It seems unlikely, however, that
Burke would have accepted these conclusions. Burke has little to say directly to judges; his pro-
nouncements on good government are directed primarily toward legislators and society at large.
Burke's model of the good legislator, however, emphasizes the detachment that, in the twentieth
century, we have come to associate with federal judges. Rejecting a suggestion by his constituents
that, as a legislator, he should be bound to follow their wishes, Burke asserted that "his unbiased
opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, [a legislator] ought not to sacrifice to
you .... Your representative owes you... his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if
he sacrifices it to your opinion." EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (November 3,
1774), in 1 WORKS OF THE RiGHT HoN. EDMUND BURKE, supra note 20, at 179-80. Similarly,
Burke insisted that "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile inter-
ests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate ... ; but parliament is a
deliberative assembly of one nation . I..." d. at 180. Given a choice between our modem
legislatures, where electoral and interest group politics play a prominent, if not preeminent, role,
and the judiciary, which remains constrained to deliberative norms, see supra text accompanying
notes 289-91, Burke would probably see the judiciary as having the institutional capacities most
suited for divining and following traditions. As for the abstraction point, it is not at all clear that
the abstractions popular, for example, in legal academia predominate over the common-law
method of doctrinal development in modem constitutional adjudication. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 488-94. Even if Strauss is correct that judges presently tend toward abstraction, more-
over, that would simply be a reason to encourage the more frequent use of the common-law
method, as opposed to originalism or abstract moral theory.
297. See supra text accompanying note 201. It is also worth noting that the character of
judges-perhaps Burke's most important qualification for the natural aristocracy-is scrutinized
closely prior to confirmation, and subsequently regulated by a code of ethics that does not apply to
legislators. See ABA CODE OF JuDIcIAL CONDuCT (1990). Of course, the large proportion of
legislators that are lawyers, and thus bound by the ethical rules of the profession even when acting
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judges, lawyers who can create law without fear of loss or job or income,
have all the characteristics of Burke's aristocrats except personal wealth and
inheritable title. They have the power to ameliorate abuses by the people or
the executive, and yet they also have the power to create arrogant, disor-
derly tyranny."2 98 The courts, then, supply the missing element from
Burke's scheme of mixed government created by the absence of a heredi-
tary aristocracy. 299 Hence, a Burkean conservative ought to view the role
of unelected federal judges in shaping social policy as an essential counter-
weight to the more majoritarian elements of government, rather than as "ju-
dicial tyranny."
In addition, as Professor Bickel recognized, judges are uniquely situ-
ated to preside over the evolutionary development of constitutional princi-
ples. The "case and controversy" requirement encourages judges to make
decisions in the way that Burke would prefer legislators to make them: in-
crementally, and in response to particular problems. Moreover, the life ten-
ure of judges tends to ensure continuity even in this age of politicized
appointments. 3" Perhaps most importantly, courts are inherently back-
ward-looking in their approach to decisionmaking; as Dean Wellington
points out, "while other countermajoritarian institutions out of parochial in-
terests slow the rate of change, the courts alone deliberately search the past
for elements worth preserving."301 Wellington goes on to observe that
"[b]y applying those elements to the often heated controversies before
them-thereby reminding the polity of the values to which it has long ad-
hered-the courts may be seen as the key political institution charged with
taking account of our public traditions.""3 2 In the end, the thrust of Burke's
traditionalism is that the principles by which society is governed should
evolve in the same way that the common law evolves-by analogy, prece-
dent, and incrementalism. And to the extent that this process represents a
outside a legal capacity, see MODEL RuiEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 8.4 cmt. 3 (1992),
cuts into this comparative advantage somewhat. Nonetheless, the ethical rules governing attor-
neys are not directly targeted at the sorts of vices likely to afflict legislators.
298. Wilson, supra note 5, at 943. Tocqueville makes a similar observation with respect to
lawyers generally, noting that
[s]ome of the tastes and the habits of the aristocracy may consequently be discovered in
the characters of lawyers. They participate in the same instinctive love of order and
formalities; and they entertain the same repugnance to the actions of the multitude, and
the same secret contempt of the government of the people.
1 TocQuEvILU, supra note 214, at 284.
299. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 942 (concluding that "one must assume that the courts,
particularly the tenured federal courts, play the equivalent of the 'aristocratic' role in Burke's
mixed government").
300. See BICEL, supra note 46, at 32 ("Continuity is a chief concern of the Court, as it is the
main reason for the Court's place in the hearts of its countrymen.").
301. Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YA L.J, 486, 493 (1982).
302. Id. at 493-94.
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distinctly legal form of reasoning, it makes sense for courts to have a prom-
inent role.303
Burke's conservatism thus offers a relatively new perspective on the
majoritarianism debate, which has tended to take place between those who
emphasize the counter-majoritarian difficulty and those who, by emphasiz-
ing the nomination process, congressional control over jurisdiction, the pos-
sibility of constitutional amendment, and antidemocratic aspects of the
legislative and executive branches, note the deterioration in practice of the
distinction between the judicial and "political" branches in terms of demo-
cratic legitimacy.304 These positions accept the primacy of democratic ma-
jorities as a given; in contrast, the Burkean view holds that the majoritarian
elements of our constitutional system have no inherently superior claim to
legitimacy than the counter-majoritarian components that are also embodied
within it.305 Judicial restraint, then, should be a value only in the sense of
judicial "craftsmanship," that is, the care taken by judges in respectfully
meeting traditional legal sources on their own terms, rather than manipulat-
ing those sources to reach results that are really the product of moral or
philosophical predispositions.30 6 Under this approach, deference is owed
hot to the political branches of government, but rather to judicial precedent
and the common-law tradition of gradual evolution through "reasoned judg-
ment."30 7 This brand of judicial restraint works to ensure that courts do not
overstep their proper role, while avoiding any artificial sense of judicial
incapacity that allows the other branches to overstep theirs. Only in this
way can we achieve the "nice equipoise" essential to Burke's vision of
mixed government.
D. Rules and Standards
Although a preference for formulation of legal directives in the form of
rules or standards has, at times, been associated with substantive political
303. Cf. Fried, supra note 193, at 57 (arguing that a distinctive form of legal reasoning fills in
the gaps of philosophy and allows it to be applied to particular situations). Given the affinity of
Burke's traditionalism for these fairly standard prudential arguments, it is hard to understand
Thomas Grey's assertion that "the Burkean conception of constitutional law" rests on "the appeal
to mystery." See Grey, supra note 32, at 21. It is worth noting that Professor Grey cites Burke
once, then spends most of his time talking about Durkheim.
304. See, e.g., TPM, supra note 236, § 3-6, at 63-65 (suggesting that the "dichotomy between
a democratic political process and an antidemocratic adjudicatory process .... is more metaphori-
cal than real").
305. Cf. LAURENcE H. TRrBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READiNr THE CoNsTrrUtoN 29 (1991)
(denying the "supposed need of the Constitution as a whole to affirm democracy").
306. See Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 63; see also Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice
Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 33, 51 (1991) (citing "candor, care, being true to the facts, the
record, and the precedents, and a modest respect for the other institutions that surround the
Supreme Court' as "the hallmarks of Mr. Justice Harlan's conservative ethic").
307. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 13-16 (describing the method of Justice Souter).
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positions, Professor Sullivan argues convincingly that this choice ultimately
does not consistently correlate with political liberalism or conservatism. 308
The emergence of Justice Scalia as the primary advocate of rule-based deci-
sionmaking, however, has caused rules to be consistently associated with
judicial conservatism.3 9 Nonetheless, Burkeans must find this characteri-
zation to be precisely backwards; indeed, Burke was one of the most elo-
quent proponents of a balancing approach to political and social problems:
The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in
proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and
politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of middle, incapa-
ble of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights
of men in governments ... are often in balances between differ-
ences of good; in compromises sometimes between good and evil,
and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a com-
puting principle; adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing,
morally and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral
denominations.310
Professor Sullivan's conclusion that the contrasting positions on rules and
standards on the present Court represent "two kinds of judicial conserva-
tism, not one" '' is thus worth reconsidering in light of the Burkean tradi-
tion. Rather than equivocating between the two modes, that tradition comes
down firmly on the side of standards.
The first and most clearly anti-conservative aspect of rules is the ambi-
tious rationalism inherent in their formation. Comparing Justice Scalia to
the "nineteenth-century legal codifiers facing the messy landscape of the
common law," Professor Sullivan observes that Scalia "is likewise optimis-
tic about the possibility that judges can rationalize the chaotic jumble of
twentieth-century constitutional precedents and reorder constitutional law
around clear interpretive and operative rules. 312 The proponent of rules
thus makes the same sort of rationalist assumptions about the rule-maker
that the originalist makes about the Framers; neither allows much scope for
elaboration and alteration in the light of subsequent experience. 313 Stan-
dards, on the other hand, operate with greater humility. Although they may
308. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 97-99. Professor Sullivan notes, for example, that stan-
dards have been associated with the progressive and realist assault on nineteenth-century categori-
cal legal thought, as well as with McCarthy-era suppression of free speech under the Dennis
balancing test. She thus concludes that "strong substantive theories of rules as conservative and
standards as liberal-or vice versa-are wrong. The relationship between rules and standards on
the one hand and political positions on the other is not necessary, but contingent." Id. at 98.
309. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
310. BuRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 112-13.
311. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 121.
312. Id. at 114-15.
313. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text
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aim at a comparable level of determinacy as rules, standards become deter-
minate through a process of elaboration in the course of individual deci-
sions. Through the gradual method of the common law, particularistic
decisions in individual cases gradually add up to a rational pattern of doc-
trine.314 Professor Duncan Kennedy explains this process as follows:
[The application of a standard to a particular fact situation will
often generate a particular rule much narrower in scope than that
standard. One characteristic mode of ordering a subject matter
area including a vast number of possible situations is through the
combination of a standard with an ever increasing group of partic-
ular rules of this kind. The generality of the standard means that
there are no gaps: it is possible to find out something about how
judges will dispose of cases that have not yet arisen. But no at-
tempt is made to formulate a formally realizable general rule.
Rather, case law gradually fills in the area with rules so closely
bound to particular facts that they have little or no precedential
value.3 15
The structure that emerges from this process will likely lack the simplicity
of a general rule, yet it is more likely to conform to the complexities of
social reality. Hence, as Professor Greenawalt notes, "Skepticism about ab-
stract ideas and rapid change, and concentration on particular context, does
incline one toward balancing approaches to the resolution of social
problems. ' 316
Standards also promote a Burkean notion of prudence through their
facilitation of compromise. For Burke, "All government... every virtue,
and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance
inconveniences; we give and take; ... and we choose rather to be happy
citizens than subtle disputants. ' 317 This preference for moderation is based
on a suspicion that absolutist positions can never adequately capture the
complexity of real life, as well as a notion of political prudence. Although
rules may be used to codify moderate positions, they are more amenable
than standards to use by proponents of ideological extremes. Because a
standard will be applied with some degree of discretion by decisionmakers
of varying political views, the distribution of actual results will tend toward
314. See Ackerman, supra note 241, at 9.
315. Kennedy, supra note 91, at 1690; see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 62 ("A rule may be
understood as simply the crystalline precipitate of prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come
out the same way .... On this view, a rule is a standard that has reached epistemological
maturity.").
316. Greenawalt, supra note 13, at 64. Greenawalt goes on to observe that "an activist might
also approve of some sorts of balancing formulations" such as the compelling interest test. Id. As
Professor Sullivan notes, however, "two-tier review generally decides cases through characteriza-
tion at the outset, without the need for messy explicit balancing.' Sullivan, supra note 3, at 60.
317. BuKE, On Concilation, supra note 180, at 200.
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the middle to a greater extent than where decisionmakers are more con-
strained by a rule that incorporates a particular political position.318 Be-
cause standards allow room for the direct application of background
principles in individual fact situations, they rank among the "'the arts of
compromise,' the 'ways of muddling through' that permit us to reach an
accommodation between our principles and the complex, murky, and often
resistant reality on which these principles operate." '319 And because this
accommodation occurs over time through successive applications of the
standard in individual cases, standards are a means of "permit[ting] the
marginal and evolutionary reconciliation of our principles and practices. '3 20
A somewhat more complex set of Burkean arguments revolves around
what advocates of rules often list as the primary disadvantage of standards:
their incompatibility with the ideal of judicial restraint. Because standards
leave considerable discretion to the decisionmaker to give content to the
law ex post, partisans of rules tend to see standards as a mask for applica-
tion of the judge's own preferences, or "the wolf of judicial arrogance in the
sheep's clothing of the common law judge." '321 In response to this charge,
proponents of standards point to three distinct sources of constraint, each of
which rests on fundamentally Burkean assumptions. The first is a belief
that, over time, social traditions and practices can meaningfully give con-
tent to a given constitutional provision.322 This response reflects a concern
that decisionmaking should be slow and decentralized. Because stan-
dard-based adjudication relies on case-by-case application to develop the
meaning of legal directives, it inevitably devolves considerable responsibil-
ity to the lower courts. This devolution ensures that decisionmaking will be
incremental, with individual courts serving as laboratories wherein different
resolutions of similar problems can be tested without risking the broad sys-
temic consequences of experimentation by the Supreme Court itself. More-
over, decentralization may have the additional benefit of decreasing
political pressure on the Court, both because the pace of change will be
slower and because the Court will have the opportunity to examine the ef-
fects of innovations before having to pass on them.323
318. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 99 ("[S]tandards will tend to correlate more systematically
with moderation than rules. The choice of standards over rules thus dampens ideological swings
as compared with a shift from one polar rule to another.").
319. Kronman, supra note 132, at 1570 (quoting BicKEL, supra note 46, at 64).
320. Id.
321. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 118.
322. Id.
323. See John 0. McGinnis, The 1991 Supreme Court Term: Review and Outlook, 1993 Pua.
INT. L. REv. 165, 167 ("One method of controlling the pace of change and deflecting criticism of
the Court itself is to decentralize decision making by announcing rules that provide lower courts
greater responsibility for making decisions on a case-by-case basis.").
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A second argument for the constraining effect of standards rests on a
belief that "shared understandings embedded like bedrock in the legal cul-
ture will inform the line-drawing that the Justices do."324 This position, in
turn, depends on the assumption that our heterogeneous society retains suf-
ficient "shared understandings" that judges will be able to discern and be
guided by a common tradition rather than their own personal values.3" As
Professor Tushnet suggests, this view is more characteristic of conservative
social theory than of liberalism; "[c]onservatism," according to Tushnet,
"has insisted that consensus and community rather than conflict are the ba-
sis of social order," whereas liberalism assumes "that each of us is funda-
mentally in conflict with the rest." '326 Although Tushnet overstates the case
when he concludes that "within the conservative tradition, the imagined
consensus means that no decisionmaker, whether legislator or judge, can
possibly deviate in any interesting way from the community's views,"" he
is certainly correct in attributing to Burkeans a belief in shared traditions
and a greater emphasis on the community vis-a-vis the individual.328 Reli-
ance on shared understandings is, of course, substantially more problematic
in our modem, heterogeneous society than in Burke's eighteenth-century
Britain; it may be, however, that the primary area of common ground that
remains lies in the tradition of rights developed through constitutional adju-
dication.329 Moreover, standards are sufficiently capacious to be tailored to
324. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 118.
325. See id. at 123 (noting that the Justices of rules "also doubt that any single or shared
community can exist to anchor standards").
326. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 926; cf. Tushnet, supra note 250, at 785 (arguing that only "the
communitarian assumptions of conservative social thought" can provide "the requisite continuities
of history and meaning" which would make both interpretivism and neutral principles viable
modes of interpretation).
327. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 926. Tushnet's view of conservatism is, for example, hard to
square with Burke's preoccupation with the problem of how a representative should act when his
views are in conflict with those of his constituents. See BURKE, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol,
supra note 128, at 216-18.
328. See Bua, Reflections, supra note 12, at 97-98 ('To be attached to the subdivision, to
love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public
affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and
to mankind."); see also BuRKE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 521-22 (discussing the individual's
involuntary obligations to the community).
329. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE ToLRAr Socmry: FREEDOM OF SPEECHr AND EXTRENIST
SPEECH IN AMERCA 7 (1986) ("[The free speech idea... remains one of our foremost cultural
symbols."); Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.
L. REv. 303, 306 (1986) ("mhe Constitution ... continues to be seen as a repository for the
central substantive values of our civic culture: individualism, egalitarianism, and tolerance of
diversity."); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 123 ("Some bedrock notions like negative liberty run so
deep that you can rely on them to help you draw lines across subject matters-whether con-
fronting pregnant women or states with radioactive waste.").
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the areas of agreement that exist, while making allowances for diversity. 3
In any event, the opposite preference for rules partakes more of the liberal
tradition of individualism, as articulated by John Rawls and Friedrich von
Hayek.331 Moreover, rule-based decisionmaking accommodates the liberal
individualist belief in the subjectivity of values by constraining the judge to
refer only to facts in making decisions. 32 That this position is now being
put forward by Justice Scalia simply emphasizes the extent to which mod-
em American conservatives have adopted the libertarian premises of classi-
cal liberalism.333
Finally, proponents of standards insist that "the Court's own internal
practices of reasoned deliberation-the Justices' very self-conception that
they are doing law, not politics-will discipline the tendencies of any per-
sonal preferences to guide results. '334  This argument emphasizes the
Burkean notion that the judge is a legitimate participant in the enterprise of
mixed government, rather than an interloper in a presumptively majoritarian
system.335 Indeed, the case for standards generally assumes that adequate
constraints on judicial discretion may be found within the judicial process
itself; none of the arguments canvassed above rely on other branches of
government to check the development of standards by the courts. Rather,
they rest on what the preceding two sections have developed as the essence
of a Burkean approach to constitutional interpretation: a faith in the ability
of judges to oversee the incremental evolution of our constitutional
tradition.
IV. TowARD A BuRKEA APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In this section, I hope to suggest a few directions that someone who
finds value in Burke might pursue in interpreting the Constitution. One
must be wary, of course, of the time-honored tradition in constitutional the-
ory of claiming to have discovered the one true theory that has eluded all of
one's distinguished predecessors.336 Unfortunately, a critique of existing
330. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 123 ('[S]tandards... may accommodate heterogeneity in
multi-factored tests.").
331. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
332. See Kennedy, supra note 91, at 1767-71. Note that Judge Bork displays a similar belief
in the subjectivity of values when he asserts that "[tihere is no principled way to decide that one
man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one form of gratification
is more worthy than another." Bork, supra note 45, at 10.
333. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
334. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 118-19.
335. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
336. Surveying the literature, Judge Bork notes that "one of the most entertaining aspects of
this doomed enterprise" is that "[e]ach of the moral-constitutional theorists finds the theories of
all the others deficient." Even worse, Bork concludes that "each is correct [because] all the
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theories is rather unhelpful without an attempt to develop some alternative
way of proceeding; as Justice Scalia has pointed out, "You can't beat some-
body with nobody."337 In pursuing this attempt, however, it is prudent to
narrow one's claims. Burke would be the first to agree that no theory can
be entirely satisfactory when brought into contact with the unruly facts of
reality, and that theorizing can therefore only take us so far.338 And yet,
Burke devoted a great deal of time and energy to theory. In every instance,
although he began with a particular political controversy, he strove to artic-
ulate principles of more general applicability. Burke's theory, however, is
inherently "self-limiting" in that "it recognizes the boundaries of philosoph-
ical argument and offers reasons for respecting them. ' 339 In so doing,
Burkean conservatism acknowledges that no theory can be perfectly consis-
tent, complete, or determinate. It does, nonetheless, offer a means of deter-
mining that some sorts of arguments are better than others in ways that may
guide a court's interpretation, even if they do not dictate particular re-
sults.34° If this is true, then Burkean constitutional theory is worth pursuing
despite its inevitable limitations.
Just as the Burkean approach challenges widely-held notions of what
constitutional "theory" should do, it is also likely to upset general percep-
tions of what "conservatism" is all about. The approach set out below is,
for example, far more amenable to the definition of unenumerated rights
through constitutional evolution than the originalist jurisprudence that most
associate with conservatism. On some level, of course, the question of
whether my approach can properly be called "conservative" is far less im-
portant than whether it is a good approach. Nonetheless, it is worth noting
that any seeming irony in calling the Burkean theory articulated here "con-
servative" is a product of confusion about the fundamental nature of con-
servative ideology. As a "situational" or "institutional" ideology,
conservatism is far more concerned with preserving an existing set of insti-
tutions than with prescribing the substantive content of those institutions.
Consequently, as Professor Huntington points out, "[n]o necessary dichot-
others', as well as his own, are deficient." BORK, supra note 18, at 254. The irony of this state-
ment, given Bork's natural exemption of his own originalist theory from his pessimistic assess-
ment, see id. at 251-59, seems lost on Judge Bork. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 925 (arguing that
"no constitutional theory, liberal or conservative, can be coherent").
337. Scalia, supra note 40, at 855.
338. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 926 (noting that "[tlhe Burkean tradition rejects the ration-
alism of theories about political life").
339. Kronman, supra note 132, at 1615 (describing Bickel's prudentialism, which drew heav-
ily on Burke).
340. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1085, 1103 (1989) ("Perhaps ... constitutional interpretation is best thought of as an activity
that one can do well or poorly, rather than as an application of some explicit general theory.").
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omy exists... between conservatism and liberalism." '34 Positing such a
dichotomy, moreover, "only serves to obscure the fact that in the proper
historical circumstances conservatism may well be necessary for the de-
fense of liberal institutions."342 Indeed, it is only in this sense that original-
ism itself could possibly be called conservative; the Constitution, after all,
was an extremely liberal project at its inception, and adherence to its origi-
nal intent is, fundamentally, adherence to the platform of classical
liberalism.343
The true enemy of conservatism, then, is not liberalism but radical-
ism-from whatever source.344 There are elements of liberalism, of course,
that are fundamentally incompatible with conservatism: excessive faith in
human reason and corresponding reliance on abstract theory, for example.
In the preceding section, I have sought to demonstrate that it is precisely
these elements that modem "conservative" jurisprudence has chosen to em-
phasize; the tension between that jurisprudence and principles of stare deci-
sis,3 4 5 moreover, is powerful evidence of modem judicial "conservatism" 's
kinship with the radicalism that conservatives have traditionally opposed.
Burkean theory, on the other hand, is the antithesis of radicalism: it es-
chews abstraction and seeks to limit its demands on human rationality by
insisting that change be limited by incrementalism and guided by tradition.
This is the historical meaning of conservatism in western political theory,
and it is by this standard that the approach articulated below should be
judged.
A. Common-Law Constitutionalism
The "theory" I want to advance is less a new way of looking at consti-
tutional interpretation than an attempt to explain and justify what courts do
now. This approach heeds Burke's suggestion that "instead of exploding
general prejudices," we would do better to endeavor "to discover the latent
wisdom which prevails in them." '346 Theories constructed in this manner,
Burke argues, are more durable "because prejudice, with its reason, has a
motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it
permanence."347 Working to refine and strengthen our existing traditions of
interpretation has two advantages: the effort begins with a tested method
which we have at least been able to live with for two centuries, and the
341. Huntington, supra note 10, at 460.
342. Id.; see also supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., supra notes 237-46, 266-67 and accompanying text.
344. See Huntington, supra note 10, at 460.
345. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
346. BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 138.
347. Id.
[Vol. 72
CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
product is more likely to be acceptable to practitioners of interpretation who
might well be skeptical of a radically new approach. Defining the interpre-
tive tradition, of course, is no easy matter. I want to argue, however, that a
common-law model fairly describes much of what courts actually do when
interpreting the Constitution, and that such interpretation would generally
be more successful if the common-law model were more candidly acknowl-
edged and more broadly employed.
By "common-law model," I mean a process that attempts to emulate
Burke's rejection of abstract theory and his corresponding emphasis on tra-
dition and incremental change.348 Although many of the characteristics of
this process are clear from my preceding discussion, it is useful to reiterate
them here. The first point is that none of the generally accepted modes of
constitutional argument are ruled out; arguments from the constitutional
text, the intent of the framers, judicial precedent, the broader philosophical
purposes of the constitution, moral philosophy, and social policy may all be
relevant in any given case.3 49 Given a Burkean set of assumptions, how-
ever, some of these arguments are more persuasive than others. For exam-
ple, even the most fervent nonoriginalists tend to concede that originalist
history is an important factor for judges to consider.350 For the Burkean,
that history is primarily valuable as an aid in ascertaining the tradition as a
whole as it has evolved from the original period to the present. Similarly, a
Burkean judge will tend to reject arguments based on abstract moral theory
except insofar as that theory can be shown to reflect and clarify the moral
intuitions of society at large.
The relative importance of different sorts of constitutional argument
will also vary according to the particular provision of the Constitution that
is being interpreted. This kind of flexibility is essential to avoid the fallacy
of treating the Constitution as a document that was created at a single time
with a single set of premises and goals.3"' The text of many provisions, for
example, is sufficiently clear that almost all questions involving them can
be resolved without recourse to other interpretive methods.35 2 In other ar-
eas, the values historically associated with a provision, as well as its tradi-
348. See supra notes 131-51, 185-96 and accompanying text.
349. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (observing that "most judges, lawyers, and
commentators recognize the relevance of at least [these] kinds of constitutional argument").
350. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 32, at 228 (observing that "nonoriginalist adjudication ...
treats the text and original history as important but not necessarily authoritative").
351. Professors Tribe and Dorf refer to this fallacy as "hyper-integration." See TRIE & DoRs,
supra note 305, at 20, 24-30. Although their critique focuses on the assumption that all parts of
the Constitution embody the same values or principles, hyper-integration seems to apply equally
well to the idea that all constitutional provisions call for the same interpretive approach, despite
differences in language, history, and development.
352. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL.. L. REv. 399, 418-19 (1985):
19941
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion of interpretation over time, may require that some types of arguments
count more than others.353 Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, argues
that evidence of traditional practices is highly relevant to substantive due
process inquiries, but less relevant (or relevant in a different way) under the
Equal Protection Clause:
[T]he Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely ...to
protect traditional practices against short-run departures [and]
has therefore been associated with a [conception] of judicial re-
view [that] sees the courts as safeguards against novel develop-
ments brought about by temporary majorities who are
insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history.
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been under-
stood . . . to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory
practices, however deeply ingrained and longstanding. The Due
Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the
Due Process issue whether an existing or time honored conven-
tion is violated by the practice under attack. By contrast, the
Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate prac-
tices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that
were expected to endure.354
The recognition that different parts of the Constitution should be read in
different ways favors a jurisprudence of local doctrines rather than general
theories. We should be wary, of course, of forgetting that "it is a Constitu-
tion, and not merely an unconnected bunch of separate clauses and provi-
sions with separate histories, that must be interpreted." 55 Nonetheless,
Burkean skepticism about the capacities of human reason should deter us
from attempting to emulate Professor Ronald Dworkin's Hercules by trying
[The] general intelligibility of language enables us to understand immediately the man-
date of numerous constitutional provisions without recourse to precedent, original in-
tent, or any of the other standard interpretive supplements. We need not depart from the
text to determine the rudiments of how a bill becomes a law, the age and other qualifica-
tions for various federal offices.... and the permissibility of calling the defendant as a
prosecution witness in a federal criminal case.
353. See generally TRIBE, supra note 236, §§ 1-1 to 1-9 (outlining seven distinct models that
represent "the major alternatives for constitutional argument and decision").
354. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988); see also
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
('The Equal Protection Clause and other provisions of the Constitution, unlike the Due Process
Clause, are not an explicit invocation of the 'law of the land,' and might be thought to have some
counterhistorical content."). History may well be relevant in equal protection cases, however, for
the purpose of determining whether a given group should be accorded special protection as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
461-64 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the mentally retarded should be regarded as a quasi-suspect class based on the history of
extensive discrimination against them).
355. TRIE & DoRe, supra note 305, at 20.
[Vol. 72
1994] CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
to formulate a general moral and political theory of the Constitution that
can then be used to determine right answers in every case.35 6 Rather, we
will do better to work within the traditions of interpretation that have grown
up around particular constitutional provisions.
In a jurisprudence of doctrine, the primary tool of constitutional inter-
pretation will be judicial precedent rather than originalist history or abstract
moral theory. This approach mirrors the reality of constitutional advocacy;
although lawyers may make arguments about original understanding or
moral philosophy to courts, they generally emphasize the requirements of
doctrine as articulated in prior decisions.357 Many precedents, of course,
will themselves rely in whole or in part upon arguments about the original
understanding. By incorporating originalism in this indirect way, however,
adherence to precedent also takes account of a constitutional provision's
line of growth from the original period down to the present.358 When used
as a means of divining the present meaning of a constitutional provision as
it has evolved over time, precedent itself functions as a tool of interpreta-
tion; rather than offering a reason to adhere to an incorrect interpretation
under the doctrine of stare decisis, the force of precedent enters into the
356. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1084-85 (1975). Although a
comprehensive discussion of Dworkin is outside the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
his approach mirrors the common-law method in a number of important respects. In particular,
Dworkin's concept of "fit"--under which any theory of decisions constructed by the judge must
fit and justify the majority of existing legal rules, precedents, and institutions, see id. at
1096-1101-resembles Burke's own insistence that reformers should "make the reparation as
nearly as possible in the style of the building." BURKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 290. None-
theless, Burkean distrust of rationalism and abstraction ought to make conservatives suspicious of
Dworkin's superhuman Hercules, despite Dworkin's own concession that Hercules is simply an
ideal that real judges should seek to approximate. See Dworkin, supra, at 1108-09. The Burkean
judge may, for example, find that analogical reasoning from accepted precedents is preferable to
an attempt to emulate Hercules' "top-down" approach to legal reasoning, which requires that
judges approach individual cases by first constructing a theory at a high level of generality. See
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741,785-86 (1993) (arguing that
lawyers and judges generally reason horizontally by analogy from one situation to another, and
criticizing Dworkin's theory for requiring lawyers and judges "to ask questions that are too broad
and abstract-too hard, large, and open-ended for legal actors to handle"); see also Kent Greena-
walt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REv. 991, 1043 (1977) ("If a judge tries
self-consciously to emulate Hercules, he may be set adrift in abstractions he cannot really handle
and end up rationalizing his own preferences more than he would under some simpler process of
decision.").
357. See T~aE & DoRF, supra note 305, at 71 ('ITihe elaboration of constitutional values
proceeds mostly from prior decisions."); WELuNGON, supra note 242, at 127 ("An additional
strength of the common-law method is its experiential familiarity: it is how courts generally
adjudicate... "').
358. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MiCH. L. REv. 1033, 1070
(1981) ('The question is rot simply what the framers thought, but what has become of their ideas
in the time between their age and ours.").
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initial determination of what the correct interpretation is.359 Use of prece-
dent in this way allows the judge to tap into a cumulative wisdom that
transcends his own rationality. As Dean Brest observes, "a doctrine that
survives over a period of time has the approval of a court composed, in
effect, of all the judges who have ever had occasion to consider and apply
it."360 More generally, a heavy reliance on precedent acknowledges the fact
that "no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh
in every case that raised it."36'
When specific precedents cannot directly determine a result, judges
pursuing the common-law model are nonetheless constrained to some ex-
tent by the conventions of legal argument and reasoning. These considera-
tions confine the range of arguments presented to courts by advocates. As
Dean Wellington observes, "[1]awyers on both sides are hedged about in
their adversarial roles by the conventions of the legal profession: each ar-
gues... 'like a lawyer." 362 Lawyers, according to Wellington, "are mem-
bers of an interpretive community"; as a result, "they know that those
before whom they contest will listen only to certain types of arguments."3 63
Dean Wellington concludes that "[tihis shared sense of what is relevant in
a situation sharply reduces the number of considerations that might other-
wise be thought germane and makes it much more than merely idealistic to
talk about treating like cases alike."3 4 An important part of this shared
vision of what it means to argue "like a lawyer" is a commitment to the
method of analogical reasoning, which Professor Sunstein describes as our
legal culture's "most characteristic way of proceeding. ' 365 According to
Sunstein, the doctrine of stare decisis means that a certain number of out-
comes must be respected as starting points for further reasoning; as a result,
"[w]ithin the legal culture, analogical reasoning imposes a certain disci-
359. The distinction between interpretation and stare decisis would conceivably be meaningful
in a case where the prior precedent was not ultimately persuasive as evidence of the meaning of an
underlying constitutional provision, but the decision was so entrenched that, as a practical matter,
it would be imprudent to overrule it. Arguably, this is what occurred in Planned Parenthood v,
Casey, 112 S. CL 2791 (1992), where the plurality was not completely convinced of the consis-
tency of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with the previous line of development in the privacy
area, but declined to overrule Roe for reasons having to do with settled expectations and public
confidence in the Court. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-16 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter, JJ.).
360. Brest, supra note 32, at 228.
361. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.)
(citing BENJAm CARDozo, THE NATURE oF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 149 (1921)).
362. WEL.NGTON, supra note 242, at 14.
363. Id. at 80.
364. Id. at 14.
365. Sunstein, supra note 356, at 741.
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pline" that can help courts to reach determinate results even in the absence
of "widespread moral or political consensus." '366
Similarly, judges may also be constrained by norms and procedures
inherent in the judicial process. Charles Fried has defined judicial conser-
vatism as involving a faithful adherence to judicial craftsmanship, including
"dedication to analyzing the record of the case, a refusal to twist the histori-
cal truth to reach a desired result, a respect for adjacent institutions, and a
vision of a judicial opinion as a ruling tailored to address the specific legal
issues presented to the Court in a given case."367 These norms, of course,
can hardly decide cases, and judges pursuing them may certainly find ways
to impose their own subjective preferences. Nonetheless, a judge who ap-
proaches a dispute feeling that he is bound to certain norms of craft regard-
less of his substantive predispositions is already a long way from the
attitude of a court that is nothing but a "naked power organ." Moreover, the
norms themselves require the judge to pay scrupulous attention to the facts
of each case-a focus that may in itself distance the judge from his more
abstract ideological or moral beliefs. The individual discretionary power of
any given judge is further constrained by the fact that, at the appellate levels
at least, judicial decisionmaking is a collective process. The need to con-
vince others of potentially differing views provides an incentive to confine
discussion to the more common ground of distinctly "legal" modes of anal-
ysis, an incentive which strengthens the already "deeply internalized role
constraints" of most judges, who tend to insist that "judgment is not poli-
tics."36 Even good faith commitment to the norms of legal reasoning, of
course, cannot entirely prevent substantive moral and political views from
intruding into adjudication. The need for consensus, however, will substan-
tially constrain the range of possible outcomes. In addition, the commit-
ments to adjudicative deliberation that judges do hold may ensure that
366. Id. at 770. Of course, in constitutional cases, the doctrine of stare decisis generally ap-
plies with less force than in common-law cases. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 409 n.5 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). One aspect of my argument for a com-
mon-law approach to constitutional interpretation is thus a suggestion that precedent should be
more important in the constitutional area. Even under the present approach, however, it seems
clear that certain holdings are virtually unassailable. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLuM. L. Rv. 723, 723 (1988) (acknowledging that despite
the inconsistency of Brown v. Board of Education with originalism, originalists have to accept as
given that "Brown will not be overruled"); see also Akhil R. Amar, Comment-The Case of the
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HAv. L. REv. 124, 125 (1992) (arguing
that after R.A.V., the Court's earlier decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), "is no
longer up for grabs"). Cases such as Brown (and possibly Johnson) can thus function as generally
accepted starting points for analogical reasoning in the way Professor Sunstein describes.
367. Fried, supra note 306, at 44.
368. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 120.
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compromises among political and moral positions occur even when the
composition of a court appears to be ideologically homogeneous. 36
9
These internal constraints on the adjudicatory process-precedent,
legal reasoning, and collective deliberation-assume a critical importance
in interpreting the Constitution's open-ended clauses, particularly in the
area of unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause. As the plurality
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey370 recognized, "The inescapable fact is that
adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradi-
tion courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. 3 71 Judges have
consistently insisted, however, that such judgment is not wholly indetermi-
nate. While the Casey plurality acknowledged that the boundaries of such
judgment "are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule," the justices
recognized that "[tihat does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy
choices with which we disagree. 372 Perhaps the definitive affirmation that
reasoned legal argument can decide cases without simply imposing the
judge's own values dates back to Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe
v. Ullman:373
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content can-
not be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be
said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation... has struck between
[individual] liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of neces-
sity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where
judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by
this country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which
it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.
No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment
and restraint.374
369. See id. at 119-21 ("Because good deliberation requires the consideration of multiple per-
spectives .... the Court will maintain a kind of internal ideological equilibrium. As Justices come
and go, those left behind will fan out to ensure reasoned deliberation that takes the full range of
ideological difference into account.").
370. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
371. Id. at 2806 (plurality opinion).
372. Id. (plurality opinion).
373. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
374. Id. at 542 (Harlan, ., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). The Casey
plurality quoted extensively from this opinion in reaffirming the right to an abortion established in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-06.
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Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe demonstrates the application of the com-
mon-law model to resolve actual cases.375 Arguing that a ban on the use of
contraceptives violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan relied heavily
on the tradition of interpretation of the Due Process Clause, noting that the
Court had consistently rejected both the purely procedural interpretation of
the clause, as well as the view that the substantive rights protected by the
clause were limited to those found in the original Bill of Rights.376 He then
surveyed the development of substantive due process, observing that
"[e]ach new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against
a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally per-
ceived and historically developed .... The new decision must take 'its place
in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to
come."' 377 Focusing on precedents such as Meyer v. Nebraska3 78 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 7 9 in the substantive due process area, as well as
search and seizure cases such as Wolf v. Colorado,380 Harlan concluded that
a law authorizing the state to invade the home and inquire into the most
intimate details of marital relations could not possibly be consistent with
due process. 38' He was aided in this conclusion by looking also to contem-
porary morality as revealed in the enacted statutes of other states and na-
tions; the "utter novelty" of the means of enforcement employed by
Connecticut was, for Harlan, "conclusive" as to its unconstitutionality.382
Legislation or the absence thereof may be evidence of conventional
morality, but it cannot be dispositive in every case.383 Public morality rep-
resents the general principles to which a community generally adheres; leg-
islative majorities, however, may well violate these principles in particular
cases. 384 Exclusive reliance on statutes is similarly problematic when much
time has elapsed between enactment and the time at which public morality
is to be evaluated.385 Dean Wellington thus argues that courts must apply
375. See Ackerman, supra note 241, at 21.
376. Poe, 367 U.S. at 540-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
378. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
379. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
380. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 661 (1961).
381. Poe, 367 U.S. at 553-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 554-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that neither the federal government nor any
other state or nation had such a statute).
383. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 287 (1973).
384. See Wellington, supra note 301, at 514 n.133 (noting that problems of inconsistency are
particularly serious in the legislative process, "when self-interest is least neutralized by considera-
tions of conscience or moral obligation").
385. See WNELLINoTN, supra note 242, at 109 (arguing that courts should consider legislative
history to determine whether a statute actually reflects public morality); Wellington, supra note
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the "method of philosophy" in order to ascertain the state of conventional
morality. This method has little to do with abstract moral theory; rather, a
judge must "live in [society], become sensitive to it, experience widely,
read extensively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to
call moral obligations into play."3 86 Such reflection on the values of soci-
ety at large is essential if the inquiry is to constrain judges, for the com-
mon-law model insists that judges apply society's values and not their
own.387 Finally, the judge must apply the methods of legal argument and
reasoning to moral values before they can be applied in concrete cases.
This process, Wellington asserts, "has some promise of filtering out the
prejudices and passions of the moment, some promise of providing the
judge with distance and a necessary historical perspective. 388
Despite all this, one has to admit that this conception of public moral-
ity is a rather weak reed upon which to decide a case. Conventional moral-
ity will, in many cases, be too ephemeral a creature to constrain a judge
who really wishes to decide an issue on the strength of his own values.
Much the same thing, moreover, could be (and has been) said of tradition,
legal reasoning, or even precedent. Nonetheless, the hope is that if each of
these instruments can impose some constraint on courts, then the cumula-
tive impact of all of them will be enough to preserve the balance between
the judiciary and the other institutions in our mixed government.389 In as-
sessing this claim, it is important to remember that this eclectic approach is
essentially what we have been relying on for most of our history. In
presenting arguments to courts, advocates will describe the original under-
standing, cite precedents, argue by analogy, appeal to tradition, public mo-
rality, or even abstract moral philosophy, and warn of dire policy
consequences if their position is not adopted by the court. Similarly, in
383, at 287 (noting also "the unreliability of drawing conclusions from subsequent legislative
inaction, and, most importantly, the nature of the legislature which is responsive to shifting power
configurations in a community, but not advantageously positioned to find shifting conventional
morality in the community").
386. Wellington, supra note 383, at 246. Formal moral philosophy does influence conven-
tional morality over time. Wellington notes, however, that "the impact of professional philosophi-
cal thought on common morality is slow and philosophical positions undergo a life-change,
having to do with absorption and assimilation and interaction with the best of the past and with the
conditions of society." Id. at 280.
387. See id. at 244. According to Wellington, "OJludicial reasoning in concrete cases must
proceed from society's set of moral principles and ideals, in much the same way that the judicial
interpretation of documents ... must proceed from the document." Id.
388. Id. at 248.
389. Of course, these various sources of law may well point in contradictory directions in any
given case. That simply means that the case is hard, however-not that the judge is suddenly left
without constraint. It is the judge's job to reconcile and balance the divergent sources of law in
such a case, and merely because another judge might balance them differently does not mean that
the first judge has stopped doing law and has imposed his own values.
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justifying their decisions, judges will generally appeal to many or all of
these sources. One of the reasons for proceeding in this way may well be
that no one-not the advocates selecting the arguments, and not the judges
writing the opinions-is sufficiently sure of his own preferred method of
interpretation, if he even has one, to stake the outcome of real cases on one
particular form of evidence or mode of analysis. This, I think, is as it
should be. In the end, the most important thing Burke can teach us about
constitutional interpretation may be simply a sense of humility in the face
of the law's complexity. As Professors Tribe and Dorf observed in the
context of unenumerated rights, "the difficulty of these issues does tell us
... that courts would do well to proceed with caution and humility-to
avoid the rush to sweeping, global, across-the-board solutions."39 Simi-
larly, Professor Bickel rested his prudentialism on a sense of "'sheer won-
der'-a fascination with the world, an appreciative grasp of its complexity
and of the resistance it offers to ideas." '39 1 The Constitution, Professor
Thayer said, "is forever dwarfing its commentators, both statesmen and
judges, by disclosing its own greatness. ' 392 In the face of such an institu-
tion, then, we would do well to proceed with a sense of our limits, leaning
heavily on the interpretive traditions left to us by those who have gone
before.
B. In Defense of Tradition
The emphasis on tradition is likely to be the most controversial aspect
of the account of constitutional interpretation set out above.
"[T]raditionalism is today in disrepute," according to Professor
Kronman. 393 "Any contemporary philosopher of law who... takes tradi-
tionalism seriously enough even to want to understand it, thereby ....
places himself in opposition to his age, an age in which the rationalizing
spirit of philosophy, having escaped all previous limits, now rules the world
of Western politics unchallenged. '394 Burke's body of work stands for the
rejection of this rationalizing spirit; in this sense, most of this 'Article
amounts to a defense of the idea of traditionalism. In this section, I hope to
390. TREBE & DoRe, supra note 305, at 63 (noting that "[i]t is in this respect that the Supreme
Court in hindsight can be criticized for its performance in Roe v. Wade"); see also Fried, supra
note 306, at 39 (identifying Justice Harlan's conservatism as "simple humility-an unwillingness
to think he possessed all of the insight into the resolution of a problem").
391. Kronman, supra note 132, at 1598.
392. James B. Thayer, On Our New Possession, 12 H~a~v. L. REv. 464 (1899), quoted in
Bicm, supra note 46, at 44.
393. Kronman, supra note 148, at 1044.
394. Id. at 1046-47. But see Luban, supra note 15, at 1037, 1040 (observing that "the inter-
penetration of sociology, economics, and philosophy into legal thinking" had sent legal tradition-
alism into decline, but suggesting that "the pendulum among both legal academics and law
students is swinging rapidly ... back in the direction of law's aboriginal grand tradition").
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address some of the more specific criticisms that have been levelled at the
use of tradition in constitutional law.
1. Which Tradition?
Perhaps the most common criticism of tradition is that it is too indeter-
minate to constrain judges. According to Professor Ely, "people have come
to understand that 'tradition' can be invoked in support of almost any cause.
There is obvious room to maneuver, along continua of both space and time,
on the subject of which traditions to invoke."395 The most serious version
of this objection focuses on the fact that "historical traditions, like rights
themselves, exist'at various levels of generality. 3 96 This debate is gener-
ally fought out over the terrain of the Supreme Court's decision in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,3 97 which upheld a California law establishing a conclusive
presumption that a child born to a woman living with her husband, who is
not impotent or sterile, is a child of the marriage. Michael H., whom blood
tests showed almost certainly to be the genetic father of Victoria, chal-
lenged the presumption in the course of a suit to establish his paternity and
obtain visitation rights. Michael's principal argument was that the statute
infringed an alleged substantive due process right to establish his paternity
of the child.39 In rejecting this argument, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
relied on the historical prevalence of similar statutes, and the complete ab-
sence of any case "award[ing] substantive parental rights to the natural
father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union
that wishes to embrace the child. '399 By contrast, Justice Brennan's dissent
emphasized the traditional interest "of a parent and child in their relation-
ship with each other," which the Court had protected in a long line of prece-
dents.4 ' In response, Justice Scalia argued that courts should choose
among traditions defined at differing levels of generality by "refer[ring] to
the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified." '' This, according to
Justice Scalia, is the only way to constrain judges: "Because ... general
395. ELY, supra note 32, at 60.
396. TRmE & DoRu, supra note 305, at 100.
397. 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989).
398. See id. at 113-16 (plurality opinion).
399. Id. at 124-26, 127.
400. Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944)).
401. Id. at 127 n.6. Justice Scalia explained that "[i]f, for example, there were no societal
tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived,
we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in
general" Id. at 128 n.6.
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traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate
rather than discern the society's views." 2
Justice Scalia's proposed test has been criticized on the ground that
"there are many different ways of describing a liberty, and many different
ways of characterizing a tradition.' 3 Professors Tribe and Doff, for exam-
ple, emphasize that Michael H. had lived with Victoria for a substantial
period and established a relationship with her; consequently, the most spe-
cific formulation of the issue in the case would be: "What are the rights of
the natural father of a child conceived in an adulterous but long-standing
relationship, where the father has played a major role in the child's early
development?"' 4 There is, of course, probably no tradition at this level;
when we go to a higher level of generality, however, we must choose be-
tween abstracting away either the adultery or the natural father's relation-
ship with his daughter. The result, as Tribe and Doff point out, may depend
on this choice, as natural fathers who have established such relationships
are not all that far from Justice Brennan's protected tradition of parenthood
in general.4°5 It is thus hard to avoid Tribe's and Dorf's conclusion that
"It]he absence of a single dimension of specificity is a pervasive problem
for the tradition-bound program." ''6
A second and potentially more serious problem with Justice Scalia's
approach is that the limitation of tradition to its most specific incarnation
eliminates the ability of "abstract principles regarding the contours and con-
tents of protected realms of liberty and equality" to serve as "a source of
progressive pressure." 40 7 As Professor Balkin observes, "[O]ur most spe-
cific historical traditions may often be opposed to our more general com-
mitments to liberty or equality." It is "one of the untidy facts of historical
experience," Balkin asserts, that "different parts of the American tradition
may conflict with each other. . . Traditions do not exist as integrated
wholes. They are a motley collection of principles and counterprinciples,
standing for one thing when viewed narrowly and standing for another
402. Id. Justice Scalia buttressed his argument by noting that "Justice Brennan's opinion and
Justice O'Connor's opinion .... which disapproves this footnote, both appeal to tradition, but on
the basis of the tradition they select [they] reach opposite results." Id. (citation omitted). Chief
Justice Rehnquist was the only other member of the plurality to join the footnote containing Jus-
tice Scalia's test. Id. at 112.
403. J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 C~anozo L.
Rev. 1613, 1615 (1990).
404. TRmE & DORF, supra note 304, at 103.
405. Id. at 103-04.
406. Id. at 101.
407. Id. at 109; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("'[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth."' (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910))).
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when viewed more generally."4 ° Reference to the highly general, aspira-
tional aspects of our traditions is essential if we are to have a basis from
which to criticize established practices such as slavery or segregation; Jus-
tice Scalia's bright-line rule, however, eliminates the flexibility necessary to
permit such criticism.4 9
Nonetheless, these criticisms do not require rejection of tradition alto-
gether. Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. suggests that instead of
arbitrarily selecting the most specific level of generality, judges should seek
a tradition at the level of generality used in related prior precedent.410 Pro-
fessor Balkin describes this process as a sort of common-law development,
through which the specific content of abstract traditions are "determined
from case-by-case adjudication, from judgments of similarity and difference
to what has gone before-in short, from the tradition of readings and rer-
eadings of authoritative materials that constitute the practice of constitu-
tional stare decisis."411 This approach requires the same sort of faith in
legal reasoning and the adjudicative process characteristic of common-law
constitutionalism; Justice Scalia's approach, by contrast, adopts what
Professors Tribe and Doff describe as "a form of judicial nihilism" that
"implicitly assumes that there is no way to read the prior cases on their own
terms so as to discern rationally the level of generality at which a right was
408. Balkin, supra note 403, at 1618; see also The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading
Cases, 103 HARv. L. Rv. 137, 184 (1989) ("Previous due process decisions recognized the possi-
bility that a specific tradition denying a right may contradict a broader, alternative tradition up-
holding a more general, and more fundamental, right that encompasses the specific right in
question."). As examples, Professor Balkin notes that
[t]he fourteenth amendment's abstract commitment to racial equality was accompanied
by simultaneous acceptance of segregated public schools in the District of Columbia and
acquiescence in antimiscegnation laws. The establishment clause and the principle of
separation of church and state have coexisted with presidential proclamations of national
days of prayer, official congressional chaplains, and national Christmas trees.
Balkin, supra note 403, at 1618.
409. See infra notes 418-20 and accompanying text. Professor Balkin suggests that Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy refused to join Scalia's test because they recognized that flexibility is
needed to make traditionalism a viable tool of interpretation. See Balkin, supra note 403, at 1621
n.31; cf. Strauss, supra note 103, at 1709 (noting the tension between traditionalism and a commit-
ment to rules).
410. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('The
better approach.., is to ask whether the specific parent-child relationship under consideration is
close enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an aspect of 'liberty' as
well."); see also TRmE & DoRe, supra note 305, at 111 (describing this approach). Gregory Cook
rejects this approach on the ground that "it is no rule at all to follow precedent blindly without
ever asking whether it was correctly decided." Cook, supra note 296, at 866 n.74. This argument,
of course, would apply equally well to following uncritically the most specific tradition available.
The better procedure is to give precedents-which are really just judicial traditions of interpreta-
tion-the same deference as other forms of tradition.
411. Balkin, supra note 403, at 1624.
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recognized." '412 Of course, it may be difficult to determine an appropriate
level of generality in areas where there are no well-developed lines of re-
lated precedent. In such cases, it may be necessary to rely on a combination
of Justice Scalia's approach and the Equal Protection Clause as a less arbi-
trary approach than a totally unbounded judicial inquiry. However, Justice
Harlan's ability to use the intersection of widely divergent lines of prece-
dent to ground an apparently novel right to privacy in Poe v. Ullman indi-
cates that judges may have to fall back on the most specific tradition test in
a relatively small number of cases.413 In the end, the rejection of tradition
as too indeterminate to use as a source of law involves the same sort of
nihilism as Justice Scalia's approach in Michael H.
2. Bad Traditions
A less sophisticated argument against reliance on tradition in constitu-
tional adjudication points to the dark side of our collective past. Gary
Wills, for example, is often quoted to the effect that "[r]unning men out of
town on a rail is at least as much an American tradition as declaring
unalienable rights. 4 14 Citing the example of segregation, Professor Strauss
concludes that "[iln fact, traditionalism is just not an acceptable creed. At
bottom neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else arguably within the legal
mainstream today accepts its implications. To make the obvious and blunt
point, there are ugly, even unspeakable traditions in our history." '415 It is, of
course, impossible to deny the existence of such episodes. To paraphrase
Professor Strauss, however, no one arguably within the mainstream of legal
traditionalists-starting with Burke himselfa' 6-accepts Strauss's impover-
ished definition of traditionalism. It is true that, in 1954, it was possible to
make traditionalist arguments for segregation.417 Nonetheless, I hope to
412. TRIBE & DoRu, supra note 305, at 112.
413. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (combining
precedents involving search and seizure with precedents protecting family prerogatives to discern
a right of married couples to use contraceptives in the home). But see Cook, supra note 296, at
884 (arguing that Harlan's reference to the novelty of the Connecticut statute is consistent with
Justice Scalia's narrow approach to tradition).
414. GARY WILLS, INVENMNa AMERICA at xii (1978) (paraphrasing Willmoore Kendall),
quoted in ELY, supra note 32, at 60.
415. Strauss, supra note 103, at 1711-12.
416. See supra notes 173-96 and accompanying text. Despite his confident characterization of
Burkean traditionalism, Professor Strauss falls to cite or quote Burke's actual writings once in his
article. And the secondary authorities on Burke that Strauss does cite-Robert A. Burt, Precedent
and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1685 (1991); Kronman,
supra note 148, and PococK, supra note 136-do not even remotely support Professor Strauss's
interpretation of Burke's traditionalism. Moreover, Justice Scalia (who is Strauss's real target)
does not accept Strauss's version of traditionalism either. See Scalia, supra note 40, at 861, 864
(admitting that he would not uphold a statute that imposes flogging as a punishment).
417. See Strauss, supra note 103, at 1712.
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show in this section that it was possible to make better traditionalist argu-
ments against it.
The first step in such an argument is based on the observation that
"abstract principles" can serve as "a source of progressive pressure. 4
18
These principles are not the product of metaphysical theory; rather, they are
simply the traditions of society taken at a higher level of generality. "A
developed political institution," according to Professor Kronman, "is never
just a collection of rules prescribing how those subject to it should behave.
Any institution of even moderate complexity will also have an aspirational
component-it will reflect certain ideals and be oriented toward the attain-
ment of certain values that are never fully realized in practice. '41  The
existence of this aspirational component means that "one can always argue
that the currently prevailing interpretation of an institution's ideals is faulty
or incomplete, and attempt to show that from the standpoint of a more ade-
quate interpretation, certain of the institution's existing features must be
judged wanting and in need of reform."420 It is a more difficult matter, of
course, to decide when we should accept and act on such arguments.
Although I will return to this question below, for now it is important simply
to recognize that tradition is not without critical resources that may serve as
a basis for reform.
This fact is nowhere more evident than in the struggle against slavery
and racism-the very instances that opponents of tradition cite as proving
its unacceptability. Although some elements of the civil rights movement
rejected American liberalism in favor of more radical ideologies, the more
successful groups-both within and without the African-American commu-
nity-grounded their arguments in an appeal to the classical liberal ideals
of freedom and equality.421 As Charles Henry observes, "[Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr.] was able to strengthen [his] moral appeal by drawing on the
democratic elements of the American political tradition.""42  Dr. Benjamin
Mays eloquently expressed this aspirational side of the American tradition:
I know that the Declaration of Independence was not meant for
me; that its chief architect, Thomas Jefferson, was a slave owner;
418. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
419. Kronman, supra note 132, at 1608.
420. Id. at 1609.
421. See generally ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 33 (1987); ALLEN J.
MATusow, THE UNRAvELiNo oF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s 373-75
(1984) (noting the limited appeal of black nationalism as compared to the liberalism of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.). According to Professor Matusow, "Among the black masses the classic liberal
ideal, more important than any particular liberal failing of policy, never lost its appeal. That ideal
envisioned a multi-ethnic, multiracial democracy characterized by equal justice and equal oppor-
tunity, and affording to each citizen reward according to merit." MATUSOW, supra, at 375.
422. Charles P. Henry, Delivering Daniel: The Dialectic of Ideology and Theology in the
Thought of Martin Luther King, Jr., 17 J. BLACK STuD. 327, 329 (1987).
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... and that the "land of the free" and "sweet land of liberty" are
not equally applicable to black and white. But these are ideals to
which the nation clings and the goals toward which it strives
when it is at is best and thinks nobly. It is not always easy for a
black man to swear allegiance to the flag, but the American
dream is embodied in that allegiance, and until it is repudiated
one can still hope for and work toward the day when it becomes a
reality.4z
The philosophy of the struggle against racism in America is, of course,
more complicated than this thumbnail sketch can convey. It is striking,
however, that the opponents of segregation were able to tap into the tradi-
tions of the establishment they were fighting. What is equally striking,
moreover, is that the defenders of segregation were cut off from those dem-
ocratic traditions, and forced to fall back on the naked fact of segregation's
existence without any way of justifying the institution itself in terms of
shared American values.424 Louis Hartz makes a similar point with respect
to the earlier Southern theorists of the Reactionary Enlightenment, who at-
tempted to defend slavery on Burkean traditionalist grounds. According to
Hartz, the aspirations to liberty and equality inherent in the American polit-
ical tradition were simply too powerful for these theorists to develop a co-
herent traditionalism around the institutions of slavery.425 Rather than
proving the arguments of the anti-traditionalists, then, the history of resist-
ance to racism in this country shows the liberating potential of tradition at
work, constantly undermining the claims of unjust institutions and provid-
ing a consensual basis for arguments in favor of reform.
The more sticky problems arise when we turn from the rhetorically
powerful but ultimately unconvincing example of racism to narrower ques-
tions such as the issue in Michael H. v. Gerald D.426 Here, the injustice is
less obvious, the gap in terms of generality between aspirational and spe-
cific traditions more broad. Professor Balkin notes that in such cases, the
423. ANDREW M. MANIS, SouTrrsm CiviL RELIGIONS IN Co.ro.icr 36 (1987) (quoting Benja-
min Mays).
424. Although defenders of segregation were able to appeal to American traditions of federal-
ism, opposition to social engineering, etc., it is difficult to find any (nonreligious) substantive
defense of racism per se, as opposed to arguments for noninterference. And even if we include
American religious traditions as relevant here, it is impossible to ignore the effectiveness of Dr.
King's use of those traditions to criticize racial injustice. See generally Henry, supra note 422, at
329 (arguing that "the secular American political creed and the sacred civic religion of the nation"
were inextricably intertwined in Dr. King's thought); MArms, supra note 423, at 10 (explaining the
"dual role of legitimation and criticism" played by "a common set of religious understandings").
425. See HARTz, supra note 22, at 153. Hartz adds that "to the extent that it recognized
slavery the Constitution had itself been a historic anomaly, contradicting the larger liberal tradi-
tion in which it had been created. To reject it on this score was to purge, not to repudiate,
America's political past." Id. at 155-56.
426. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see supra notes 397-413 and accompanying text.
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need to determine whether the specific practice is a good or bad tradition
"leads us back to the very value-laden inquiry that Justice Scalia sought to
avoid by his theory of tradition. To follow tradition because it reflects the
values of the many is insufficient-one must also believe that these values
are justified .... ." Professor Balkin thus concludes that tradition "does not
solve the problem of determining the boundaries of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty, but merely phrases the same question in a different way." 427
Phrasing the question in a different way, however, may make a difference.
Instead of measuring a tradition by comparison to abstract notions of jus-
tice, the traditionalist judge derives the standard of justification from a more
general understanding of history. From a Burkean standpoint, directing the
judge to focus upon the lessons of history is likely to be more reliable than
abstract theorizing, even if those lessons still require some degree of discre-
tionary interpretation.
Justice Brennan's performance in Michael H., of course, ought to in-
spire doubt as to tradition's ability to constrain the judge. As Professor
Balkin notes, "[Justice Brennan] miraculously discovers that the traditions
protected by the Constitution-adultery, homosexuality, and fornication-
are precisely those traditions to which majoritarian society objects the
most.""42 Allowing traditions defined at a high level of generality-like
"parenthood"-to always trump more specific limitations on those princi-
ples proves too much; it means that "the Constitution never fails to protect
tradition, no matter what the Supreme Court decides."4 29 There may be
ways, however, to avoid this extreme while retaining the concept of aspira-
tional traditions as a basis for criticizing specific practices. In some cases-
such as the examples of slavery and segregation-aspirational arguments
will only be available on one side. The fact that the historical practice of
racial discrimination is masked by a rhetorical affirmation of equality goes
a long way toward proving that racism, however prevalent it may be in
reality, is not part of our aspirational tradition. In this sense, words speak
more loudly than actions, because words indicate what we think is right,
while actions may simply display our inevitable failure to always live up to
427. Balkin, supra note 403, at 1618; see also Luban, supra note 15, at 1056-57 ("In the end,
of course, if falls to us (who else?) to pass judgment on the traditions into which we are born, and
to determine whether a multigenerational project should be tended and cultivated or abandoned
without regret. Thus, in the end, rationalist inquiry into the justification of traditions is inescap-
ably our lot.").
428. Balkin, supra note 403, at 1625. Although Justice Brennan is undoubtedly correct in
observing that "[wie are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
one," Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting), it is difficult to develop a meaningful
theory of tradition based upon his directive that "we must be willing to abide someone else's
unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyn-
crasies." Id.
429. Balkin, supra note 403, at 1625.
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those ideals. Burkean prudence may suggest that change should nonethe-
less be careful and incremental in such cases, but the imperative of reform
will be clear.43 In other cases, both opponents and defenders of a specific
tradition may be able to claim the same aspirational value in a zero-sum
fashion; Michael H. appears to be such a case, as both parties were able to
claim that awarding parental rights to the other would interfere with their
own attempts to establish "parenthood."431 Because the general, aspira-
tional tradition cannot choose between the two positions in such a case, it
will be necessary to seek other such traditions that may be implicated, and
if none can be found, to accept the balance that society has struck at the
more specific level.43
A more difficult sort of case will present different aspirational tradi-
tions on each side. In some of these, the text of the Constitution or an
established tradition of interpretation may suggest an appropriate ranking of
these principles. For example, Professor Akhil Amar argues that the Court
in R.A.V. v. St. Paul433 ought to have weighed the value of racial equality
embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment against the free speech imperatives
of the First Amendment.43 4 Amar's critics point out that this choice be-
tween values is one that the Constitution makes for us, because the Thir-
teenth Amendment cannot plausibly be read to trump the First.435 Where a
clear hierarchical ordering is unavailable, courts may nonetheless be able to
reason by analogy to other situations in which courts have resolved similar
conflicts. Such reasoning must also be the mainstay of analysis in the more
general case in which a general tradition in favor of liberty is modified by a
more specific limitation.436 While it is impossible here to trace precisely
the manner in which such an enterprise would proceed, the important thing
is that rational argument is possible in such cases without sacrificing the
attachment to tradition.
430. Professor Kronman suggests that the charge that traditionalism locks us into abhorrent
practices is really based on opposition to the pace of change required by respect for the past. See
Kronman, supra note 132, at 1609.
431. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) ("Here, to provide protection to an
adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa.').
432. I am inclined to think that Michael H. was rightly decided for this reason.
433. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
434. See Amar, supra note 366, at 155-61.
435. See Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 1639,
1649-51 (1993).
436. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-82 (1990)
(approving a clear and convincing evidence requirement used to limit the traditional right to refuse
medical treatment in right-to-die cases, based on analogy to similar requirements in cases-such
as civil commitment, termination of parental rights, and the parol evidence rule--involving less
substantial interests).
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It will be difficult, however, to investigate seriously the potential of
traditionalism as an aid to constitutional adjudication until the critics put
away their stock references to slavery, segregation, and similar horribles.
After all, defenders of traditionalism are equally entitled to cite the French
and Russian Revolutions as examples of what happens when a society turns
its back on its traditional heritage in favor some abstract ideal of social
justice. Neither position is likely to get us very far, however; it seems pref-
erable to accept the fact that we live in a society in which both the lessons
of history and some minimal level of shared moral intuitions place both a
return to segregation and a new Reign of Terror off the list of acceptable or
likely alternatives.437 And if we insist on considering such possibilities, we
ought at least to be able to agree on the truth of Judge Hand's observation
that "a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can
save."438 Perhaps then we can concentrate on the real-and vastly more
difficult-problem of sifting out those traditions that are unworthy of con-
tinued adherence and yet not so obviously evil as to pose little problem of
identification.
3. Is Tradition Undemocratic? Or Is It Too Democratic?
"Reliance on tradition," according to Professor Ely, "seems consistent
with neither the basic theory of popular control nor the spirit of the major-
ity-checking provisions to which we are seeking to give content. '4 39 Ely
explains the first prong of this critique by observing that tradition's "overtly
backward-looking character highlights its undemocratic nature: it is hard to
square with the theory of our government the proposition that yesterday's
majority, assuming it was a majority, should control today's." 440 This argu-
ment, in addition to sharing Professor Bickel's flawed assumption that judi-
cial review is a "deviant institution," assumes a notion of the social contract
which, unlike Burke's formulation, rejects the idea that the present genera-
tion may be bound to respect choices made by those who have gone
before.441 More importantly, Ely fails to assess the democratic acceptabil-
ity of tradition as compared to other ways of deciding cases. If the
open-ended clauses of the Constitution cannot be given content without ref-
erence to some sort of moral principles, then it seems more democratic to
refer to the morality embodied in societal traditions than to the judge's own
437. See Scalia, supra note 40, at 864 (admitting that the example of flogging poses a problem
for originalists, but asserting that he cannot imagine such a case ever arising).
438. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THn
SPInrr OF LmiBERT 155-65 (I. Dilliard ed., 1953), quoted in BicrEL, supra note 46, at 23.
439. ELY, supra note 32, at 62.
440. Id.
441. See supra notes 46-47, 159-72 and accompanying text.
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beliefs.' 2 Ely would probably reply that judges should not undertake to
apply any substantive moral guidelines; rather, they should defer to the
political process so long as there is no evidence that that process is not
functioning properly." 3 This process-based approach, however, is prob-
lematic for a number of reasons, 4 " not the least of which is its ultimate
failure to eliminate the need for a substantive theory of moral and political
values." 5 Absent that option, reference to the traditional values of society
will always be more democratic than applying some alternate set of values
that do not originate with the people.
The more serious objection is that tradition is too majoritarian: "'If
the Constitution protects only interests which comport with traditional val-
ues, the persons most likely to be penalized for their way of life will be
those least likely to receive judicial protection,' and that flips the point of
the [counter-majoritarian] provisions exactly upside down.""16 In replying
to this objection, it will help to be a bit more specific about which provi-
sions of the Constitution are at issue. As noted above, the Equal Protection
Clause has a distinctly counter-historical bent, in that it was enacted, and
has since been understood, to eradicate established patterns of discrimina-
tion against disadvantaged groups." 7 History is still relevant to determine
whether the discrimination at issue in a modem case is analogous to the
442. See Cook, supra note 296, at 870.
443. See ELY, supra note 32, at 101-04.
444. Although an adequate analysis of Professor Ely's theory is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, a Burkean critique of representation-reinforcing would emphasize the propensity of that the-
ory to require abstract theorizing, see WELLiNGTON, supra note 242, at 70 ('To police
participation in what Ely calls 'the American System of representative democracy,' each justice
has to understand, develop, invent... that system and then be prepared to impose it.'), its ten-
dency to downplay the importance of precedent, see Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitu-
tional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445, 454 n.26 (1984) (noting that Democracy and Distrust does
not discuss the role of precedent, and that "[i]t is its absence, rather than anything Ely explicitly
says about precedent, that is so striking"), and most important, Ely's acceptance of Alexander
Bickel's view that judicial review is a deviant institution in an otherwise majoritarian arrange-
ment. See WELL NarON, supra note 242, at 71. For the Burkean, the judiciary has an important
substantive contribution to make to American government; ensuring the proper functioning of the
other branches, then, cannot be the sole role of the courts.
445. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1045 ("The fundamental difficulty with Ely's theory is
that its basic premise, that obstacles to political participation should be removed, is hardly
value-free."); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) ("The process theme by itself determines almost nothing
unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substan-
tive rights and values-the very sort of theory that process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid.').
446. ELY, supra note 32, at 62 (quoting The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Leading Cases, 91
I-LHAv. L. REv. 70, 136 (1977)). This objection is actually consistent with the first: Ely is arguing
that current majorities are disempowered by having to defer to past majorities, while both past and
current minorities are likely to be discriminated against by the initial majority's ability to frame
traditional rules in terms of its own values.
447. See supra note 354.
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forms of discrimination the clause has generally been interpreted as barring,
but that is a different analysis from substantive due process. The latter doc-
trine has been interpreted as protecting only liberties that are "so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental.""'
This doctrine, like equal protection, is counter-majoritarian, but in a subtly
different way. Substantive due process protects individuals against present
legislative majorities that would make a sharp break with history by deny-
ing rights which previous majorities for a substantial period of history have
regarded as fundamental, and against local legislative majorities that would
deny rights generally regarded as fundamental throughout the larger com-
munity." 9 Substantive due process also prevents majorities from prohibit-
ing specific forms of a generally protected liberty, when those forms are not
materially distinguishable from the protected liberty enjoyed by the major-
ity.450 As described above,4 51 this last form of protection can be a powerful
counter-majoritarian force in that it allows minorities to challenge specific
practices by referring to the more general, aspirational aspects of our tradi-
tions. It is difficult to see, however, what substantive due process could
mean without ultimately looking to traditions that are established by majori-
ties; any alternative would necessarily invoke either some form of abstract
theory or simply the subjective preferences of the judge. Given these alter-
natives, one can sensibly conclude that the account of tradition I have de-
veloped provides as much counter-majoritarian potential as we can
realistically hope for out of this particular doctrine.
4. The Need for Innovation
A final set of arguments centers around Justice Frankfurter's observa-
tion that "only a stagnant society remains unchanged."452 Taking up
Burke's metaphor of the intergenerational social contract, Professor David
Luban argues that this contract should actually be understood as containing
two distinct clauses: "a 'preservation' clause, in which we pledge to con-
serve our ancestral heritage and trust that our descendants will likewise pre-
serve theirs," and "an 'innovation' clause, in which we offer our
descendants the same freedom to break with the past that we ourselves en-
448. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
449. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
novelty of the Connecticut statute barring use of contraceptives as a reason for invalidating it).
450. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (citing the general
protection of "the family" in invalidating a city ordinance allowing nuclear families to live to-
gether, but not extended families).
451. See supra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
452. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter,
., dissenting).
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joy."4"3 The latter clause, according to Luban, is essential for two reasons.
First, because "[o]ur forebearers were not prophets," the present generation
must have the freedom to abandon tradition in order to meet unforeseen
problems.414 The "innovation clause" is also necessary for a more funda-
mental reason, that is, to accommodate "the central role the possibility of
new beginnings plays in maintaining our sense that life has meaning."455
The intergenerational contract must thus be read as "not just an agreement
to accept constraints imposed by the past, but also one which grants the
freedom to adapt the past flexibly to meet the needs of the present."456
Burke, of course, would be surprised by Professor Luban's suggestion
that he had "neglect[ed] altogether" the reformist aspect of the intergenera-
tional contract,45 7 as would the American colonists, the Irish Catholics, and
the oppressed masses of India, all of whose causes Burke championed in the
name of reform. 45 8 Luban's argument is developed as a critique of original-
ism, which he associates with the traditionalism of Burke and Professor
Kronman.4 59 I have argued above, however, that this association will not
bear close examination.46 Burke clearly accepts Professor Luban's prem-
ise that institutions must adapt in response to problems unforeseen by previ-
ous generations; Burke acknowledges,' for example, that "[elvery age has
its own manners, and its politicks dependent upon them; and the same at-
tempts will not be made against a constitution fully formed and matured,
that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or to resist its growth during its
infancy." 461 Burke's thought thus permits the sort of common-law adapta-
tion that Luban describes. Luban argues, for instance, that the tension be-
tween preservation and innovation must be resolved in terms of the
specifics of each case, through legal reasoning based on analogy and meta-
453. Luban, supra note 15, at 1055.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 1054.
456. Id. at 1056.
457. Id. at 1055.
458. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
459. See Luban, supra note 15, at 1055 ("One of the attractions of interpreting law by appeal-
ing to the intentions of its makers has always been its claim to keep faith with our ancestors;
clearly, the Burkean contract argument, focusing exclusively on the preservation clause, may be
invoked on behalf of originalism."). For a summary of Professor Kronman's argument for tradi-
tionalism, see supra note 158.
460. See supra notes 231-75 and accompanying text. It is similarly inappropriate to describe
Professor Kronman as an originalist. Kronman's argument for tradition occurs in the course of a
defense of following judicial precedent, not original intentions. See Kronman, supra note 148, at
1031-33 (describing stare decisis as based on a belief that the past has "the power to confer
legitimacy on actions in the present"). Indeed, Kronman's article on Alexander Bickel's pruden-
tialism indicates an affinity for evolutionary development in the law. See Kronman, supra note
132, at 1608-09.
461. BuinK, Present Discontents, supra note 144, at 258.
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phor, and without appealing to tradition or innovation as abstract con-
cepts.4"2 All of these suggestions are consistent with Burkean
constitutionalism. 46
3
Other language used by Professor Luban, however, suggests that he
and Burke may have a genuine disagreement after all. For Burke, reform is
something internal to a tradition; the reformer seeks the "latent wisdom"
within the tradition in order to perfect it.4 4 As Professor Kronman
explains,
Those who ... belong to... a tradition, are... always involved
in a controversy about the meaning of its ideals; indeed, in its
aspirational dimension, the.., tradition is just this controversy
itself-a kind of endless debate about the proper construction to
place on the partially inchoate commitments that the participants
share in common.465
Some of Luban's phrasing-for example, his description of "the freedom to
adapt the past flexibly"--is consistent with this view. In other places, how-
ever, Luban speaks of the need "to shake ourselves free of our heritage as
the need arises," or the "exten[sion] to our own children [of] the permis-
sion to unmake what we have made." 46 For Burke, "shaking ourselves free
of our heritage" is anathema; instead, "a good patriot and a true politician
always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of
his country. '4 67 One may legitimately ask, moreover, whether such renun-
ciation of the past is necessary to secure the advantages of innovation and
reform emphasized by Professor Luban. Once we agree that we can use the
aspirational, highly general elements of our tradition-such as "individual
liberty" or "equality"-to criticize existing social arrangements, it becomes
hard to see why we would need to step outside those traditions in order to
find tools for reform. Even when moral and political philosophers debate
the principles of liberty or equality at a very high level of generality, those
debates take place within a tradition of commonly understood meanings
attached to those terms; few participants in the mainstream of our political
or philosophical discourse have felt the need (or displayed the ability) to
come up with wholly "new" principles of justice.46 This, for Burke, is as it
462. See Luban, supra note 15, at 1056.
463. See supra notes 346-92 and accompanying text.
464. BuRKE, Reflections, supra note 12, at 138.
465. Kronman, supra note 132, at 1608-09.
466. Luban, supra note 15, at 1055.
467. BuRKF, Reflections, supra note 12, at 206.
468. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 97, at 3 (acknowledging that "justice as fairness... general-
izes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of the social contract");
id. at 20 (describing the process of "reflective equilibrium," whereby the philosopher perfects his
theory by repeatedly comparing it to his preexisting considered judgments about what justice
requires). Even if examples of wholly new theories can be discovered, the recognition that al-
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should be. "We know that we have made no discoveries," he writes, "and
we think that no discoveries are to be made, in morality, nor many in the
great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which were un-
derstood long before we were born ... ."469
Professor Luban also makes a second argument for innovation,
grounded not in Burke's intergenerational contract but rather in the circum-
stances of modem American culture. "Ironically," Luban argues, "to be
truly a traditionalist in America, one must give the rationalism that infuses
our political culture its due."470 Accordingly, he argues that "the highly
rationalized character of our contemporary economy, the power of modem
technology, and the rapidity of social change .... [all] call for legislative
and administrative regulation that is actively intrusive, firmly consequen-
tialist, and forward-looking in character."471 Several responses, however,
are available to this position. First, Luban seems to answer it himself when
he notes that "the realm of statute" is "properly forward-looking and conse-
quentialist, not traditionalist.""47 If this is true, and if, as seems likely, the
areas of society that call for such legislative and administrative regulation
are primarily governed by statutes, then it is unclear why courts need to
adopt a similarly rationalist posture in non-statutory contexts.473 Indeed,
we may well see courts-especially when exercising the power of judicial
review-as locking in certain values that we do not want to alter in the face
of changing social conditions.474 After all, it is one thing to say that values
such as "due process" should evolve over time, and quite another to assert
that government should be free to abandon the concept altogether because
of some "forward-looking and consequentialist" justification.475
More fundamentally, reasoning from the premise of increasing social
complexity to the conclusion that more rationalism is needed seems pre-
cisely backwards. Professor Luban's preference for "actively intrusive,
most all arguments for reform can be articulated within our traditions robs Luban's objection of
much of its normative force.
469. BuRs, Reflections, supra note 12, at 137.
470. Luban, supra note 15, at 1050.
471. Id. To the extent that this argument is based on a tradition of rationalism, rather than on
the need for rationalism in our present circumstances, it is vulnerable to Luban's earlier argument
that we must adapt our traditions to present needs. If we accept Burke's prudential critique of
rationalism, then we would want to emphasize the aspects of our tradition that are cautious about
human reason.
472. Id. at 1047-48.
473. Robert Bennett argues further that the nature of the adjudicatory process makes it diffi-
cult for courts to effect a dramatic break with the past. "The courts only decide cases that litigants
bring to them," he observes, "and litigants take clues about available claims from the justificatory
sources judges employ." Bennett, supra note 444, at 488.
474. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
475. See Luban, supra note 15, at 1048.
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firmly consequentialist '47 6 regulation would seem to reach its highest ex-
pression in the intricate web of statutes and regulations that make up the
modem administrative state; it is far from clear, however, that this set of
institutional arrangements has done a satisfactory job of coping with "the
highly rationalized character of our contemporary economy, the power of
modem technology, and the rapidity of social change."47 7 At the very least,
it is unclear that this form of regulation has been more effective than the
less overtly rationalist approach of enacting general statutes that are devel-
oped by courts over time in the manner of the common law. 478 Moreover,
courts have shown a capacity to adapt old concepts to even the most "cut-
ting-edge" aspects of modem technology.479 The important point is the
simple .Burkean insight that increasing social complexity makes it more dif-
ficult, not less, to order the world around us in a rationalistic way. The
harder it is to comprehend the intricate social, political, and economic inter-
relationships of modem society, the less confident we should be of our abil-
ity to predict the consequences of government action. In such
circumstances, the imperative of slow, cautious, incremental change should
assume a greater, not a lesser, importance. We should thus be hesitant to
abandon traditionalism in favor of Professor Luban's activist rationalism.
C. The Owl of Minerva
Explaining his conclusion that conservative constitutional theory is not
interesting, Professor Mark Tushnet asserts that "[c]onservatism has no
need for constitutional theory."480 One reason for this, he argues, is that
476. Id. at 1050.
477. Id.; see, e.g., STEPnEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEwART, ADMimSTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 141-42 (1992) ("Federal administrative agencies have been subjected to an
increasing barrage of criticism emanating from a variety of philosophical and political posi-
tions .... All this criticism centers around the charge that the agencies have failed effectively to
discharge their mission of regulating given sectors of the economy to promote the public
interest.").
478. The antitrust laws are the best example of this process. See PHULLIP AREEDA & Louis
KAPLOw, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 51 (4th ed. 1988) ("The Sherman Act may be seen not as a
prohibition of specific classes of conduct but as a general authority to do what common-law courts
usually do: to use certain customary techniques of judicial reasoning, consider the reasoning and
results of other common-law courts, and develop, refine, and innovate in the dynamic com-
mon-law tradition.").
479. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases,
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU? 106 HARV. L. Rav. 977, 980
(1993) (arguing that courts have been able to successfully apply to computer software general
copyright principles developed in the context of literary works, despite "astonishing technological
and social developments"). But see Irwin R. Gross, Software Protection: Distinguishing Between
Interactive and Non-Interactive Aspects of Computer Programs, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TPCH.
LJ. (forthcoming 1994) (arguing that general copyright principles are not appropriate in the area
of computer software).
480. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 925.
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conservative justices are already in power and thus need not convince
others by deploying a general theory of interpretation. "Perhaps," Tushnet
suggests, "constitutional theory develops only under the pressure imposed
by the need to defend results in a hostile environment." 481 This comment is
reminiscent of Hegel's observation that "[t]he Owl of Minerva takes its
flight only when the shades of night are gathering." 482 Hegel's phrase cap-
tures the consequences of the conservative's distrust of abstract theory: the
conservative would prefer to discuss the practical issues of day-to-day gov-
ernment and is drawn into theorizing only when confronted with a funda-
mental challenge that can be met only in more abstract terms. So it is with
conservative judges as well, who would prefer to decide cases in terms of
doctrine and circumstances rather than developing overarching theories of
constitutional interpretation.
In recent years, there has indeed been a twofold challenge to traditional
modes of constitutional interpretation, a challenge that has been articulated
in abstract theoretical terms. Judge Bork may, ironically, be regarded as
having launched the era of critical theory when he assailed the Warren
Court for departing from the original understanding of the Constitution.
Judge Bork's seminal article on this issue begins with the statement that
"[a] persistently disturbing aspect of constitutional law is its lack of the-
ory." '483 Bork's article helped to precipitate a theoretical firestorm that
rages unabated to the present day. Rather than defend traditional methods
of interpretation, however, Bork's critics have tended to devise highly origi-
nal, intricate, and abstract theories to justify the results of the Warren Court,
as well as the general proposition that the courts may undertake an activist
role in promoting individual rights against the state.48 4 Other critics have
gone further and rejected all attempts to formulate a coherent theory, con-
cluding instead that constitutional adjudication is simply politics by another
name.485 The insidious thing about the modem debate, however, is that it
has been carried out almost exclusively between factions that universally
reject the traditional method of adjudication. There has been very little sys-
tematic defense of interpreting the Constitution through evolutionary doc-
481. Id. at 927.
482. MANNHaIm, supra note 225, at 231 (quoting GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
(J.W. Dryde trans., 1896)).
483. Bork, supra note 45, at 1. Although earlier prominent exercises in constitutional theory
had been critical of the Court, I suggest that none of them would have entailed such a drastic
revision of existing doctrine as Bork's originalism. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying
text.
484. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 32, passim; Dworkin, supra note 356, passim; Thomas Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 passim (1975); Perry, supra note
65, passim.
485. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Omo ST. L. J.
411, 425-26 (1981).
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trinal development, supplemented by reference to tradition and constrained
by conventions of legal reasoning and adjudicatory process.486
It is not the case, then, that conservatism has no need for constitutional
theory. A theory is needed, first of all, to reclaim the mantle of conserva-
tism from the adherents of originalism, judicial restraint, and bright-line
rules. More importantly, theory is essential to protect existing interpretive
practices from continued erosion in the face of theoretical assault. Accord-
ing to Professor Ackerman, Burkean commitment to traditional modes of
interpretation continues to be prevalent among practicing lawyers and
judges despite its absence from the law journals.4 87 Nonetheless, we cannot
expect that situation to endure while the old methods become less and less
intellectually respectable. As Judge Bork observes, many students pres-
ently in law school are learning "that legal reasoning of the sort that served
us for centuries is now utterly outmoded, and a verbal formulation can al-
ways be devised to reach the correct political result."4 8 Students are also
led to believe that the only systematic alternative to abstract nonoriginalist
theories is Bork's own originalism. Both these beliefs, as Bork is well
aware, will be carried with students as they serve as judicial clerks, lawyers,
and eventually judges.4 8 9 There is, of course, an element of hysteria in
Bork's depiction of legal academia. In reality, students are heavily indoctri-
nated in the traditional modes of evolutionary development simply by the
necessities of reading and organizing decided cases. The danger, however,
is that this process is distinct in their minds from the realm of interpretive
theory; the practical aspects of argument in actual cases thus exist in an
uneasy tension with the "pure" imperatives of interpretive systems. In such
a situation, an individual's theoretical commitments may not often be deci-
sive, but will inevitably exert some pull away from established methods of
interpretation. This problem can only be met by articulation of com-
mon-law doctrinal development as a distinct form of interpretive theory
possessing a claim to intellectual legitimacy that is equivalent (if not supe-
rior) to the theories developed by Borc, Dworkin, Ely, and others.
This Article has attempted to highlight this gap in our thinking about
constitutional interpretation and point toward some potential ways of filling
it. Much work needs to be done, however, in considering the extent to
which the usual constraints on common-law judges can be said to operate in
constitutional adjudication, the extent to which norms of judicial craftsman-
ship actually operate as a self-imposed constraint on judicial decisionmak-
486. But see WEUANGrON, supra note 242, passim (advocating many elements of this ap-
proach); Bennett, supra note 444, passim (same).
487. See AcKERmAN, supra note 13, at 17.
488. Bore, supra note 18, at 135.
489. See id.
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ing, and the extent to which viewing judicial precedents as a primary source
of information about interpretive traditions should cause us to alter existing
attitudes toward constitutional stare decisis. What this Article has at-
tempted, rather, is to highlight the existence of a rich Burkean tradition that
can assist us in answering these and similar questions and to reclaim the
mantle of conservatism from the proponents of a jurisprudence that is radi-
cally inconsistent with Burkean ideals.
V. EPILOGUE: THE UNSURPRISING 'THENOMENON OF
SRuPIIsNG MODERION"
Hegel's observation about the Owl of Minerva suggests that "philoso-
phy ... always comes too late."490 Recent terms, however, have shown
promising indications that common-law traditionalism is making a come-
back on the Supreme Court. At the outset of the Court's 1991 Term, many
observers expected a dramatic rightward tilt in the areas of abortion, estab-
lishment of religion, toleration of speech by marginal groups, federalism,
and property rights.49' The results of the 1991 Term, however, were char-
acterized by "surprising moderation"; in a series of important constitutional
rulings, "political 'liberals' lost less than they feared and political 'conserv-
atives' gained less than they hoped."492 They key to this development was
the apparent emergence of a "moderate" bloc on the Court, composed of
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter.493
490. MA trm, supra note 225, at 231 (quoting GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
(J.W. Dryde trans., 1896)).
491. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 24.
492. Id. at 26; see also Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin: Moderates on Court Defy Predic-
tions, N.Y. TiMEs, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1 ("[The 1991 Term] appeared only months ago to have
all the makings of a conservative counterrevolution but.., in the end produced powerful, if
qualified, reaffirmations of some of the Court's most important modem precedents."). The most
important cases are Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (upholding the
basic principle of Roe v. Wade); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. CL 2649, 2661 (1992) (barring school
prayer at high school graduation ceremonies under the Establishment Clause); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down hate crimes ordinance applied to cross-burning);
Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON I), 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992)
(affirming the right to distribute literature at airports); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522,
1531 (1992) (refusing to invalidate a rent control ordinance as a "permanent physical occupation"
under the Takings Clause); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901
(1992) (requiring compensation for land-use regulations that totally deprive the owner of the eco-
nomic value of his land, but creating an exception based on state common law defining the scope
of property rights); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (holding that the
federal government may not require states to "take title" to radioactive waste, but permitting the
federal government to induce shifts in state waste policy by other means).
493. During the 1991 Term, Justice O'Connor voted with Justice Kennedy 63.2% of the time
and with Justice Souter 67.3% of the time. Justice Kennedy voted with Justice Souter 74.3% of
the time. See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163, 379
(1992). Perhaps more importantly, these three justices joined with Justices Blackmun and Stevens
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According to Professor Paulsen, the emergence of this bloc "may be the
most significant development on the Rehnquist Court... in several years
.... If they continue to link arms in major, fault-line cases... they will
control the course of the decision... and the way in which any 'conserva-
tive' majority opinion is written." '494
It is too early to tell, of course, whether this "moderate bloc" will re-
tain its pivotal role. As Linda Greenhouse has observed, "any Supreme
Court term is just a snapshot in time, of an institution that is neither isolated
nor unchanging."' 5 It is thus not altogether surprising that the Court's
1992 Term largely failed to confirm the patterns of the previous year; in a
term that began with observers focusing on the impact of the new
O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter alliance,496 those Justices found themselves in
disagreement in a number of significant cases.497 Although it is difficult to
draw broad conclusions from the results of a term in which the Court "dealt
with issues of limited interest, in a manner that avoided broad pronounce-
ments,""49 it does seem fair to say that the continued existence of a "moder-
ate bloc" on the Rehnquist Court has yet to be proven.
to form a majority in five out of fourteen five-four decisions over the course of the term, including
Casey, Lee, and parts of ISKCON II. See id. at 381.
494. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 20-21; see also Greenhouse, supra note 492, § 4, at 1 (noting
that "[w]hen [Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter] voted together, they were not on the
losing side in any case this term"). The importance of this grouping can only increase with the
replacement of Justice Byron White with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, after which Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter presumably will occupy a position between evenly matched
"conservative" and "liberal" wings.
495. Greenhouse, supra note 492, at 12.
496. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Begins Today with Focus on New Coalition,
N.Y. Tnsas, Oct. 5, 1992, at Al.
497. See Constitutional Law Conference, 62 U.S.L.W. 2263, 2265 (Nov. 2, 1993) (reporting
the conclusion of Professor Jesse Choper that the 1992 Term "dispel[led] the media 'myth' of a
year ago that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter constitute a 'new centrist core' who would
join with Justices Blackmun and Stevens to form a moderate or liberal majority in a number of
cases"). Althoug the statistical rate of agreement between Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter in the 1992 Term was comparable to that in the 1991 Term, compare The Supreme Court, 1992
Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. R-v. 144, 373 (1993) (showing agreement rates ranging
from 70.2% to 74.6%) with The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 493, at
379 (showing agreement rates from 63.2% to 74.3%), this trio failed to vote together in the major-
ity of a single five-four decision in 1992, see The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases,
supra, at 375, as opposed to five such decisions in 1991, see The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-
Leading Cases, supra note 493, at 381. Moreover, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter dis-
agreed in a number of prominent cases. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993)
(O'Connor and Kennedy voting with majority to hold that obviously race-based redistricting is
subject to strict equal protection scrutiny, with Souter dissenting); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (Kennedy voting with majority to hold that use of public
funds to provide sign-language interpreter for deaf child attending parochial school did not violate
the Establishment Clause, with O'Connor and Souter dissenting).
498. Janice Cooper ed., Supreme Decisions: The 1992-1993 Term in Review, LEGAL TiMS,
July 26, 1993, at S21.
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Nonetheless, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter are important
not only for their potentially pivotal role in future voting, but also for the
sort of judicial conservatism that each may be seeking to articulate, whether
individually or in concert with the other moderates. Although none of these
Justices have yet produced a fully-developed judicial philosophy, each has
displayed indications of kinship with the interpretive position that I have
sought to develop in this Article. The hallmarks of moderate jurisprudence
on the Rehnquist Court are avoidance of abstract reasoning and broad pro-
nouncements, respect for precedent, and allowance for evolutionary growth
in constitutional doctrine.499
This approach is nowhere more evident than in the joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"° in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter joined Justices Blackmun and Stevens in declining an invitation
squarely to overrule Roe v. Wade.5 0 The Casey opinion begins with an
exploration of the abortion right's roots in the doctrine of substantive due
process. Quoting extensively from Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v. Ull-
man,5" 2 the plurality recognized that "[i]t is settled now.., that the Consti-
tution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood.., as well as bodily integrity. '503
Acknowledging that the question of whether those limits extend to protect
the right to an abortion involves a difficult exercise of "reasoned judg-
ment," the plurality was unwilling to say that its analysis of tradition, social
mores, and precedent was so conclusive that the Justices would have ar-
rived at the result in Roe as an original matter;5" instead, the plurality
chose to rely on a lengthy discussion of stare decisis in concluding that Roe
should be upheld. 5 Finally, the plurality went on to uphold most provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania statute as not imposing an "undue burden" on the
basic abortion right.5 06 The Casey joint opinion thus displays all the key
aspects of common-law constitutionalism: attention to doctrinal develop-
ment, as informed by societal traditions rather than originalist sources; con-
cern for doctrinal continuity and an aversion to sharp breaks with existing
499. See Greenhouse, supra note 496, at A19 ("[The moderates' approach] was marked by
concern for precedent, a taste for incremental rather than quantum shifts in legal doctrine, and by a
seeming aversion to the aggressive arguments for change that the Bush Administration put for-
ward in several high-profile cases."); Schroeder, supra note 8, at 143 (referring to this approach as
"dispositional conservatism," as contrasted with "judicial role conservatism" and "ideological
conservatism").
500. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
501. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
502. 367 U.S. 497 (1961); see discussion supra notes 373-82 and accompanying text.
503. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
504. See id. at 2806-08 (plurality opinion).
505. See i. at 2808-16 (plurality opinion).
506. See id. at 2816-33 (plurality opinion).
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case law; and willingness to undertake incremental reform of current doc-
trine. The opinion ends, moreover, with a nice Burkean touch: "Our Con-
stitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us
and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and
aspirations that must survive more ages than one.""5 7
Of the three members of the Casey plurality, Justice Souter seems the
most clearly Burkean in terms of jurisprudential principles. According to
Jeffrey Rosen, "[Justice] Souter ... has taken up the mantle of [Justice
Felix] Frankfurter and his disciple, [Justice John Marshall] Harlan: respect
for precedent; case by case balancing; Burkean continuity with the
past. '5 °8  Similarly, Professor Paulsen describes Souter as "a classic,
conservative, common-law jurist: Doubtless influenced by his years as
a state court judge, he appears to view all law, including constitutional law,
as 'evolving."' 50 9  This commitment to evolutionary development
of constitutional doctrine was evident at Justice Souter's confirmation
hearings, where he repeatedly identified himself with Justice John Marshall
Harlan and expressed agreement with Harlan's approach in deriving
"an unenumerated right of privacy" from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 10 Although defining himself as an
507. Id. at 2833 (plurality opinion).
508. Rosen, supra note 25, at 27. Justice Souter's pivotal role in the surprising outcomes of
the 1991 Term led Mr. Rosen to write of "Souter's displacement of Scalia as the intellectual leader
of the new majority." Id. This assessment, however, may have been somewhat premature.
Rather than leading a "new majority," Justice Souter found himself in the 1992 Term often joining
Justices Blackmun and Stevens in dissent. See Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term: The
Court's Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and Starts, N.Y. TvMiS, July 4, 1993, § 4, at 1, 5; see,
e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2845-49 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority's holding that obviously race-based redistricting is subject to strict equal protection scru-
tiny); 2obrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469-74 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (Souter joining dissent dissenting from holding that use of public funds to provide
sign-language interpreter for deaf child attending parochial school did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause); Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 876-84 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Souter
joining dissent from Court's refusal to grant federal habeas corpus relief based on belated claim of
actual innocence in light of newly discovered evidence). As Greenhouse points out, however,
"[t]hese developments do not necessarily mean that the conservative New Hampshire judge sud-
denly emerged this year as a liberal." Greenhouse, supra, at 5. Rather, it is simply too early to
assess the influence that Justice Souter's judicial philosophy will have over his fellow justices.
509. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 13-14; see also id. at 15 (describing "Souter's moderate tradi-
tionalism, attachment to precedent, and fondness for balancing and incrementalism").
510. See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1990) (statement of Judge David Souter) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings]; see also id. at 140
(agreeing with Justice Harlan that courts should search "the history and traditions of the American
people" in defining unenumerated rights). Despite these indications of Justice Souter's current
independence at his confirmation hearings, commentators have noted that during his initial term
on the Court he "provided a quiet, dependable vote for the Court's increasingly strong conserva-
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"interpretivist,"51' Souter explicitly rejected the intentionalist version of
originalism 12 and made it clear that the application of constitutional princi-
ples is "enlightened by changing facts and circumstances in society."513
Such evolution, however, is ultimately rooted in continuing study and appli-
cation of precedent; as Linda Greenhouse has observed, "Justice Souter's
hallmark is a willingness to confront some of the Court's murkiest doctrinal
areas, working his way through the contradictions to try at the same time
both to make sense of the precedents that apply and to steer clear of those
that do not."514
Justice Souter's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee also
indicated an ambivalence toward modem notions of judicial restraint.
Although acknowledging that judges are constrained in interpreting the
Constitution by the nature of the judicial role, 1 5 Souter insisted that the
courts have an important part to play in "making a just society."5 6 Rather
than emphasizing the aberrant nature of judicial review in a majoritarian
system, Justice Souter appears to find the sources of judicial restraint "in
precedent, tradition, and a naturally conservative personal disposition."51 7
Finally, Justice Souter has indicated a Burkean distrust of bright-line
rules.- 8 For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,5" 9 Justice Souter wrote a separate concurrence calling for a rejec-
tion of the bright-line test for Free Exercise claims articulated by Justice
Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith; 20 in so doing, Souter called for a
Free Exercise jurisprudence based on "substantive neutrality," which would
require the Court to engage in a more complex, fact-intensive analysis of
the actual burdens imposed upon religious observance by formally neutral
laws.52' Although Justice Souter has hardly been on the Court long enough
tive majority." Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the
Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JuDicATURE 238, 243 (1992).
511. See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 510, at 59.
512. See id. at 161.
513. Id. at 307; see also id. at 161 (stating that principles such as the privacy right, for exam-
ple, "have to be developed by the courts over the course of probably a great many years").
514. Greenhouse, supra note 508, at 5. Greenhouse goes on to note that "[t]hrough this pro-
cess, [Justice Souter] appears this term to have found a personal voice almost completely free of
ideological identity." Id.
515. See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 510, at 139.
516. IL at 142; see also Linda Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Justices,
N.Y. Timas, Oct. 25, 1992, § 1, at 1 (reporting public comments by Justice Souter expressing
respect and admiration for the constitutional legacy of Justice William Brennan).
517. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 13-14.
518. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that Justice Souter "eschews bright-line rules" in
favor of "multifactor balancing tests derived from patterns of precedents").
519. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
520. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
521. See City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2241. Justice Souter's discussion of precedent in the
same opinion also illustrates his commitment to standard-based decisionmaking. See id. at 2248
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to permit confident generalizations about his judicial philosophy, there is
reason to hope that his evolving jurisprudence will blossom into a viable
Burkean alternative to Justice Scalia's brand of judicial "conservatism."
Justice Anthony Kennedy has shown similar Burkean propensities,
although his fundamental jurisprudential commitments remain somewhat
mysterious. 22 At the time of his appointment to the Court, many observers
characterized Kennedy as Bork without a paper trail, arguing that the real
differences between the two judges were insignificant.523 Political conserv-
atives have since become disillusioned, however, by Justice Kennedy's po-
sitions in key cases on abortion, the Establishment Clause, and other
high-profile social issues. 524 Kennedy's recent opinions indicate a move-
ment away from originalism in favor of evolutionary development of con-
stitutional principles,5 5 as well as a preference for incremental change over
("Mhe decision whether to adhere to a prior decision, particularly a constitutional decision, is a
complex and difficult one that does not lend itself to resolution by application of simple, categori-
cal rules, but that must account for a variety of often competing considerations."). And while
Souter's opinion places substantial emphasis on originalist history, it also acknowledges that
"there are differences of opinion as to the weight appropriately accorded original meaning," so
that original intent simply "ranks in the hierarchy of issues to be explored." Id. at 2250.
522. To some extent, this continued uncertainty is a function of the fact that Justice Ken-
nedy-like Justices Souter and O'Connor-has been less interested in articulating an abstract
jurisprudential theory than his colleague, Justice Scalia. In Justice Kennedy's case, however, it
also seems fair to say that there has been substantial evolution in his views. Compare, e.g., Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's plural-
ity opinion questioning the validity of Roe v. Wade), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2816 (1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (reaffirming the
"essential holding" of Roe). See generally Richard C. Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW.,
Oct. 1992, at 35, 35 (observing that, after announcing the decision in Casey, the Justice "seemed a
different Anthony Kennedy, no longer the formalistic conservative of his first five years on the
court!'); Paulsen, supra note 7, at 16 (describing contrast of recent opinions with earlier positions
but also noting that "there were hints all along that Kennedy's idea of judicial restraint was very
different from Scalia's").
523. See Christopher Schroeder, Kennedy and Bork: Different Courses, Same End, MANHAT.
TAN LAW., Aug. 8-14, 1989, at 13. But see Reuben, supra note 522, at 36-37 (noting that, from
the beginning, "Kennedy's conservatism was far different from the ideologically driven Bork's.
Born into Sacramento's upper class, Kennedy offered a pragmatic realism reflecting traditional
small-town values, his general practice law office and state capital politics").
524. See Terence Moran, Profiles in Caprice: Justice Anthony Kennedy, N.J. L.J., July 13,
1992, at 4; Reuben, supra note 522, at 35 ("Kennedy's significant departures from right-wing
orthodoxy have earned him a severe public beating from conservatives.").
525. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2717
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the definition of a public forum in
First Amendment doctrine must evolve in response to "times of fast-changing technology and
increasing insularity" rather than remain limited to the restricted class of public spaces that were
recognized as public fora at a particular time in history). See generally Moran, supra note 524, at
4 ("In big cases, [Justice Kennedy's] mode of analysis has changed; he frequently takes into
account social forces and psychological factors far afield from the historiographic confines of
original-intent jurisprudence.").
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far-reaching rejection of past precedents. 26 And although Justice Kennedy
has at times evinced a preference for bright-line rules,52 7 his more recent
opinions have shown a tendency toward more standard-based, fact-intensive
inquiries.528 The result has been, according to Professor Paulsen, "a judi-
cious mind-set of moderation, caution, incrementalism, and 'reasoned
judgement."' 52 9 Criticism of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence in recent
years by some on the Right as "rudderless and unpredictable 530 thus may
be inaccurate as well as unfair. Rather, Justice Kennedy increasingly may
be seeking both direction and discipline in the more complex-but ulti-
mately more satisfying-pursuit of common-law constitutionalism.
The third member of the Court's new center-Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor-has been the subject of intensive scrutiny ever since joining the
Court in 1981.531 As with Justices Souter and Kennedy, a comprehensive
survey of her work on the Court is beyond the scope of this Article; it is
possible to discern, however, a number of tendencies consistent with the
interpretive perspective I have advocated here. For example, Justice
O'Connor's William Howard Taft Lecture on the bicentennial of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 sets out a fundamentally Burkean view of the American
revolutionary tradition and the role of human reason in politics:
A comparison of the legal revolution engendered by the Judiciary
Act and the course of the French Revolution illustrates this Na-
tion's distinctive commitment and approach. The French Revolu-
526. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade and instead opting to
modify the approach to abortion restrictions under the "undue burden" test). See generally Paul-
sen, supra note 7, at 17 (arguing that Justice Kennedy "is committed to sticking close to past
precedents and not himself creating 'new law.' He is conservative not in the sense of being
unshakable in first principles of text, structure, and history, but, like Souter, in being incremental-
ist in terms of changes in the law-whether in a substantively liberal or conservative direction").
527. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victim's Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512-15
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a per se rule against content-based
restrictions on speech that would not consider whether the state can show a compelling interest to
justify the restriction).
528. Compare, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-61 (1992) (employing a coercion
test for Establishment Clause violations that requires courts to engage in a fact-intensive evalua-
tion of whether psychological-not merely physical or legal-coercion is at work) with id. at
2683-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating a test limited to coercion "by force of law and threat
of penalty," and describing the majority's psychological coercion test as "infinitely expandable").
529. Paulsen, supra note 7, at 16.
530. Reuben, supra note 524, at 36 (quoting Professor Michael McConnell); see also Paulsen,
supra note 7, at 17 (commenting that "there seems to be truth to the charge that Justice Kennedy
trims his jurisprudential sails to what he perceives to be the prevailing political winds").
531. See, e.g., Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an
Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. Rsv. 119, 122-23 (1989) (portraying Justice O'Connor as the key
to the Supreme Court's future approach to abortion); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Femi-
nine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. Rv. 543,592-613 (1986) (seeking in Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence a uniquely feminine form of contextualized decisionmaking).
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tionaries valued reason, and assumed that pure acts of will,
guided by reason, would allow them to construct the ideal society.
That revolution was transformative, seeking to uproot that which
had gone before. Our Nation's revolution was by contrast essen-
tially a conserving one: conflict and institutional change ap-
peared necessary to protect traditional liberties, community
structures, and personal rights. Change, in this view, must take
place through means in accord with law and must build upon that
which has gone before.532
This sensitivity to the limits of abstract rationalism has led Justice
O'Connor to develop an approach to constitutional interpretation that shares
many of the principles of common-law constitutionalism. Although her
fear that federal judges might "follow the model of the French Revolution-
aries and attempt to replace their inheritance with one particular version of
the ideal society" has prompted O'Connor to be a consistent advocate of
judicial restraint,533 she has also eloquently defended the role of the courts
in exercising the power of judicial review. The joint opinion in Casey, for
example, insists that "[the People's] belief in themselves as [a Nation that
aspires to live according to the rule of law] is not readily separable from
their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their
constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ide-
als."'534 Similarly, Justice O'Connor's substantive due process decisions
have evinced a willingness to look beyond originalist history and nar-
rowly-defined traditions to recognize and uphold "new" rights; those opin-
ions, however, have derived those rights through a painstaking analysis of
the principles inherent in the Court's precedents rather than by turning to
532. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition,
59 U. Cri . L. RBv. 1, 4 (1990); cf., e.g., BuRKE, On Conciliation, supra note 180, at 86 (noting
that the American colonist's view of liberty was based on English traditions, and that "[a]bstract
liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found"); ButxE, Appeal, supra note 20, at 120-21
(describing the American Revolution as aimed at restoring traditional English liberties to the colo-
nies); id at 230, 254-55 (condemning the French revolutionaries for relying on abstract "rights of
man" that presuppose "the absence of a state of civil society," and commending the British Con-
stitution as designed "to prevent any one of its principles from being carried as far, as taken by
itself, and theoretically, it would go").
533. O'Connor, supra note 532, at 10; see, e.g., id. at 8 ("[J]udges cannot, ultimately, pre-
sume to direct the Nation's ongoing process of change accomplished through the legislative pro-
cess .... [J]udges are citizens like others in the republic and not, in Judge Learned Hand's
phrase, Platonic Guardians."); see also Robert J. Glennon, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Demo-
crat with a Small "d", A.B.A. J., June 1986, at 54 (suggesting that Justice O'Connor's commit-
ment to judicial restraint springs from the fact that, as the only member of the Court ever elected
to legislative office, "[o]nly Justice O'Connor has had exposure to democratic accountability").
534. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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abstract theories of justice. 35 Finally, Professor Sullivan has noted that
"[w]here other justices are attracted by bright lines, [Justice O'Connor] is
able to find the finest of distinctions. '536  Although some commentators
have argued that this preference for standards over rules is a product of her
gender,537 it is equally consistent with a Burkean distrust of rationalism and
abstraction.5ra
It may be, then, that despite all this talk of the Owl of Minerva, the
shades of night are not gathering after all. Although the Court will likely
retain pronounced left and right wings for the foreseeable future, neither
group will be able to form a majority without persuading at least two of the
Justices that made up the Casey plurality; the arrival of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, moreover, is likely to strengthen the centrist tendencies of the
current Court.539 There is thus every reason to hope for a robust revival of
535. See id. at 2804-08 (following Justice Harlan's analysis in Poe v. Ullman in deriving a
right to privacy from the Court's earlier precedents); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-89 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (deriving a substantive due pro-
cess "right to die" from earlier precedents involving the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment). See generally David B. Anders, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging
Dispute Between Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights,
61 FoRnDHa L. REv. 895, 915-21 (1993) (arguing that Justice O'Connor "has apparently aban-
doned her originalist approach to Fourteenth Amendment rights and replaced it with a fundamen-
tal rights theory"). Although Mr. Anders seems correct in noting O'Connor's departures from
originalism, he vastly oversimplifies in asserting that she has become a "fundamental rights" theo-
rist. Justice O'Connor's focus in both Casey and Cruzan is firmly on history and precedent-not
on the abstract theory commonly identified with "fundamental rights" theories. Cf. id. at 900-01
(defining "fundamental rights" theory by reference to the interpretive theory of Ronald Dworkin).
536. Howard Kohn, Front and Center: On a Changing Supreme Court, Sandra Day
O'Connor Has Emerged as a New Power, L.A. TnIMs MAG., Apr. 18, 1993, at 14, 14 (quoting
Justice O'Connor); see, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711,
2732 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that, in determining whether a punitive
damages award violates due process, "there is no 'mathematical bright line between the constitu-
tionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable" and proposing a standard-like test
based on "the relationship between the punitive damages award and compensatory damages,
awards of punitive damages upheld against other defendants in the same jurisdiction, awards up-
held for similar torts in other jurisdictions, and legislatively designated penalties for similar mis-
conduct") (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (refusing to join footnote
six of the majority opinion, in which Justice Scalia articulated his rule that traditions should be
defined at the most specific level of generality); see also M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan,
Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currents
from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TtrL. L. REv. 1443, 1451 (1990) (noting O'Connor's
preference for "contextual balancing" in both the federalism and separation of powers areas).
537. See Sherry, supra note 531, at 604-09.
538. See supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text; see also Kohn, supra note 536, at 14
("O'Connor is rooted in the here and now, in details, not abstractions, certainly not in ideology or
a single theory of constitutional interpretation.").
539. See Robert Giuffra, Justices Move to Sidelines, LEGAL Trms, July 26, 1993, at S23
("Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg appears to fit within the mainstream of the present Court."); Marcia
Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Judge Ginsburg Gives Little Away at Hearings, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2,
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Justice Harlan's common-law constitutionalism in future years. Sustaining
this revival, however, will require continued work to explore how tradition
and the conventions of the common law can actually restrain judges; other-
wise, Harlan's modem disciples will continue to be vulnerable to charges
that "reasoned judgment" constitutes nothing more than "rattl[ing] off a
collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a
political choice."540 Moreover, the project of developing a coherent
Burkean approach to interpretation should help to reclaim the good name of
"conservatism" from the misperceptions that presently surround it. After
all, it is not surprising that conservative justices would act with moderation.
What is surprising is that, in an age when "conservative" constitutional ju-
risprudence is dominated by originalism, judicial restraint, and bright-line
rules, there are any real conservative justices left.
1993, at 5 (predicting that Justice Ginsburg "should find [herself] comfortably seated at times
alongside Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David H. Souter, the high court's wavering center").
540. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 72
